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1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces and raises the research questions, and documents the rele-
vant content and context of this study. 
A more businesslike use 
Results are important for Dutch local governmental organizations. Nowadays Dutch 
municipalities often underline the importance of specific, measurable and account-
able organizational results. Examples of the importance of results are easily found. 
For example, many Dutch cities are currently involved in programs to increase the 
focus of the organization on results
2, are increasingly using results in contracts or 
formal agreements with other governments
3, and are referring to results in their 
communication
4 with the press.  
 
Performance measures are at the center of all this. Performance measures are used 
as a tool for various reasons. For example: to set the objectives of governmental or-
ganizations, to make results measurable and specific, as indicators for managing 
processes, and to make results accountable. This use of performance measures by 
Dutch municipalities appears to be widespread and pronounced. Nowadays perform-
ance measures are being used for both external-oriented communication
5, as well as 
for more internal-oriented strategic, political and operational reasons (Ter Bogt, 2004, 
2005). Currently many of the major cities in the Netherlands are formally using finan-
cial and non-financial performances for accounting and control purposes (Van Hel-
den and Ter Bogt, 2001, Van Helden and Johnsen, 2002). 
 
The use of performance measures by Dutch local government is certainly not just of 
recent date. Government has always used performance measures to plan and con-
trol its activities or its intended results. For example, the involvement of Dutch Water 
Boards in performance measures can be traced back to the Middle Ages
6. These 
                                            
2 The city of Amsterdam, for example, has recently started a program with the title “Only results count”. 
The aim of this program is to “work smarter”, to continuously stimulate civil servants to focus on effi-
ciency and effectiveness of their work. 
3 i.e. in covenants between the central and local government, such as the Large Cities Policies or LCP 
(in Dutch “Grote Stedenbeleid” or GSB). 
4 i.e., the mayor of the city of Rotterdam (mr. Ivo Opstelten), one of the more pronounced advocates of 
the use of result based policies in recent time, included the following text in his speech on January 2, 
2006: “We started this term with a clear program, with clear choices for which we wanted to be ac-
countable. We were result oriented: no vague policies, but specific actions. No empty promises, but 
accountable targets” (original spoken in Dutch). 
5 for example, doing an internet search (Google) at the beginning of 2006 on the words “prestaties” 
(performance), “gemeente” (council), and “internet sites from the Netherlands” resulted in circa one 
million hits. The majority of the hits referred to documents from a large group of Dutch municipalities, 
or to sites for comparing the performances of Dutch municipalities (such as 
http://www.watdoetjegemeente.nl). 
6 According to a charter signed by Jan van Nassau on May 12, 1277, a public board of local execu-
tives was made responsible for the maintenance and repair of the dyke of the river Lek, an important 
dyke for the protection of the cities in the provinces of Utrecht and Holland against floods. 
   2 
early governmental organizations, established to ensure some level of collective pro-
tection against human and natural disasters, are not of course comparable with our 
modern municipalities. Governments then were in essence boards of executives, with 
the authority to collect taxes and to temporarily recruit inhabitants for performing spe-
cific tasks. Nowadays municipalities are often large organizations, with a wide variety 
of tasks, providing a large number of products and services both to the general public 
and to specific citizens. However, to a certain degree financial and non-financial per-
formance measures have always been present. 
 
Contemporary interest in performance measurement in Dutch local government is 
often regarded as an example of the changes that many governments in Western 
countries have been going through in the past decades. In this period most Western 
governments have been confronted with tensions between increasing organizational 
size, growing demands for governmental services, the stress of fiscal scrutiny on the 
organization, as well as criticism from citizens. In response governments have 
changed their organizations, in order to improve both their managerial performance 
and their accountability to society (Accoin, 1990; Hood, 1995, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2000).  
“Bashing bureaucracy” has been a popular term for the solution to this challenge; or 
in the words of Osborne and Gaebler (1993, p. xvii): 
“We believe that industrial-era governments, with their large, centralized bureaucracies and 
standardized, “one-size-fits-all” services, are not up to the challenges of a rapidly changing in-
formation society and knowledge-base economy.” 
 
Although oversimplified, this basic view of the preferred direction of change for gov-
ernmental organizations has stimulated a move towards a less centralized, less for-
malized, and more entrepreneurial government in many western countries, with more 
autonomy for managers and other employees (Hood, 1995). Hood (1995) related this 
public management reform to two doctrines: lessening or removing the differences 
between the public and private sector and shifting the emphasis from process ac-
countability to accountability in terms of results. He actually labeled the reform as 
New Public Management (NPM), and added that “the ideas of NPM were couched in 
the language of economic rationalism” (p. 94). Business organizations were seen as 
role models, and their (assumed) economy, efficiency and effectiveness were used 
as goals, and a more businesslike use of planning and control instruments was ad-
dressed as one of the means for achieving it (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).  
 
The introduction of businesslike instruments in governmental organizations has 
stimulated the use of performance measurement and output control. A new genera-
tion of “econocrats” and “accountocrats” (Hood, 1995, p. 94) emerged, and promoted 
the use of more quantitative information and administrative control. “Businesslike 
use” of planning and control instruments became a label for the use of formal sys-
tems (especially accounting information systems) for organizational result control 
purposes. Businesslike use of planning and control documents refers in general to 
the use of businesslike instruments (i.e. decentralized organizational devices, output 
control, and performance measurement systems) and private sector management  
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styles (i.e. the usual employment and pay conditions in the private sector), with ac-
counting and performance measures as key elements (Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2000). 
 
This international trend has had an influence on the majority of Dutch governmental 
organizations in the past decennia. Two major changes are generally attributed to 
this influence: a changed organizational structure (decentralization of autonomy) and 
the introduction of businesslike planning and control instruments (such as medium-
term plans, output budgets, hierarchical planning and control systems, and perform-
ance reports) (Van Helden, 1998; Van Helden and Ter Bogt, 2001; Van Helden and 
Jansen, 2003; Groot and Budding, 2004).  
Businesslike use in practice 
The introduction and adaptation of businesslike planning and control instruments in 
Dutch municipalities has developed gradually over the last 15 years. The initiative to 
change the control systems, in order to facilitate a more businesslike use, was taken 
by some large Dutch municipalities in the 1980s. Around 1990 all Dutch municipali-
ties were stimulated by the Dutch central government to apply a set of specific busi-
nesslike instruments (Van Helden, 1998).Over this period the spread of businesslike 
ideas and instruments has diffused (Van Helden, 1998) and became part of the prac-
tice of local governments. Although the effects of the introduction of these instru-
ments in Dutch municipalities, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, has not been 
studied extensively to date (Van Helden and Jansen, 2003), recent empirical ac-
counting research has given some insights into the use of businesslike instruments. 
Research findings show that according to most municipal managers, one of the main 
objectives of the introduction of businesslike instruments was achieved: this was im-
proving the information provided to the municipal council. Managers also seem to 
value the businesslike planning and control instruments positively, in terms of in-
creased attention given to efficiency and division between political and managerial 
levels of the organization (Van Helden and Ter Bogt, 2001).  
Research findings are, however, less clear on the effects of the businesslike use of 
planning and control instruments. The suggestion here is that the reforms have not 
significantly increased the attention to organizational efficiency or improved the clear 
division of responsibilities between the political and managerial organizational levels 
(Van Helden, 1998; Van Helden and Ter Bogt, 2001). It may have only increased the 
related number of documents and the time spent discussing them (Ter Bogt, 2005). 
 
Accounting research analyzing the use of businesslike instruments in Dutch munici-
palities has concentrated mainly on two inter-related issues: the factors that have 
hindered the introduction and adaptation of businesslike instruments, and the use of 
performance measures.  
Firstly, research has pointed to various factors that have probably hindered the suc-
cessful introduction and adaptation of new accounting techniques in Dutch munici-
palities. Factors that have been recognized are, for example:  
• limitedly  homogeneous  outputs (Bordewijk and Klaassen, 2000),  
•  difficulties in planning the output of non-programmable or ad-hoc tasks (Van 
Helden and Ter Bogt, 2001),    4 
•  ambiguous organizational objectives (Van Helden, 2001),  
•  instrumental approach during the adaptation process (Van Helden, 1998), or  
•  the underdeveloped planning attitude of municipal management (Ter Bogt and 
Van Helden, 2000).  
Secondly, the use of performance information has also been researched. These 
types of studies reported, amongst other things, that performance information rarely 
seems to be used for motivating or evaluating managerial performance (Ter Bogt, 
2001, 2004), is used only to a limited extent for variance analysis (comparing actual 
with planned performance) (Bordewijk and Klaassen 2000; Van Helden and Ter Bogt, 
2001), or is used in a more ritualistic or symbolic way (i.e. Bordewijk and Klaassen, 
2001).  
The use of performance measures in a more ritualistic or symbolic way has also 
been documented in research findings on governmental and non-profit organizations 
outside the Netherlands
7. 
Pollitt (2001), an exponent of this viewpoint, argued that the real convergence of 
many West-European governmental organizations in order to improve outcomes may 
be a useful myth. In his words (p.945): “Thus, ‘real’ convergence may be more story 
than fact, but if so, it is a myth that will support careers, enhance images and boost 
the incomes of those who purvey its sign and symbols” (underlining added).  
 
The above documented findings could give the impression that the introduction and 
the use of businesslike instruments have not contributed much to the improvement of 
financial management in Dutch local government. Businesslike instruments, such as 
the use of output control and performance measurement, may have only a marginal 
effect on the functioning of public sector organizations. To put it in other words, gov-
ernmental organizations may have been changed, but it still remains questionable as 
to what extent they are being managed more businesslike than before the reforms.  
 
But is this impression adequate, does it reveal the actual use of accounting informa-
tion for controlling governmental organizations? Does recent accounting research 
fully explain the use of performance measures in these organizations, or are some 
aspects being overlooked?  
These broadly stated and fairly general questions cannot be answered easily. Public 
accounting research delivers a rich flow of insights into various specific topics, theo-
ries and methods (Van Helden, 2005), and contributes to these questions in several 
ways. Thus, the general critique that accounting research overlooks relevant aspects 
                                            
7 It has been suggested that, for example, these reforms have not only improved the use of accounting 
information, but also invoked more symbolic or ritual processes (Brignal and Modell, 2000). Modell 
(2001) argued that Scandinavian not-for profit organizations often lack a clear linkage between organ-
izational goals and management information (as performance measures) and found evidence for a 
symbolic and ritualistic use of performance measures. Modell (2004) confirmed his earlier made as-
sumption, and interpreted the use of performance measures in terms of emerging and declining organ-
izational myths.   
Lapsley and Pallot (2000), researching local government in Scotland and New Zealand, found in Scot-
tish local government evidence of symbolic use, and argued that “management of these local authori-
ties adopted structures and practices which they can portray themselves as rational, modern organiza-
tions”(p.227).  
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may be hard to support. However, in my opinion there is still an aspect that deserves 
more than passing attention. This aspect was addressed earlier and discussed by 
researchers, but leaves unresolved issues. This aspect is documented below. 
Assuming performance measurement use 
As briefly discussed in the previous section, businesslike use of planning and control 
instruments in Dutch municipalities was associated with the notion of business or-
ganizations as a role model. This role model was perhaps more a label than a com-
plete blueprint of business organizations. It mainly emphasized specific aspects 
which were supposed to apply to business organizations, such as economy, effi-
ciency, effectiveness, rational planning and control systems, decentralization of au-
thority, and result control. For example, businesslike organizational control was often 
portrayed as on average rational and technical processes, in line with the traditional 
functional view on management accounting
8. At the same time the attention to the 
more sociological and political influences on organizational control appears to be lim-
ited (Ter Bogt, 2005).  
The motivation for accepting this “businesslike“ label as an achievable goal for organ-
izational control appears to be built on at least two underlying assumptions:  
(a) performance-based output control can be a dominant control mechanism in 
public organizational control, and  
(b) performance-based output control is a dominant control mechanism in busi-
ness organizations.  
 
Support for assumption (a) can not be found easily. On the contrary, the majority of 
accounting theory delivers arguments against it. For example, in management ac-
counting research two often applied theoretical perspectives (contingency theory and 
sociologic institutional theory) provide evidence against the dominant use of formal 
and rational controls in governmental organizations. Both theoretical perspectives are 
summarized below. 
 
The first theoretical perspective is the contingency theory
9. A general theme of the 
contingency theory is that formal controls (such as process and output control) are 
more appropriate for controlling routine tasks in a stable tasks environment, while 
informal controls (such as clan control (Ouchi, 1979), professional control (Abernethy 
and Stoelwinder, 1995), and political control (Hofstede, 1981)), are expected to con-
trol more non-routine tasks in a more dynamic or ambiguous environment (i.e. Per-
row, 1970; Ouchi, 1979, Hofstede, 1981). Couched in this contingency theory is the 
notion that organizational decisions are made under varying degrees of uncertain 
                                            
8 The traditional functional view on management accounting suggests that managerial accounting 
should reflect and promote rationality in decision making. Accordingly, management accounting infor-
mation used by managers serves as quantitative expressions of organizational goals and is used to 
support rational decision making. (Covaleski e.a., 1996, p. 6).  
9 These studies are in general researching the relationship between contingent factors (such as task 
technology and environment, organizational size or organizational strategy) and the design and func-
tioning of the various organizational arrangements for coordinating and controlling tasks (Covaleski 
e.a., 1996; Chapman, 1997).   6 
conditions and that the required information of decision makers is driven by uncer-
tainty (i.e. Simon, 1945; Chapman, 1997). Managing routine tasks under stable cir-
cumstances is generally associated with a low level of task uncertainty; organiza-
tional goals are clear, and tasks are well understood and can be pre-planned. If tasks 
are less understood, more knowledge is required during task execution and fewer 
activities can be planned in advance. In such circumstances communication must be 
more sophisticated
10 in order to align sub-unit decision making with organization ob-
jectives (Galbraith, 1973). Under these more uncertain conditions complete reliance 
on accounting information for organizational control can be inappropriate (Hofstede, 
1978, Hopwood, 1972). 
By applying this more technical perspective, contingency theory associates the use 
of performance measures for output control mainly with the presence of stable and 
certain organizational tasks for achieving formal, clear, and relatively unambiguous 
organizational objectives. 
However, tasks in governmental organizations are often less stable and certain, and 
can be subject to more ambiguous and unclear objectives, resulting in the reliance on 
more political forms of control instead (e.g. Ouchi, 1979; Hofstede, 1981; Anthony 
and Young, 1994). The dominant use of performance measures for output control in 
governmental organizations is therefore not supported by these general assumptions 
of the contingency theory.  
Limited studies have been made of the actual use of performance measures for out-
put control in governmental organizations, referring to this general perspective of the 
contingency theory. Perhaps one of the most outspoken studies in this field is Ter 
Bogt (2004b). He tentatively concluded that aldermen (executive politicians) in Dutch 
municipalities, when responsible for less concrete and less measurable outputs, 
would be less inclined to decentralize control, and would prefer more sophisticated 
and less formal information. However, he also concluded that aldermen rarely used 
performance measures for control purposes at all, and suggested that more research 
on this issue was needed.   
More research has been done into the actual presence of performance measures in 
planning and control documents. It was initially expected that output control in gov-
ernmental organizations required a significant number of performance measures, 
which described concrete levels of products or services and focussed attention on 
data that could be useful in decision making (Mayston, 1985). In practice, however, 
performance measures in Dutch municipalities seldom revealed the total number of 
units to be produced or the desired cost per unit. Thus the relevance and controllabil-
ity of the performance indicators were considered as rather poor (Bordewijk and 
Klaassen, 2000, Van Helden and Johnsen, 2002). The heterogeneous sets of inputs, 
processes, and products of Dutch municipalities were addressed as one of the main 
causes for this. Consequently, it was concluded that the standard format of output 
control (using variances between actual and budgeted performances, differentiated in 
volume and price variances.) was hardly applicable (Bordewijk and Klaassen, 2000). 
                                            
10 Accounting instruments are classified as more sophisticated when they capture, for example, not 
only financial, historic, and internal oriented information, but also more non-financial, future, and ex-
ternal oriented information (Chenhall and Morris, 1986).  
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Instead, performance measures were used to characterize a wide range of desired or 
accomplished results (Van Helden, 2001). 
 
The second theoretical perspective is the new institutional sociology (abbreviated in 
this study to “institutional theory”), which is associated with the legitimacy of formal 
structures
11. In this institutional perspective, the use of performance-based output 
control is mainly related to aspects of politics, power and gaining society’s continuous 
support for legitimizing and justifying decisions. This in order to promote specific in-
terests and values, and to legitimize and rationalize an organization’s actions to 
dominant external stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1983; DiMaggio and Powel, 
1983, 1991; Burchell e.a., 1980). Confronted with the impact of conflicting institu-
tional pressure, organizations can try to avoid conformance to these pressures, and 
can use accounting information in a more symbolic and ritualistic way. They can try 
to conceal the organizational activities behind a façade of acquiescence and can de-
couple
12 their internal control structures from external observation (Oliver, 1991).   
Non-profit and public accounting research has frequently taken an institutional per-
spective to study organizational behavior
13. These studies seldom support the sug-
gestion that in practice output control is a dominant organizational control mecha-
nism. On the contrary, the majority of these studies use concepts of institutional the-
ory for explaining why performance-based output control has only limited relevance 
to organizational control. The use of performance measures has often only been re-
lated to gaining legitimacy or conformance to institutional pressure, although some 
recent research is adding nuances to these suggestions
14. 
 
                                            
11 Traditional contingency theory accepts legitimacy as given and managerial decision-making as ra-
tional, being oriented on delivering the formal organizational objectives. Institutional theory suggests 
that an organization’s survival requires not only achieving production efficiency, but also conformance 
to social norms of accepted behavior. These social norms are part of specific institutionalized social 
structures, and are not to be regarded as general values (Meyer and Rowan, 1983; Covaleski e.a., 
1986, 1996). The norms of rationality of highly institutionalized governmental organizations can thus 
differ from those of less institutionalized public organizations, and can be more infused with aspects of 
honesty, fairness and mutuality than the in general more economically oriented norms of business 
organizations (Hood, 1995), and can more be involved in processes of accommodating conflicting 
institutional demands as imitation, coercion, and legitimation (Meyer and Rowan, 1983). 
12 Decoupling implies that formal inspection, evaluation and control of the way operational activities 
contributes to formal objectives are minimized (Meyer and Rowan, 1983). 
13 A few examples: Covaleski and Dirsmtith (1986) conducted a case study in six U.S. hospitals on the 
use of budgets. They concluded that budgets were not only for objective and rational control over sub-
units, but were also an integral part of the politics and power of organizational life and are used to 
legitimize action. They suggested that a political view of budgeting definitely appears to be useful for 
understanding the budgeting process. Ansari and Euske (1987), analyzing the use of cost accounting 
data by military repair facilities in the US, concluded that there was little technical rational use of ac-
counting. They suggested that the accounting system was mainly concerned with institutional notions 
of rationality, such as gaining external legitimacy and making the system “appear functional”.  
14 Johnsen (1999) came to a different conclusion. Conducting a case study on the implementation of 
four performance measurement projects at Norwegian local governmental organizations, he sug-
gested that loose coupling can act as a facilitator for instrumental or businesslike use of performance 
measures. The suggestion that loose coupling should not be regarded as a buffer between objectives 
and activities, but as a coupling device between different interests, is also supported by Collier (2001).   8 
To summarize, in general contingency and institutional theories do not strongly sup-
port the assumption that performance measures for output control is a dominant con-
trol device in governmental organizations (assumption a).  
 
Assumption (b), concerning the dominance of performance-based output control in 
business organizations, is both supported and nuanced by theoretical and empirical 
studies. The importance of performance measures has been extensively proposed in 
both theoretical and empirical literature, both  for planning and implementing organ-
izational strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Simons, 2000; Nørreklit, 2000; Chen-
hall, 2005)
15 and for output control purposes (e.g. Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2003, Anthony and Govindarajan, 2003).  
Theoretical support for the use of performance measures for output control is found 
for example in economics and organizational theory
16. Applying economic theory, the 
use of  performance measures is expected when it can effectively communicate pre-
set outputs, provide information on the performance of employees, or can be reliably 
and validly measured, (e.g. Ouchi, 1979; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). Apply-
ing organizational theory, the use of performance measures is often related to the 
execution of programmable or certain tasks (Galbraith, 1973; Chapman, 1997). 
Empirical studies in business organizations convincingly document the use of per-
formance measures, both for the purpose of strategic planning and for organizational 
control (e.g. Simons, 2000; Anthony and Govindarajan, 2003). These findings ap-
proach the use of performance measures mainly from a rational and formal perspec-
tive, seeing performance measures as being financial or non-financial, formal and 
written information related to formal preset objectives. 
However, the importance of this formal information for organizational control in busi-
nesses can vary considerably. Performance measures and output control are not of 
equal importance for all firms in all environments. Even when the technical character-
istics of organizational tasks contribute to the use of output control, and financial per-
formance information reveals all necessary information, organizational control in 
firms is seldom built exclusively on performance measures and output control. Institu-
tional, social and political influences can have a considerable effect on the control 
structure of businesses, and can vary considerably between businesses. Output con-
trol is therefore often dovetailed with more behavioral and political control mecha-
nisms (Ouchi, 1979; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). Consequently, managers 
of businesses often prefer rapid, informal, and speculative information to precise, ag-
gregated, written performance information (e.g. Mintzberg, 1972).  
                                            
15 These theories build on Porter’s (1980) concept of strategy, and state that s firm’s strategy should 
be driven by its environment, and not by its competencies or resources. Performance measures are 
used as a tool for translating strategy into measurable objectives and to align departmental and per-
sonal goals to overall strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). 
16 Economic theory on organizations is often built, amongst other things, on basic assumptions of or-
ganizational theory; e.g. on the assumption that authority in organizations rests on the acceptance or 
consent of subordinates (Barnard, 1938), and on the principle of self-interested individuals with prefer-
ences over a wide variety of things but with limited capacity (Simon, 1945). Economic organizational 
theories further assume that firms will seek efficiency and try to maximize their value. Performance 
measures and output control will therefore be expected when they contribute to the motivation and 
evaluation of employees in order to achieve these organizational goals.   
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Thus, it seems that the general assumption that all private organizations rely signifi-
cantly on performance measures and output control for organizational control pur-
poses (assumption b) is not really supported. The general assumption would proba-
bly be more evidence based if it was re-phrased in terms of “The importance of per-
formance measures use and output control in business organizations can vary sig-
nificantly, and is always accompanied by forms of informal controls”.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the previous discussion only documents some general 
findings on the use of performance measures and output control in governmental 
organizations, it is illustrative. It emphasizes that the rational use of performance 
measures for formal control in governmental organizations is not solidly founded on 
theoretical or empirical grounds. Suggesting that organizational control is (or can be) 
primarily achieved by the rational use of performance measures and output control 
may therefore be less realistic for contemporary governmental organizations (at least 
for local government in the Netherlands). 
 
However, research findings clearly suggest that performance measures are being 
used in the planning and control instruments of Dutch local government. If they are 
not used in a rational and technical way for organizational control, what then are they 
used for? What is the role
17 of performance measures? This study concentrates on 
this last question, and aims to explain the role of performance measures in Dutch 
local government. 
The role of performance measures is the subject of study, but the focus of research 
is not limited solely to its use. Only researching the use of performance measures will 
not explain the different roles managers attach to them. By focussing on the role 
played by performance measures, attention is directed to the way accounting proce-
dures and information are used and integrated into organizational control processes 
(Chapman, 1997), and on the way accounting can arise out of technical and political 
processes (Burchell e.a., 1980). 
Research question 
In accounting literature, explicit attention to the different roles of performance meas-
ures surfaced around 1970. By then authors focused on wider concept of accounting 
information, and defined accounting information as a function of a complex and insti-
tutionalized mechanism for economic and social management (Hopwood, 1972; 
Burchell.e.a., 1980). In the words of Burchell e.a. (1980, p.13): “Accounting, it would 
appear, is made to be purposive rather than being purposeful”. 
 
                                            
17 Three fairly close related words can be used in this context: function, purpose, and role. This study 
is using role (meaning: usual or customary function, “what is his role in the organization?”), instead of 
function (meaning: intended purpose, “it is the function of the hammer to hit nails into wood”, or pur-
pose (meaning: the reason for which anything is done) (source: Collins, 1986). By using the phrase 
“the role of budgeted performance measures”, this study is addressing a more general function for 
which performance measures are being applied. For example, roles can relate to more general rea-
sons as to facilitate result control, or to learn.  “Function” will be mainly used in this context for describ-
ing a more specific purpose (for example: the role of BPM can be broken down into several functions).    10
The role of accounting information has been theoretically and empirically researched, 
in both the public and the private sector (e.g. Burchell e.a., 1980; Ansari and Euske, 
1987; Coveleski and Dirsmith, 1986; Simons, 1990; Vanderbosch, 1999). These 
studies often apply different concepts and research methods, and have produced 
many insights and nuances that can be used as a basis for explaining the role of per-
formance information. Notwithstanding their differences, these studies are often built 
on the assumption that accounting information can simultaneously support more in-
ternally oriented processes of organizational control as well as more externally ori-
ented processes of discussions with external agents. The differentiation between the 
internal or external organizational context is often characterized by its technical or its 
institutional environment (Meyer and Scott, 1983).  
 
The technical context is in essence related to the technology and environment of the 
organizational task. Applying a technical context to control, the focus is on a more 
rational and technical use of performance measures and the importance of output 
control. Within this perspective, managers can use performance information not only 
to compare actual with expected performance and to manage by exception (Simons, 
1990, 1995), but also for monitoring, detecting change, identifying problems and op-
portunities, and disseminating information (Mintzberg, 1972), or for operational plan-
ning, performance evaluation, communication of goals and strategy formation (Han-
sen and Van der Stede, 2004). 
This context, associated with a more technical rationale on organizational control, is 
labelled as a “businesslike control context” in this study. 
 
From a more institutional perspective, the organizational context is based on institu-
tionalized social structures, processes and ideologies. Applying this control context, 
the focus is on conflicting institutional pressures on organizational goals and objec-
tives. Within this perspective, managers use performance information to legitimize 
choices made by the organization and to create a common understanding of what is 
appropriate (e.g. Burchell e.a., 1980). This context is labelled as a “political control 
context” in this study. 
 
In order to define both contexts in more general accounting based terms, contempo-
rary accounting research on public and private sector organizations is used. 
However, both types of research differ considerably, and cannot easily be used to 
complement each other. Private sector accounting research, especially that con-
ducted by North American researchers, is more quantitatively oriented, appears to be 
more focussed on performance measurement, costing and cost management, using 
economics and organisation theory as theoretical frames of references (Van Helden, 
2005).  
Public sector accounting research, on the other hand, is rarely analytical or survey-
based, is more qualitatively oriented, and appears to be more concerned with budg-
eting and performance measurement. Considering the importance of budgeting for 
resource allocation, the interest of public sector accounting research in this subject is  
     11
understandable
18. Public sector accounting research mainly applies organizational 
and neo-institutional sociological theories (Van Helden, 2005). As a result, public 
sector accounting research is not primarily focussed on delivering statistical testing of 
more general hypotheses. Indeed, recent research has produced valuable and spe-
cific information, but has hardly explored the use  of accounting information in more 
general terms (e.g. Bordewijk and Klaassen, 2000; Van Helden en Ter Bogt, 2001; 
Lapsley and Pallot, 2000, Van Helden and Johnsen, 2002, Ter Bogt, 2004)
19.  
 
In order to relate or preferably to integrate these differently-oriented approaches and 
concepts of the roles of accounting, a frame of reference is needed that connects or 
covers both. But using a more open and generally applicable framework is likely to 
result in a more simplistic concept, and will come at the cost of losing some of the 
details, variety and diversity of reality.  
 
An appealing model that can be used for this purpose is the “traditional” model pre-
sented by Earl and Hopwood (1979). Taking a management information systems 
(MIS) perspective, Earl and Hopwood inventoried the problems in the development 
and use of MIS. Information overload on the one hand and information gaps on the 
other were used to express the disappointment of managers with the systems. They 
argued that information processing was viewed in a too narrow and technical man-
ner. Information was seen as a “thing”, and “the underlying concepts and languages 
tend to encourage the formalization, bureaucratization, standardization and mechani-
zation of information processes” (p.5). It was stressed that information systems often 
neglected the less formal and less routine information processes, and were neglect-
ing the more social and political roles of accounting information. MIS, therefore, were 
only partly supporting the roles that information can serve in organizations. They 
composed a framework to define several different roles of accounting information 
use.  
 
Although only focussing on a few explanatory factors and presenting archetypical 
roles of accounting information use, the use of the Earl and Hopwood framework for 
analyzing different roles of accounting information has three main advantages. 
                                            
18 Budgetary control, however, is a complex organizational form of formal control. Private sector ac-
counting research has often addressed the many limitations and major shortcomings of budgeting, 
and underlined that budgeting operates in a social context in combination with other forms of control 
(Birnberg e.a. 1983; Hansen e.a., 2003). Researching the use of accounting for budget control can 
therefore easily result in an inadequate or incomplete picture. 
19 Survey-based management accounting research, testing more general hypotheses, is not often 
published. Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) is an example of a survey study into the development and use 
of performance measure (PM) in US federal state agencies. This study confirms several variables that 
are supposed to have a positive relation to the development and use of PM, such as information sys-
tem capabilities, ability to specify performance measures, management commitment, managerial au-
thority to make decisions on performance information, training, and legislative mandates to comply 
with performance measurement systems. Van Dooren (2005) is an example of a survey on the supply 
and demand of PM in Belgian sections within the Ministry of the Flemish Community. This study 
shows that implementation and use of PM are significantly correlated. Furthermore this study confirms 
positive relations between PM (implementation and use) and standardization of activities, political 
involvement, organizational size, street level discretion (only related to implementation of PM), and 
goal orientation (only related PM use).   12
Firstly, the framework explicitly addresses both the more technical and the more so-
cial-political context of the use of accounting information for decision-making and 
control, using uncertainty of objectives as a factor. 
Uncertainty of objectives is applied to determine whether accounting information is 
likely to be used for (a) managing the organization in a technical goal directed way or 
(b) for more political reasons (such as gaining influence, or legitimizing and rationaliz-
ing executed tasks). 
Secondly, the framework explicitly addresses the technical environment of the organ-
izational tasks. Using differences in task uncertainty (i.e. managers’ beliefs in the 
causal relationship between the means and ends of tasks execution) the likelihood of 
using accounting information for formal control is made operational. 
Thirdly, the framework explicitly addresses different roles of accounting information 
use, corresponding for example to a mechanical use (control in a technical cybernetic 
way, correcting variances on pre-set targets) or to a rationalizing use (as a response 
to institutional pressures) of information. This framework of dimensions and arche-
typical roles is used in this study as a starting point and as a source of inspiration. 
 
The use of this framework also has some serious limitations. First, it is more a state-
ment than a theory. It is written to inspire system designers, managers and research-
ers to adopt new metaphors, language and frameworks (Earl and Hopwood, 1979). 
Secondly, the specified different roles are merely examples. Some normative and 
actual applied roles are documented, without the intention to be complete. Further-
more, the roles themselves are specified in a tentative and suggestive manner, and 
were not based on sufficient empirical studies of the organizational operations of the 
accounting systems (Burchell e.a., 1980).  
Using this framework as a source of inspiration for further analysis, and not as a set 
of testable hypotheses, thus seems to be in line with the intentions that lie beneath it. 
 
By researching the role of performance measures for controlling municipal organiza-
tions, this study focuses on the use of formal performance measures (PM). Most of 
the PM in municipal organizations are set in formal budgets (such as program and 
product budgets) and documented in formal reports (such as interim and annual re-
ports). PM in governmental organizations can therefore be regarded as budgeted 
performance measures (BPM). So, BPM and PM are interchangeable, at least in this 
study. 
By using budgeted measures, this study centres on dominant parts of public sector 
resource allocation (Anthony and Young, 1994; Hood, 1995), and on a complex or-
ganizational form of formal control which operates in a social context in combination 
with other forms of controls (Birnberg e.a. 1983; Hansen e.a., 2003). Researching the 
use of BPM can therefore reveal and enrich our knowledge of both the businesslike 
and the political use of BPM.  
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This study attempts to explain the practical use of information by answering the re-
search question: 
 
What is the role of budgeted performance measures in the organizational control of 
Dutch municipalities?   
 
Using Earl and Hopwood’s framework as a source of inspiration, and focussing the 
research on the use of BPM at the top of the organisation, where politicians are as-
sumed to steer and managers to row, the main research question can be broken 
down into three more specific sub-questions: 
 
a)  Which aspects can explain the relationship between different contexts of organ-
izational control (businesslike or political context) and the roles of BPM applied by 
top management and politicians in Dutch local government? 
b)  To what extent do the aspects, introduced under a), explain the roles of BPM in 
Dutch municipalities? 
c)  Do the applied roles of BPM explain the use of BPM by top management and poli-
ticians in Dutch municipalities? 
 
The first sub-question aims to provide a research framework, using existing, gener-
ally accepted accounting literature as sources and the framework of Earl and Hop-
wood (1979) as inspiration. The framework is used to provide more insight into the 
applied archetypes of budget use, and aims to recognize different roles of budget use 
and the aspects that can be used to characterize these roles. 
The second sub-question aims to explore the research framework in practice, by re-
searching Dutch municipal organizations. This study is designed to describe, explore 
and interpret. It does not test specific deductive hypotheses; it aims to document a 
way of measuring different roles of BPM, and to contribute to the formulating of hy-
potheses that can be tested later on. The third sub-question is focussed on the use of 
performance information, and analyzes whether the specific use of performance in-
formation can be related to the roles identified in Dutch municipalities.  
Research motivations 
The relevance of this study arises from theoretical and practical positions.  
 
Management accounting literature clearly indicates that both the importance of budg-
ets and the way of using budgets can vary under fluctuating levels of uncertainty, but 
it differs considerably on the underlying reasons (Earl and Hopwood, 1979; Ouchi, 
1979, Hofstede, 1981; Simons, 1995, Abernethy and Brownell, 1999). By including 
both the businesslike and the political context, this study is intended to contribute to 
the currently limited knowledge on this subject, and aims to offer some relevant in-
sights into the daily practice of budgeting in Dutch local government organisations. A 
better distinction and definition of different roles of budgeted performance measures 
may highlight relevant aspects that could influence the effectiveness of performance 
measure use. Also, and perhaps even more importantly, further insight into the actual 
use of performance measures could address the future design of accounting systems   14
and the use of performance measurement. By concentrating on the use of perform-
ance measures by the persons at the top of the organization (politicians and top 
managers), is not only the actual use of performance measures at the top of munici-
pal organisations explored, but also the meaning of performance measures for both 
political and civil executives.  
 
By addressing the different roles of performance measures explicitly, this study ex-
plores the contribution of existing theory to explaining empirical situations. As sug-
gested by Abernethy and Brownell (1999), uncertainty of objectives (being an aspect 
of the control context) and task uncertainty are included as factors that can explain 
different ways of (budgeted) performance measurement use (see A in Figure 1). The 
existing theory on the relationship between these antecedents and roles is more in-
dicative and suggestive than empirically and statistically affirmed. The relationship 
between the roles and the use of performance measures (see B in Figure 1) has only 
been partly researched. By exploring the relationships between multiple roles and 
performance measurement use, this study explores existing theory which may con-
tribute to the identification of testable assumptions or hypotheses. Statistical testing 
of assumptions is beyond the scope of this research.  
 
A
B
ANTECEDENTS
(control context &
task uncertainty)
ROLES OF BPM USE OF BPM
A
B
ANTECEDENTS
(control context &
task uncertainty)
ROLES OF BPM USE OF BPM
 
Figure 1 Research Questions 
The relationship between the antecedents (with uncertainty of objectives and task 
execution as aspects) and (budgeted) performance measurement use (see A+B in 
Figure 1) has been researched frequently from a contingency theory perspective. 
This study mainly uses the more organisational design-oriented studies of Perrow 
(1970), Galbraith (1973), and Chenhall and Morris (1986), and aims to refine this re-
lationship by analyzing the specific context of Dutch municipalities. 
 
Locating the study outside the profit organizational context fills a void pointed out by 
prior researchers (e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Chenhall, 2003). Previous studies on 
the roles of accounting information and performance measures have been more fo-
cussed on profit organizations (e.g. Simons, 1990; Davilla, 2000; Lawson and Lillis, 
2001), or on health care organizations (e.g. Abernethy and Brownell, 1999). Studying 
local governmental organizations can address some specific characteristics of gov-
ernment and their possible impact on performance measure use. Frequently recalled 
characteristics specific to local government are, for instance: the more ambiguous  
     15
objectives, its openness, its politically uncertain environment, and the lack of a “bot-
tom line” (Anthony and Young, 1994, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Bovens e.a., 2001). 
 
By focussing on organizational instead of managerial performance, this study can 
add some empirical knowledge to the contemporary stream of publications on reli-
ance on accounting based performance measurement by managers (Hartmann, 
1997; Ter Bogt, 2001, 2003, 2004). 
 
The descriptive, explorative and more qualitatively oriented nature of case study 
methodology is chosen to describe and interpret the role and use of BPM, and to 
build knowledge about the phenomenon. This could provide a starting point for more 
quantitative studies later on (Yin, 1994; Brownell, 1995). The cases are basically in-
tended to describe and explore the existing situation and to refine existing theory. 
Existing theory is addressed as a starting point, and is allowed to unfold gradually 
through interaction with data. By adopting this theory specification approach, the pur-
pose of the scope of this study is to merge theory with the complexity and heteroge-
neity of practice, prior to subjecting the theory to more rigorous testing (Keating, 
1995). As in any case study, this study’s possible weakness lies in controlling the 
effects of key variables. The “identification of all possible rival explanations is clearly 
a practical impossibility” (Brownell, 1995, p.62). To minimize possible bias, special 
attention is given to the selection of the case study sites and the design of the case 
study protocol.  
Summary 
Governmental organizations have incorporated a significant level of performance 
measures into their planning and control documents, but the role(s) of performance 
measure is still largely unclear. Recent research points to the limited use of perform-
ance measures in Dutch governmental organizations for budget-based output con-
trol, but has not yet analyzed other possible roles for the performance measures in 
depth. This study aims to clarify these roles and the related use of performance 
measures. However, a research framework for explaining differences in the use of 
performance measures, related to possible different roles of use, is not yet opera-
tional. This study aims to contribute to the construction and documentation of such a 
framework. A research framework is constructed, using three constructs: the control 
context (businesslike or political), the role and the use of BPM (budgeted perform-
ance measures). The next chapter documents in more detail the main accounting 
theories that are used to compose the research framework. 
Structure of this dissertation 
The outline of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of 
the most relevant theoretical concepts which are used to compose a research 
framework. Chapter 3 documents the plan that is used to collect data for answering 
the research questions. Chapter 4 contains the reports of the four case studies. 
Chapter 5 is the last chapter and documents the analysis of the case studies and the 
answering of the research questions.   16
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2. A Theoretical Research Framework  
This chapter presents a brief overview of the most relevant theoretical concepts of 
management control, accounting information systems, performance budgets and the 
roles of budgets. These general accounting concepts, applicable in both the private 
and public sector, are used to compose a research framework for analyzing the role 
of budgeted performance measures in Dutch local government. 
Organizational and management control 
Control, next to strategy formulation and objective setting, is one of the critical man-
agement processes (Merchant, 1998; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). The term 
“organizational control” has no single generally accepted definition. Literature pre-
sents various definitions, describing organizational control as a process (of setting a 
standard, observing what is happening, comparison of observation and standard, and 
if necessary, behavior altering communication), or by its main goal (e.g. assuring im-
plementation of strategies).  
 
Anthony (1988) has provided a general accepted structure for organizational control. 
His traditional framework distinguishes three separate and distinct processes; being 
strategy formulation, management control, and task control. Within this concept, task 
control and strategy formulation form the boundaries of the management control 
process. Strategy formulation is the process of deciding on the goals of the organiza-
tion and the strategies for attaining these goals. Task control is the process of ensur-
ing that specific tasks are carried out effectively and efficiently. Management control 
fits between the two concepts, and is defined by Anthony (1988, p.8) as “the process 
by which managers influence other members of the organization to implement the 
organization’s strategies”. 
 
Anthony considers management control to be a rational and systematic process; as a 
formal prescribed set of activities with the purpose of achieving the organization’s 
pre-set or emerging objectives (Anthony, 1988, Anthony and Govindarajan, 2003, p. 
9, p.11). This formal and rational process is in essence cybernetic, involving some 
kind of standard setting, variance analysis and feedback activities. 
  
The notion that formal systems of management control are in essence cybernetic is 
generally accepted within accounting literature. But defining the management control 
process as systematic and cybernetic is by no means to be seen as defining man-
agement control itself as cybernetic (Fisher, 1998). Even highly formalized, quantified 
and computerized organizational processes usually involve communication between 
people and their motivation, which means that they contain psychological elements 
(Hofstede 1978, 1981). 
Although Anthony’s framework suggested that the basic source of discipline for 
studying control is behavioral science, it has often been narrowed down to an ac-  18
counting based control approach with a behavioral flavor, and as a mainly formal and 
functional system (Otley, 1999; Hartmann, 1997). 
 
Taking a more behavioral and organizational approach, management control is con-
ceptualized as a human activity, with humans as objects of management control 
(Hartmann, 1997). Studying only performance measurement and management meth-
ods is therefore unlikely to result in a totally coherent outline or a rational set of con-
trol mechanisms well-suited to the purpose for which they have been designed. The 
scope of management control should thus be wide enough to also encompass activi-
ties such as: discussing strategy, selection of personnel, management and organiza-
tional development practices and business process re-design techniques (Otley, 
1999). 
 
Following this line of reasoning, management control includes “all the devices man-
agers use to ensure that the behavior and decisions of people in the organization are 
consistent with the organization’s objectives and strategies” (Merchant, 1998, p.2).  
These devices can in practice involve limitless kinds of control mechanisms, which 
can be formal or informal in nature. According to Merchant (1998) it is the function of 
management control systems to influence behavior in desirable ways. The assump-
tion behind this function is that individuals act more in their own best interest than in 
the organization’s interest. Control systems are used to increase the probability that 
individuals will behave in such a way that the organization’s objectives will be 
achieved (Merchant, 1998).  
 
This study is researching organizational control on an organizational level, and is 
mainly referring to management control processes. Strategy formulation and task 
control is beyond the scope of our study. However, strict boundaries between man-
agement control, strategy formulation and task control will mainly exist in theory. In 
practice, management control is part of the wider organizational context (Birnberg, 
1983). Merchant’s (1998) vision of organizational control is used in this study as a 
reference.  
 
Ouchi (1979) analyzed different control mechanisms and described three fundamen-
tally different mechanisms “through which organizations can seek to cope with the 
problem of evaluating and control” (p. 833). He identified three archetypes of control 
mechanisms: markets, bureaucracies and clans. Taking a technical efficiency per-
spective, he argued that the choice between the three control mechanisms should 
depend on the organization’s ability to measure (individual) contributions (measured 
in outputs or behavior) to the achievement of organizational objectives. 
If prices contain all the necessary information for decision making purposes, a market 
mechanism should be an effective control mechanism. But when market prices are 
not available, the measurability of organizational outputs or behavior should deter-
mine whether bureaucratic/administrative controls or social controls are the preferred 
main control mechanisms. 
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Bureaucratic control, as defined by Ouchi (1979), relies upon rules and close per-
sonal surveillance and the direction of subordinates by superiors. Rules are to be 
regarded here as “an arbitrary standard against which a comparison is yet to be 
made” (Ouchi, 1979, p. 835). Using bureaucratic control, an organization will create 
an explicit set of rules about behavior (e.g. budgets or cost standards), or level of 
production or output. This set of rules will not completely specify the duties of an em-
ployee, but will reduce the involvement of hierarchical authority to a desired level. 
Bureaucratic control can thus be seen as a mechanism to reduce hierarchical infor-
mation overload, and as a means of improving organizational information processing 
capabilities (Galbraith, 1973). Galbraith (1973) argued that decision-makers attempt 
to find a match between the degree of information processing demanded by the envi-
ronment and the processing capabilities of the organization. He argued that when 
uncertainty is low, tasks are well understood prior to their performance and many ac-
tivities can be pre-planned. This concept of pre-planning seems to be strongly related 
to the image of the mechanistic organization with its hierarchy and procedures. But 
when uncertainty increases, tasks cannot be fully programmed and the organization’s 
information processing requirements will increase (Chapman, 1997).  
 
This concept of programmability of tasks is similar to Perrow’s (1970) routineness of 
tasks, which expresses the extent to which tasks can be reduced to a well-defined 
set of rules. Perrow (1970) argued that organizational planning and control processes 
are related to the extent to which tasks are analyzable and homogeneous (number of 
exceptions).    
 
Bureaucratic control can be classified as a formal and rational form of control. Bu-
reaucratic control of an organization requires measurement and monitoring of, in es-
sence, the behavior of employees or the results of those behaviors. If desired behav-
ior can be specified and watched with reasonable precision, behavior control can 
create an effective control mechanism. But if the knowledge of the means-end rela-
tionships involved in the basic products or service activities is imperfect, behavior 
control is less effective. 
On the other hand, if the results of behavior (or outputs) are measurable with rea-
sonable precision and superiors in the organizational hierarchy can monitor multiple 
output objectives, output control can be effective (Ouchi, 1979, Hofstede, 1981). 
 
Bureaucratic controls, such as behavior and output control, are thus not always ap-
plicable. As Ouchi (1979, p. 845) concluded: 
“Under conditions of ambiguity, of loose coupling, and of uncertainty, measurement 
with reliability and with precision is not possible. A control system based on such 
measurements is likely to systematically reward a narrow range of maladaptive be-
havior, leading ultimately to organizational decline” 
 
When the assessment of performance is unclear, an organization is likely to try to 
reduce goal incongruity by relying more on informal, social, ritualized, or ceremonial 
forms of control. Social forms of control, such as clan control, are unable to monitor 
and evaluate anything but attitudes, values and beliefs, and “require the stability of   20
membership which characterize the clan” (Ouchi, 1979, p. 844). These forms of con-
trol relate to the socialization process among members of the clan or the profession. 
Socialization processes emphasize agreement on a broad range of values and bene-
fits (Ouchi, 1979), or on negotiation and judgment (Hofstede, 1978). 
The choice between market, bureaucracy or clan control is, according to Ouchi, in 
essence an economic one. However, Ouchi added that real organizations will contain 
some features of each of the modes of control (p. 840). 
 
Implicit in Ouchi’s analysis is the assumption that organizational control operates 
whilst agreement on goals and objectives exists (Birnberg e.a, 1983). It is, however, 
doubtful whether this assumption of unambiguous objectives is always valid (Anthony 
and Young, 1994; Hofstede, 1978).   
Hofstede (1978, 1981) argued that ambiguity of organizational objectives is “the most 
crucial criterion for management control” (1981,p. 194), and stated: 
“When ambiguities in objectives exist, control is always political control, dependent 
on power structures, negotiation processes, the need for the distribution of scarce 
resources, particular interests and conflicting values: however, political control at the 
top of an organization can go together with other forms of control inside the organiza-
tion, because for members, the political top may have resolved the ambiguities” (p. 
198).    
 
Hofstede (1981) identified three main reasons for ambiguous objectives: (a) conflict 
of perceived interest and/or values among those having a say in the activity, (b) lack 
of knowledge about means-end relationships in which the activity considered repre-
sents the means, and (c) fast changing environments which enforce new objectives 
or make existing objectives obsolete, without immediately suggesting new ones. 
Hofstede (1981) underlined that every organization, public or private, contains activi-
ties that demand different forms of control and can have ambiguous or unambiguous 
objectives. Consequently he added: 
“unambiguous objectives exist for activities for which there are no conflicts of inter-
ests and/or values among those concerned. Then there is consensus among organi-
zation members with regard to the activity, based on shared traditions, shared indif-
ference, or an unquestioning acceptance of a central authority that sets the objec-
tives” (Hofstede 1981, p. 145). 
 
Hofstede’s (1981) control framework is defined by four criteria, of which the ambiguity 
of objectives is considered as the first and most crucial. Measurability of outputs, 
knowledge of the effects of management intervention and level of repetitiveness are 
the remaining three criteria. Unambiguous objectives and measurable outputs are 
regarded as minimum requirements for applying cybernetic models of control (using 
variances between actual performance and pre-set norms in order to decide if inter-
vention in the task execution or adjustment norms is appropriate). Purely cybernetic 
models assume rationality of the entire system. Control models will become less cy-
bernetic when the effects of intervention are not known in advance and psychological 
elements enter the control system. Non-cybernetic models of control rely more on the 
values and rituals of the group in which decision-makers operate. Hofstede stated  
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that values and rituals are manifestations of the culture of a group, and because cul-
tures between groups can differ, no universally optimal procedures for non-cybernetic 
models of control exist. Political control is, as he put it, “a vague model” (Hofstede, 
1981, p.202). 
 
Summarizing, many organizations can apply administrative or formal forms of control, 
such as behavior and output control, as long as their objectives and production proc-
esses are relatively stable and certain, and the organizational hierarchy can transmit 
control with any accuracy from top to bottom (Ouchi 1979). As discussed in more de-
tail in chapter 1, “Introduction”, the use of formal administrative controls is mainly as-
sociated with a more technical rationale on control; with the importance of achieving 
formal, relatively unambiguous and clear organizational goals. This context stresses 
the importance of the formal organizational structure and processes, and rules and 
routines that serve to bring order and minimize uncertainty for boundedly rational
20 
employees. 
However, the circumstances of many organizational tasks in the public sector may 
not fit these specifications (Ouchi, 1979; Anthony and Young, 1994). Tasks in gov-
ernmental organizations are often not stable and certain, and relate often to more 
ambiguous and unclear objectives, resulting in a reliance on more political forms of 
control instead (Hofstede, 1981). 
This study takes Ouchi’s and Hofstede’s framework as the basis from which to ana-
lyze performance measures for both administrative and political forms of control. 
Ouchi’s framework is used to analyze whether administrative controls are to be ex-
pected. Hofstede’s criterion of ambiguity of objectives is used to give additional in-
sights into the use of political control.  
Accounting Information Systems 
Forms of formal organizational control can be addressed as systems
21, for example 
as management information systems (MIS), management accounting systems 
(MAS), or as accounting information systems (AIS). Although some disparities in the 
conceptual definition of MAS, MIS and AIS exist in literature, they all refer to formal 
routines and procedures, the use of information, and a focus on patterns of activities 
(Simons, 1992). In this study the formal control system is labeled AIS, and is defined 
within the context of MIS. Figure 2 gives a simplified picture of the positioning of MIS, 
AIS, and budgets. 
                                            
20 Bounded rationality addresses the assumption that it is people’s intention to act rationally, but that 
this intention is bounded by personal and organizational limitations (Simon, 1945). Rational is refer-
ring, amongst others, to the alignment of personal and organizational goals. According to Simon 
(1945, p88): “When we speak of people behaving irrationally what we generally mean is that their 
goals are not our goals, or that they are acting on the basis of invalid or incomplete information, or that 
they are ignoring future consequences of their actions, or that their emotions are clouding their judg-
ments or focusing their attention on momentary objectives”. 
21 A system is a prescribed and usually repetitious way of carrying out an activity or a set of activities 
(Anthony and Govindarajan, 2003, p. 6). In this study formal control and systematic control are used 
as synonyms.    22
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Figure 2 MIS, AIS and budgets 
Taking an orthodox management accounting perspective, the function of AIS is to 
facilitate decision making and to control behavior (Zimmerman, 2000). AIS can serve 
decision making, or decision management, by providing information to reduce ex-
ante uncertainty. Then AIS supports strategy formulation and implementation, pro-
vides information for coordination of activities, and facilitates organizational learning 
(Simons, 1995; Abernethy and Brownell, 1999). AIS can also serve control by provid-
ing ex-post information about the actions of subordinates (Zimmerman, 2000). 
 
It is suggested that the design of AIS represents a response to the requirements for 
organizational coordination and control. AIS is perceived as effective when it is de-
signed to provide information that meets the requirements of the user and is at the 
same time consistent throughout the organization (Galbraith, 1973; Anthony, 1988; 
Nicolaou, 2000). 
  
The design and use of AIS can be characterized by the dimensions of AIS and by the 
quality of the provided information (Anthony, 1965). Accounting literature has focused 
mainly on the dimensions of AIS, such as financial versus non-financial, internal ver-
sus external, or historical versus future orientated (Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Aber-
nethy and Vagnoni, 2004). The essential characteristics of the quality of AIS have 
been addressed within the accounting literature but especially in the information sys-
tem literature. Quality of AIS is often characterized by its relevance (the importance 
of the information for the user), accuracy (error free), precision (exact) and complete-
ness (meets the needs of the user) (e.g. Anthony, 1988; Doll and Torkzadeh, 1988). 
A generally accepted approach for capturing the quality of the provided information is 
by measuring the satisfaction of the user of accounting information (Doll and 
Torkzadeh, 1988). User satisfaction is seen as a surrogate measure for AIS effec-
tiveness; the underlying general assumption is that better information systems would 
lead to higher user satisfaction, without specifying which factors contribute the most 
(Goodhue, 1995).  
  
     23
Managers need information for different purposes; management information can 
serve multiple roles
17 simultaneously. Managers can use management information, 
amongst other things, not only to be able to compare actual with expected perform-
ance and to manage by exception (Simons, 1990, 1995), but also for monitoring, de-
tecting change, identifying problems and opportunities, and disseminating information 
(Mintzberg, 1972), or for operational planning, performance evaluation, communica-
tion of goals and strategy formulation (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004). 
 
Managers use both informal and formal information sources. Managers are depend-
ent to a large extent on informal information sources. For example, these could be: 
informal talks, regular scheduled or ad hoc meetings, informal memorandums, and 
personal inspection. Informal information processes can carry news quickly, convey 
nuances and can process qualitative information. Informal information processes of-
ten represent actuality, provide concrete descriptions of unique situations, indicate 
true causality and provide private and tacit views. (Mintzberg, 1972; Earl and Hop-
wood, 1979). Formal information processes relate to AIS and to a variety of non-
routine information processes. The formal non-routine information processes can re-
late to a variety of subjects, such as meetings, conferences, studies and task forces 
(Earl and Hopwood, 1979, Simons, 2000). 
 
This study focuses on various different sources of formal control information. Dutch 
municipalities use a planning and control approach, therefore sources are included 
that relate to, for example, programming, budgeting, and the reporting of regular and 
ad-hoc tasks. Both the design criteria and the quality of AIS are researched. This is in 
order to characterize the relevance of information for users, and to relate this infor-
mation to specific roles of AIS. 
Budgeting and operational planning 
Budgeting is a major component of most AIS. Budgeting refers to the budget, as for-
mal and quantitative expressions of plans as a set of numbers, and to the budget 
process (Horngren and Forster, 1987). Budgeting is used by management as a 
means of coordinating and communicating priorities, for facilitating lower manage-
ment commitment to those priorities, and is often used by management to decentral-
ize decision making to lower-level managers.  
Budgeting is a near universal organizational process, and is so important for “day-to-
day decision making guidance for managers that it might be said that the primary 
purpose of the other planning cycles (such as strategic planning and programming) is 
merely to develop a smart budget” (Merchant, 1998, p. 336).  
 
Budgeting can be a “top down” and “bottom up” process, and involves short-term 
planning. With top down budgeting, top management set lower level budgets. Top 
management often use the preparation of operating budgets not only for the purpose 
of coordination (detecting inconsistencies), assigning responsibilities, and obtaining 
lower managers commitment, but also to fine-tune the strategic plan. This top down 
budgeting process often puts emphasis on the link between the strategic plan and 
the operational budget.   24
With bottom up budgeting, lower management participates in setting budget targets. 
Bottom up budgeting often puts emphasis on both strategic planning and operational 
planning
22 (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003; Anthony and Govindrarajan, 2003). 
 
Budgeting is the cornerstone of the management control process, but it is far from 
perfect. Despite its ubiquitous use, and its function to serve performance planning 
and ex-post evaluation of actual performance versus plan, budgetary control (exer-
cising control through the use of budgets) has many limitations. Budgeting is not only 
time consuming, it can also hinder allocation of organizational resources, encourage 
myopic decision making, and it is also a strategic game which can result in dysfunc-
tional behaviors (Hopwood, 1972; Hofstede, 1981; Merchant 1998; Merchant and 
Van der Stede, 2003). 
Hansen e.a. (2003) categorized the perceived criticism of practitioners of budgeting 
use into three groups. Firstly, budgetary control is only useful when the budget pro-
vides a valid plan for a reasonable period of time and when managers have a good 
predictive model for providing performance standards. Secondly, budgetary control 
often imposes centralized and primarily financial-oriented controls, which often sup-
port “such mechanical practices as last-year-plus budget setting and across the 
board cuts” (Hansen e.a., 2003, p. 97). Thirdly, budgetary control focuses on respon-
sibility centers, and will impede empowered employees from making the best deci-
sions. Budgetary control seems thus to be the most valid approach under relatively 
certain environmental circumstances. Under more uncertain circumstances the valid-
ity of strict budgetary controls is assumed to diminish. Organizations that face unpre-
dictable environments are likely to use budgets in combination with more subjective 
performance evaluations (Hopwood 1972; Simons, 1987; Ittner and Larcker 1998; 
Abernethy and Brownell, 1999). 
 
Budgets can contribute considerably to the tightness of formal controls, but budget-
ary control is only one way to exercise tight control; personnel and cultural control 
can also contribute to tight control (Simons, 1995; Merchant, 1998; Anthony and Go-
vindarajan, 2003). Budgetary control is considered to be tighter if it has a greater ef-
fect on decision making or if it provides a higher degree of certainty that employees 
act in a desirable way (Merchant, 1998). Tight budgetary control can be achieved by: 
defining complete and specific goals, congruent with organizational objectives, effec-
tive, timely, frequent, and convincing communication, frequent, detailed and timely 
monitoring of actions or results, and enhancing the value of rewards for employees 
(Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). 
According to Van der Stede (2001) tight budgetary control involves, in order of impor-
tance, (a) low tolerance for interim budget deviation, (b) detailed line-item follow-ups, 
(c) intense discussions of budget results, and (d) strong emphasis on meeting short-
run budget targets. 
                                            
22 The link between budgeting and operational planning is not intensively researched. According to 
Hansen e.a. (2003), this lack of research evidence is probably due to the focus on management con-
trol and strategic management (and on top management), and less on operational or task control (and 
on functional or operational management levels).   
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Control tightness is in general related to diagnostic controls, using variance analysis 
on important targets to focus managers’ attention (Simons, 1995). Control tightness 
is however, not exclusively related to diagnostic controls. Tightness can also be ob-
tained when managers frequently exchange information, analyze and debate action 
plans, and when top management is strongly involved in the day-to-day activities of 
subordinates (Van der Stede, 2001). Van der Stede(2001), empirically analyzing 
large diversified Belgium firms, suggested that especially detailed line-item follow-up 
and intense discussions by top management contributed to this more interactive use 
of the control systems. 
  
A fundamental distinction must be made between the use of budgets for measure-
ment and control of individual performance or organizational performance. Control of 
individual performance is in principle directly related to human behavior, to aspects of 
possible dysfunctional behavior, and to the incentives to managers to misinterpret 
information (Hopwood, 1972; Simons, 1995; Merchant, 1998). There is an implied 
connection between the performance of individuals and organizations. If AIS is found 
to be useful at an organizational level, it is likely to be used by individuals, who then 
can improve their decision-making and better achieve organizational goals. There are 
however “broad leaps in logic” from useful AIS, to improved job satisfaction and en-
hanced organizational performance, and “there is no compelling evidence that such 
links exist” (Chenhall 2003, p. 132). 
This study is not addressing the possible impact of performance measure use on or-
ganizational and managerial performance. 
 
Budgets can be financial and non-financial, and can relate to operational cost and 
expenditure or capital spending decisions. Concentrating on operational budgets, two 
basic types of budgets can be discerned: (a) budgets for cost centers (or expense 
centers or input budgets) and (b) budgets for profit centers (Hofstede, 1981; Anthony 
and Govindarajan, 2003). Cost centers are responsibility centers associated with fi-
nancial controls (price or cost) and efficiency (price or cost per unit quantity); inputs 
are measured in monetary terms, but outputs are not. There are two general types of 
cost centers, engineered and discretionary, of which only the first can optimize the 
physical output in relation to the input. Engineered cost centers (or production cen-
ters) can be used for loosely coupled financial and non-financial control. Profit cen-
ters express both inputs and outputs in monetary terms and can be applied for inter-
related financial and non-financial control.  
 
Budgets of governmental organizations are a dominant part of public sector resource 
allocation and performance measurement (Bordewijk and Klaassen, 2001; Van Hel-
den and Johnsen, 2002). Dutch municipalities use budgets in their hierarchical plan-
ning and control documents, which support various functions such as: information 
provision, accountability and control (Van Helden and Ter Bogt, 2001). 
Performance measures in budgets of Dutch local government 
Performance can have various meanings, but in general it relates to qualitative and 
quantitative descriptions of results which can help to shape employees’ views of what   26
is important (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). The relevance of performance 
measures can be stated by the popular quote “what you measure is what you get” 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996). In general, performance measures relate to organiza-
tional activities, production or output. In the Dutch government sector, performance 
measures relate primarily to activities, outputs and outcome (Ter Bogt, 2004). 
Organizational performance measures are often multi-dimensional in nature and can 
be divided into financial and non-financial measures. Financial information refers to 
quantitative monetary information. Non-financial information refers to both quantita-
tive and qualitative non-monetary information (Itnner and Larcker, 1998) and can re-
fer to, for example, efficiency, productivity, product quality, and to citizen, customer or 
employee satisfaction. 
 
A general conception of the use of performance measures is that they are used to 
support the formulation and implementation of organizational strategy (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996; Merchant, 1998; Otley, 1999; Simons, 2000; Anthony and Govindara-
jan, 2003). Profit organizations, with their financial “bottom line”, can view non-
financial performance measures as an indicator of financial performance (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996) or can calculate the financial consequences of increased non-financial 
performance (Nørreklit, 2000). Profit organizations aim to use the financial and non-
financial performance measures to reflect the interest of shareholders, organization 
and customers, and probably strive to ensure a fairly strictly balanced and integrated 
relationship between actions, objectives, and organizational strategy (e.g. Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996; Inttner and Larcker, 1998). 
 
Objectives of governmental organizations are often regarded as more ambiguous, 
and seldom apply a business “bottom line” of integrating multiple goals into single 
financial targets.  Consequently, performance measures in governmental organiza-
tions tend to be less balanced (often controlling financial and non-financial perform-
ances separately) and less integrated (often resulting in loosely coupled performance 
measures between different hierarchical levels) than in profit organizations (e.g. Kap-
lan and Norton, 1996; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Bordewijk and Klaassen, 2001).  
 
Performance measures are an important part of governmental budgets (Johnsen, 
1999; Bordewijk and Klaassen, 2001; Van Helden and Johnsen, 2002; Van Helden, 
2005). Dutch municipalities use budgeted performance measures (BPM) widely, e.g. 
in output and outcome budgets, in performance reports, for setting performance stan-
dards, and for the purpose of benchmarking (Van Helden and Ter Bogt, 2001; Bor-
dewijk and Klaassen, 2002). These BPM are related to various stages of the trans-
formation process (input, throughput, or output measures) and are used to provide a 
broad set of indicators on the goals, on the organizational activities, or on specifica-
tions of resource availability (Van Helden and Jansen, 2003). In terms of relevance 
and controllability the applied performance measures are often assumed to be rather 
poor. Performance measures in output and outcome budgets give little information on 
the volume of the service and its quality, are often heterogeneous or meaningless 
(Van Helden and Johnsen, 2002; Van Helden and Jansen, 2003). 
  
     27
Dutch local governments also use BPM in their relationships with external parties, 
such as with central government or government agencies. Examples of this kind of 
use of BPM are the performance contracts with central government which are used 
for main city policies
23 or for controlling police organizations.  
Roles of budgeted performance measures 
The roles of AIS in general and the specific functions of budgets have been studied 
by management accountants for a long time and from various perspectives, mostly 
focusing on the profit sector. Although no clear single starting point for these studies 
can be pointed out easily, the formal start can be attributed to the “founding fathers” 
of management accounting, such as Taylor (1911)
24 or Simon (1945)
25. Contempo-
rary interest in the roles and functions of (budgeted) accounting information often 
approaches these aspects as attributes of control systems (e.g. Simons 1987, 1990, 
1995; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003), or as servants of decision making (e.g. 
Burchell e.a., 1980), or as instrumental for various planning and control reasons 
(Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004). 
 
One of the more current studies on the roles of AIS in profit sector organizations is 
documented by Simons (1990). Simons (1990) was researching the relationship be-
tween the use of AIS and the implementation of organizational strategy, and con-
cluded that the same management information was used differently, depending on 
what managers did with it. He observed that organizations with different strategic 
stances use AIS in different ways: in a diagnostic or interactive way. Simons later 
defined diagnostic control systems as prototypical cybernetic feedback systems or as 
“the formal information systems that managers use to monitor organizational out-
comes and correct deviations from preset standards of performance” (Simons 1995, 
p.170).  Interactive control systems were defined as the formal information systems 
that managers use to personally involve themselves in the decision-making activities 
of subordinates, with the purpose of focusing everyone in the organization on emerg-
ing strategic uncertainties, on the emerging threats and opportunities that could in-
validate the assumptions upon which the current business strategy is based (Simons, 
1995, p.171). 
 
Simons articulated that the differences between the two control systems are not their 
technical design features, but the way senior managers use these systems. When 
managers use diagnostic control systems, periodic exception reports are used to 
monitor a limited amount of critical performance variables. Managers are only ex-
                                            
23 In Dutch: “Grote Stedenbeleid” or GSB. 
24 F.W. Taylor’s Principle of Scientific Management (1911) relates mainly to the execution of opera-
tional tasks. For example, as stated on page 17: “The work of every workman is fully planned out by 
management at least one day in advance, and each man received in most cases complete written 
instructions, describing in detail the task which he is to accomplish, as well as the means to be used in 
doing the work”.  
25 H.A. Simon’s Administrative Behavior (1945) focuses on decision making processes in administra-
tive organizations. Simon suggested that accounting systems were designed to inform and to influ-
ence operating decisions, for example by attention directing, scorekeeping, and problem solving.   28
pected to invest time and attention to the causes of variances when significant varia-
tions occur. Interactive control systems are used by managers for ongoing debate 
and dialogue in order to signal what is important. The debate is focused on new in-
formation, assumptions, and action plans. 
 
This notion of the different roles of AIS was earlier normatively explored by Burchell 
e.a. (1980) and Earl and Hopwood (1979). These two conceptually interlinked studies 
related organizational decision-making and the roles of AIS
26 by using two dimen-
sions of organizational uncertainty: uncertainty of objectives and uncertainty of the 
patterns of actions which determine the consequences of action. Earl and Hopwood 
(1979) defined several roles, and used “an all too unsatisfactory machine analogy” 
(p.8) to address them. 
They argued that when uncertainty on both dimensions is low, decision-making is 
structured and control is assumed to be programmable. The associated role of AIS is 
labeled as “answering machines” and is comparable with the use of Simons’ diagnos-
tic control systems.  
They continued that in situations with clear objectives but increased uncertainty of 
cause and effect, “we need to explore problems, ask questions, analyze the analyz-
able and finally resort to judgment. Here MIS [AIS] cannot provide the answer but 
they can go part of the way, providing assistance. “ (Earl and Hopwood, 1979, p. 8, 
[AIS] added by the author).  This role of AIS is labeled as “learning machines”. 
The emphasis on the role of AIS as a learning machine was expected to be limited. 
They argued that instead of using AIS to confront the uncertainty of cause and effect, 
AIS is likely to be used to reduce or even camouflage it. Algorithms, formulas and 
standardized rules were seen as tools for making a significant portion of organiza-
tional decision making programmable, which can complement or replace human 
judgment (Burchell e.a. 1980). Earl and Hopwood (1979, p.9) concluded: 
”In other words our parent disciplines of computing, accounting and management 
science have sought for answers where they cannot always be specified, aiming for 
technocratic solutions regardless of the context of either the user or the organiza-
tional environment.”  
Earl and Hopwood (1979) also explored situations with low uncertainty of cause and 
effect but increased uncertainty of objectives. Here they argued that the values, prin-
ciples, perspectives and interests of people can conflict. Political processes are ex-
pected to be important. They formulated a normative view on the role of AIS, which 
suggested that information processes would support discussion and problem sharing 
and would be used as “dialogue machines”. In practice however, they expected that 
AIS would often be used to articulate and promote particular interested positions and 
values.  
Burchell e.a. added that, under these circumstances, organizations are not to be 
seen as cohesive mechanisms for rational action, but as arenas in which members of 
the organization, with a diversity of interest, participate. Under these uncertain cir-
                                            
26 Earl and Hopwood (1979) referred to the wider concept of MIS, instead of the more narrow defined 
concept of AIS that is used in this study.  
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cumstances control will be political. This role of AIS is labeled as “ammunition ma-
chines”. 
The last defined role is related to uncertainty of causation and objectives. Here Earl 
and Hopwood assumed another way of using AIS. They argued that, with the need 
for inspiring and creativity triggering information, AIS can be used as “idea ma-
chines”. Notwithstanding this inspirational concept, this “idea machines” role was 
likely to be more normative than practical. They expected that the context of extreme 
uncertainty can create the need for AIS to serve as “rationalization machines”. The 
main purpose for this role is to legitimize and justify the organization and its actions 
with its external constituencies. This need for retrospective understanding might be 
particularly the case where there are dominant external interests in the decision mak-
ing context (Meyer and Rowan, 1983; Burchell e.a. 1980). 
 
Although the distinction between basic variations in the roles of AIS is admittedly 
simplistic, it is nonetheless suggestive and can help to articulate archetypes for a va-
riety of use (Burchell e.a., 1980, p.15). The Earl and Hopwood/ Burchell e.a. frame-
work of archetypal roles is used here as a basis to identify aspects that can be ana-
lyzed empirically.    30
Building a research framework 
From research questions to a research framework 
The next step is to compose a research framework of measurable aspects by which 
the different roles of BPM can be explained. The three basic building blocks of the 
research framework (antecedents, roles of BPM, and use of BPM) have already been 
introduced in the first chapter (see Figure 1  on page 14 and Figure 3 on page 32), 
and are now given further consideration. 
  
The first antecedent: control context 
Two different contexts of organizational control are constructed in this study, these 
being a businesslike and a political context. 
 
The businesslike control context stresses the importance of the formal organizational 
structure and processes, rules and routines. This context is associated with relatively 
certain, clear, or unambiguous organizational objectives (Earl and Hopwood, 1979; 
Hofstede, 1981; Birnberg e.a, 1983). These clearly defined organizational objectives 
are assumed to be achieved by a comprehensive and coordinated set of goals, tar-
gets at various levels of the organization, or by sets of integrated performance indica-
tors through organizational hierarchy (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Hyndman and Eden, 
2000).  
Budget systems are considered to be important managerial control systems, and are 
part of the formal control structures and processes. Budget systems can contribute 
considerably to the degree of certainty that employees act in desirable ways (Mer-
chant, 1998). Budget tightness is therefore used as an aspect of a businesslike con-
trol context.  
 
The political control context stresses the importance of the gain for organizational 
legitimacy, and addresses the organization and its confrontation with internal and 
external institutions (Hofstede, 1981; Meyer and Rowan, 1983). This perspective at-
taches meaning to the budgeting process beyond the role of formal control (Covaleki 
e.a, 2003).  
The presence of a political control context can be identified by focusing on possible 
conflicting pressures on organizational objectives by groups of people
27, or the pos-
sible results of conflicting pressures such as uncertain
28 or ambiguous objectives. 
                                            
27 Differences in perceived interests between groups of people can, amongst others, be related to 
differences in subcultures between organizational groups, e.g. between top management and middle 
management (Hofstede, 2003), or to possible role conflicts between organizational levels, e.g. be-
tween managerial and professional organizational units (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995), or to the 
ability of organizations to conform to multiple conflicting pressures (Scott 1987). 
28 Relatively certain objectives are in this study associated with a more businesslike control context, 
and relatively uncertain objectives are associated with a more political control context. Using these two 
contexts has the advantage of using two separate but interlinked constructs, both with different theo-
retical and philosophical bases. By using the businesslike and political context instead of the single 
dimension of uncertainty of objectives, extra caution is taken in order to prevent some unification be-
tween different theoretical approaches (Chenhall, 2003).  
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This study primarily uses uncertainty and ambiguity as aspects of a political control 
context. 
 
One of the assumed effects of organizational resistance to institutional pressure for 
an increased degree of multiplicity is involvement in tactics of resistance, and the at-
tempt to decouple technical activities from external contacts (Ansari and Euske, 
1987; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Oliver, 1991). By decoupling (or loose coupling), 
organizations can protect their formal structures from evaluation on the basis of tech-
nical performance, e.g. by performing activities beyond the purview of managers, by 
making objectives more ambiguous, by the avoidance of integration, and by making 
human relations very important (Meyer and Rowan, 1983). In some cases loose cou-
pling can lead to more ceremonial posturing, which may involve a preferred depar-
ture from technical efficiency (Powell, 1991). Although differences between ceremo-
nial and operational structures cannot easily be generalized into one single factor, 
loose coupling is often used as an indication of the existence of disconnections be-
tween both (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). Loose coupling is also expected to affect the 
balance (integration of financial and non-financial measures) between the integration 
(throughout the hierarchy of an organization) of performance measures (Brignall and 
Modell, 2000). Management control systems can be decoupled at different hierarchi-
cal levels, which may result in crude financially-oriented budgetary control and limited 
integration of performance measures (Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Ansari and Euske, 
1987; Brignall and Modell, 2000). Loose coupling is not explicitly included in this 
study as a measurable aspect of a political control context; it merely serves as a con-
cept which can be referred to later on. 
 
The second antecedent: task uncertainty 
Task uncertainty, or uncertainty over the consequences of actions, is one of the di-
mensions of Earl and Hopwood’s (1979) framework. Task uncertainty relates to both 
the businesslike and political control context.  
One possible trajectory for researching task uncertainty is to research the measur-
ability of output and processes. Ouchi (1979) offers clear relationships between 
mechanisms of task control and measurability of tasks, and these insights can be 
used for analysis when output or process measures are to be expected. This frame-
work is however less clear on the possible different roles of information use. Another 
option is to apply the information-use related aspects of task uncertainty, based on 
Galbraith’s (1973) principle of information gap, but this concept is only indicatively 
being used to construct measurement instruments
29. The third option is to use Per-
row’s (1970) framework, and apply the level of routines of tasks as an indication for 
task uncertainty. This framework is in accordance with Galbraith’s notion of pro-
grammability and information deficit, and various accounting studies have applied 
measurement instruments, based on this framework (Chenhall, 1998). This study 
therefore refers to Perrow’s aspect of routineness in order to frame task uncertainty. 
                                            
29 One possible approach is to estimate the total amount of information that managers require and can 
process (Jansen, 2000). Existing accounting literature has however not yet rigorously tested this con-
ceptual instrument empirically.   32
 
Roles of BPM 
Four of the archetypical roles are used as reference: the “answering” role
30, the 
“learning” role, the “ammunition” role, and the “rationalization” role. The more norma-
tively defined roles, such as the “dialogue” and “idea creation” machine role, are not 
directly included in this research. The explorative nature of the research design and 
analysis, however, does not preclude the possible application of these roles. 
Simons’s interactive control systems could probably be regarded as a “dialogue”, 
“learning” and “idea creation” machine for implementing strategy (Abernethy and 
Brownell, 1999), and can function as a reference for research later on. 
In order to express the expected essential functions of the four roles, Earl and Hop-
wood’s descriptions of roles are used to compose a descriptive phrase per role. 
These phrases are used to express the main characteristics of the roles. 
 
BPM-use 
 As has been documented in the previous sections, AIS can be defined by its design 
characteristics and by its quality. Both aspects are used in this study in order to de-
fine the use of BPM. 
Measuring the research framework 
In this section the defined constructs and aspects of the research framework are 
documented in more detail and made operational for empirical research. Figure 3 
presents a picture of the constructs. 
 
 
Control Context
•businesslike
•political
Roles of BPM Use of BPM
Antecedent aspects  Different Roles Use of BPM
Task Uncertainty
Control Context
•businesslike
•political
Roles of BPM Use of BPM
Antecedent aspects  Different Roles Use of BPM
Task Uncertainty
 
Figure 3 Research framework 
Measuring the control context: uncertainty and ambiguity of objectives 
Measuring uncertainty of objectives is an area that is not well covered within man-
agement accounting literature. Most of the accounting contingency literature is fo-
cused more on the effects of specific forms of uncertainty, e.g. of environmental un-
certainty on organizational structures or performance, and often uses risk, hostility, 
diversity, or complexity as contextual factors (e.g. Otley 1980; Chapman, 1997; 
Chenhall, 2003). 
At an organizational level, certainty of objectives can be replaced by the concept of 
clearness of objectives. Clearness of objectives, or goal clarity, is a concept that is 
frequently used in RAPM-literature, and can combine elements of goal specificity and 
                                            
30 For convenience of the reader the “machine” additive is left out in the rest of the research.  
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role ambiguity (Hartmann, 1997). Role ambiguity is related to an individual’s percep-
tion of others’ expectations of him- or herself, and can be conceived as a shortfall of 
information relevant for performing a role adequately (Marginson and Ogden, 2004). 
Role ambiguity thus relates to individual and psychological aspects, and is not in-
cluded in this study. Aiming to capture organizational objective related aspects, only 
Hartmann’s (1997) instrument for measuring goal specificity (see appendix) is used 
in this study to estimate the relative level of uncertainty of objectives.  
 
Indications of the level of ambiguity of objectives can be obtained by measuring pos-
sible conflicts of interest between relevant groups of persons (Hofstede, 1981). 
Oliver’s (1991, p. 162) notion of multiplicity, as “the degree of multiple, conflicting, 
constituent expectations exerted on an organization” is used to capture the likeliness 
of ambiguous objectives. Oliver (1991) suggested that organizational awareness of 
these conflicting institutional pressures can be used as a predictive factor of multiplic-
ity. A specially designed instrument for the purpose of measuring multiplicity in this 
research is used to apply this aspect. 
 
Measuring the control context: integration 
Limited accounting research has been published on the integration of BPM in gov-
ernmental organizations. The majority of research is more descriptive and qualitative 
in nature, and mainly suggests specific relevant aspects instead of testing more gen-
eral hypotheses. This study is therefore only using the more qualitative aspects. 
Two different concepts of integration are used in this study; between financial and 
non-financial BPM and between lower and higher hierarchical levels in the organiza-
tion. The integration between financial and non-financial BPM is researched by ana-
lyzing both financial and non-financial BPM separately, using the planning and con-
trol documents of responsibility centers as an indication. The concept of integration of 
BPM throughout the hierarchy can be qualitatively researched by capturing the pres-
ence of loosely coupled performance measures (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Brig-
nall and Modell, 2000). 
Integration throughout the hierarchy can also be captured by Hartmann’s measure-
ment of goal specificity.  This measurement applies, among others, to the concept of 
integration of goals with tasks as an indication of the clearness of objectives. Clear 
objectives are here related to greater integration of goals and tasks. Hartmann’s 
measurement is used to capture integration, and adapted for use in a more qualita-
tive case-based research setting within Dutch local government.  
 
Measuring the control context: tight budgetary control 
According to Merchant (1981), budgetary tightness can be obtained by: definition of 
goals (more complete, specific, and congruent), communication of goals (more effi-
ciently, timely, frequently and convincingly), monitoring of actions and results (more 
frequent, detailed, and timely), and by rewarding (stricter relationship between re-
wards and achieved performance). 
Van der Stede (2000) suggested to measure tight budgetary control by four factors:  
(a) tolerance of interim budget deviation, 
(b) detailed line-item follow-ups,    34
(c) intense discussions of budget results, and 
(d) strong emphasis on meeting short-run budget targets.  
Van der Stede’s instrument for measuring tight budgetary control is used in this 
study, and adapted for use in a more qualitative case-based research setting within 
Dutch local government. 
 
Measuring routineness of tasks 
Routineness is defined by two dimensions: well established or analyzable techniques 
for task execution and the degree of variety in the tasks encountered. The routine-
ness of tasks is high when tasks are highly analyzable and the number of exceptions 
is low (Perrow, 1970). A conventional way of measuring task uncertainty is by using 
the instrument originally developed by Withey e.a. (1983). This instrument is a well-
established method for measuring both task analyzability as well as the number of 
exceptions (e.g. see Abernethy and Brownell, 1997, Hartman 1997), and is adapted 
for used in Dutch local governmental organizations (Budding, 2004). 
 
Measuring the roles of BPM 
In order to capture the four archetypical roles of BPM, each role is characterized by a 
characteristic phrase, and is related to its antecedents (context of control and tasks 
uncertainty). In order to apply the characteristic phrase in empirical research, for 
each phrase one or more key characteristics are added. These key characteristics do 
not replace the phrase, but aim to highlight the most important characteristics. 
The answering role: 
•  is characterized by the following phrase: The “answering” role stresses the 
assumption that the control process, by using pre-set standards, formulae and 
rules, can evaluate performance variances by itself; act as an automatic 
mechanism for providing answers (Earl and Hopwood, 1979; Simons, 1995). 
Applying this phrase, the key characteristic is to diagnose performance vari-
ances (compare actual and budgeted performance), 
•  is expected to relate to the businesslike context of organizational control, 
•  is expected to relate to relatively high levels of task routines. 
The learning role: 
•  is characterized by the following phrase: It is the function of the “learning” role 
to assist decision making and to reduce ex-ante uncertainty (Burchell e.a., 
1980; Earl and Hopwood, 1979). Applying this role, managers or politicians 
use the control systems for decision support, using a trial-and-error approach. 
With this trial-and-error approach the focus is on learning to achieve desirable 
outputs. But if the ability to measure outputs is low, output control is not feasi-
ble and only informal controls (such as clan control) can be applied (Ouchi, 
1979). Applying this phrase, the key characteristics are: to learn and to 
change ways of doing, and unequivocal signaling of what is important (focus 
on key issues); 
•  is expected to relate to the businesslike context of organizational control, 
•  is expected to relate to relatively low levels of task routines.  
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The ammunition role: 
•  is characterized by the following phrase: It is the function of the “ammunition” 
role to make specific information visible in order to promote particular inter-
ested positions and values to obtain resources (Burchell e.a., 1980). By apply-
ing this role, top managers and politicians are using political processes and 
political control. Control is here in essence non-cybernetic and is applied more 
via a control structure than a control process (Hofstede, 1978). Top managers 
and politicians are using the “ammunition” role to try to influence decision 
making, and to obtain resources to be spent.  Applying this phrase, the key 
characteristics are: unequivocal signaling of what is important (focus on key 
issues), and influencing future budget increases; 
•  is expected to relate to the political context of organizational control, 
•  is expected to relate to relatively high levels of task routines. 
The rationalization role: 
•  is characterized by the following phrase: It is the function of the “rationalization 
role” to provide retro-active understanding of actions, specifically to external 
constituencies. By applying this role, top managers and politicians are using 
performance measures for the need to justify and legitimize actions already 
taken. Applying this phrase, the key characteristic is: to report on past per-
formances for reasons of justification, 
•  is expected to relate to the political context of organizational control, 
•  is expected to relate to relative low levels of task routines. 
 
Measuring BPM use 
In order to capture the information-related aspects of budget roles, BPM use is char-
acterized by the design characteristics and the quality of the AIS (Anthony, 1988). 
Aiming to include budget-related design characteristics of AIS in governmental or-
ganizations, both the short-term
31 financial and non-financial information must be in-
cluded (Van Helden and Ter Bogt, 2001; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). The 
first design characteristic thus captures the use of financial or non-financial informa-
tion.  
Secondly, the time horizon of information is included; the historical or future orienta-
tion of the information. Accounting information on past and actual performances is 
viewed as historical, and information relating to estimates, forecasts, and future 
events is classified as future oriented (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1996).  
Thirdly, often formal information for organizational control purposes is not exclusively 
restricted to budget related information. Often additional formal information is used 
for planning, communication, and evaluation purposes (Simons, 2000). Additional 
formal information is included as a design characteristic.  
In conclusion, four general information-related characteristics of budget control are 
included: (I) financial or non-financial pre-defined quantitative norms (budget), (II) 
information on actual accomplishments (actual), (III) variance information between 
                                            
31 The planning horizon of cost budgets in governmental organizations is on average one year (Ter Bogt, 2001). 
The planning horizons of capital spending budgets are assumed to vary with the length of capital spending-
project.  
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actual and budget, (IV) additive information (on past performances, estimates, fore-
casts, and future events). 
 
The four archetypical roles are assumed to relate to specific design characteristics of 
BPM-use. Using the descriptive phrases as indications, some suggestions can be 
made. The answering role stresses the use of variance information, using actual and 
budgeted performance measures as a reference. The learning role underlines the 
importance of additional information, using actual and budgeted performance meas-
ures, and information on performance variance as a reference. The ammunition role 
focuses on influencing decision makers to obtain future budget provision. However, 
no assumptions are made on the extent to which actual, variance or additive per-
formance measures can be of importance. The rationalization role addresses histori-
cal information, and is expected to relate to reported measures on achieved perform-
ances. No assumptions are made on the extent to which information on budget, vari-
ance or additive performances can be relevant. Table 29 in the appendix documents 
a comprehensive overview. 
 
Quality of AIS is captured by using user satisfaction as a surrogate measure. 
End-user computer satisfaction (EUCS) is considered in the information system lit-
erature as a respectable and reliable measure that can assess the success of the 
AIS use (McHaney e.a., 1999). EUCS consists of five components: ease of use, con-
tent, accuracy, format and timeliness (Doll and Torzadeh, 1988). Table 32 in the ap-
pendix documents the twelve questions in the EUCS-test. The questions of the 
EUCS-test are adapted for use in a more qualitative case-based research setting 
within Dutch local government. 
By characterizing the design criteria of AIS through the user satisfaction measure, 
AIS is identified by its perceived relevance for the user. It is being assumed that this 
user-satisfaction is positively related to the use of AIS for control purposes. 
Overview of the research framework 
The research framework is composed using three main constructs: the antecedents 
of roles of BPM (being the contexts of organizational control and task uncertainty), 
the roles of BPM (represented by four archetypical roles), and the use of BPM (see 
Figure 3 on previous page). 
  
Using existing accounting theory, the use of two separate contexts of organizational 
control are called for; the businesslike and the political context. These contexts are 
not mutually exclusive, but are expected to highlight specific aspects that are as-
sumed to relate to both contexts. Four aspects are used to define the two contexts: 
uncertainty of objectives, ambiguity of objectives, integration, and tightness of budg-
etary control (see Table 28 in Appendix VIII  Summary of Aspects). Assumed values 
of aspects are motivated and linked to the two contexts, but no assumptions are 
made on the various combinations of aspects that can occur
32.  
                                            
32 For example, perceived certainty of objectives or integration between objectives and BPM (as indi-
cations of a businesslike context) and higher levels of ambiguity of objectives (as an indication of a  
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Measures for the aspects are selected
33. Uncertainty of objectives is captured by 
valuing goal specificity, ambiguity of objectives by using multiplicity, tight budget con-
trol by using four interrelated aspects (tolerance for deviation, detailed follow-ups, 
intensity of discussions, and emphasis on targets), and integration of BPM is meas-
ured by goal specificity. 
 
Task uncertainty is captured by using routines of tasks, measuring both task analyz-
ability as well as the number of exceptions as aspects. 
 
   control  context 
   businesslike political 
task  
uncertainty 
low “answering”  role 
providing variance information 
“ammunition” role 
promoting particular interests 
  high   “learning” role 
assist decision-making 
“rationalizing” role 
providing retro-active understanding 
 
Table 1 Positioning of the archetypical roles of budgets 
 
Four identified roles of BPM are explicitly characterized by a descriptive phrase, and 
are related to the perspectives and to task uncertainty (see Table 1).  
Referring to the descriptive phrases of the roles of BPM, several information-related 
aspects are abstracted: 
•  to diagnose, to compare actual and budgeted performance (answering role) 
•  to learn and to change ways of doing (learning role)  
•  unequivocal signaling what is important (learning role, ammunition role) 
•  influencing future budget increase (ammunition role) 
•  to report and explain past performances (rationalization role) 
 
The quality of BPM use is captured by using user satisfaction (applying the user sat-
isfaction measurement instrument of Doll and Torkadeh, 1998), which captures the 
aspects: ease of use, content, accuracy, format and timeliness. 
                                                                                                                                        
more political context of control) can occur simultaneously. Empirical information will indicate the ac-
tual mix of factors, which can suggest the presence of one or both contexts. 
33 see Table 28 in the Appendix.    38
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3. Research Design 
This chapter documents the plan made to collect data to answer the research ques-
tions. 
Using the research framework 
The research framework can be seen as a fairly open framework of some specific 
and some generally defined theoretical concepts. The notion that different contexts of 
organizational control can influence the roles of BPM is used as the starting point for 
this exploration. This notion must be regarded as a suggestion in order to “explicate 
social reality and challenge technocratic wisdom” (Earl and Hopwood,1979, p.11). In 
line with this, this study does not reject the traditional, rational view of using budget-
ary control, but aims to include the possible influences of both the businesslike ra-
tionale as well as the more political rationale on the different roles of BPM. 
The relationship between the possible different contexts of BPM and the actual ap-
plied roles has as yet been only limitedly researched. Only fragmentary research is 
currently available, especially on the roles of BPM use in governmental organiza-
tions. Usable theory and related hypothesis on the relationship between BPM roles, 
their assumed context, and possible performance information use appears to be 
sparse. More insight and knowledge is needed in order to replace suggestions with 
assumptions. Consequently this study is mostly concerned with exploring and refin-
ing existing theory, not with quantitative testing of predefined hypothesis. A contribu-
tion to quantitatively-testable assumptions is seen as one of the desirable results of 
this study.  
 
With the focus on exploration, the production of a high level of statistical generaliza-
tion is not put at a premium. External validity is therefore mainly approached analyti-
cally, which involves an assessment of the extent to which a particular set of re-
search results generalizes to a theory (Brownell, 1995).  
Case study research is seen as a suitable methodical choice. Case study is de-
scribed by Yin (1994, p13) as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident”. 
 
In analyzing the four archetypical roles of BPM, a minimum of four cases are used in 
this study. The four cases are intended to produce theoretical replications, using the 
research framework (see paragraph “Building a research framework“) to produce four 
different results for predictable reasons (Yin, 1994). In order to produce four contrast-
ing results, case selection aims to include contrasting values of measurable aspects. 
Research validity is enhanced by checking for pre-defined contextual factors. An 
open mind is kept on these contextual factors during the research; cases can pro-
duce conflicting theory, and initial propositions can be re-evaluated. 
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Construct and internal validity and reliability are further strengthened by using Yin’s 
(1994) guidelines. In order to improve construct validity, both documents and inter-
views are used as sources of evidence. Also, with the aim of analyzing the use of 
“vertical” information flows, both superiors and subordinates are interviewed, about 
the same unit of analysis. Interviews are held in a semi-structured way. The inter-
views are guided by the use of case protocols. Experts (such as management con-
sultants, academics, and municipal managers) are involved to calibrate questions to 
local needs, and key informants are approached to review drafts of the case study 
reports.  
Detailed case study protocols are used. A case protocol contains an overview of the 
project, the field procedures, the case questions, and a guide for the case study re-
port. The protocol is the main instrument to maximize the reliability of case study re-
search (Yin, 1994). The protocol contains checklists of desirable procedures, semi-
structured questionnaires and open questions. These can be adjusted during the pro-
ject when relevant variations occur. 
 
The focal point of this study is the way BPM is being used to control subordinate 
management in governmental organizations, with an initial focus on the top of the 
organization. The main unit of analysis is therefore the control relationship of politi-
cians with top managers (the top civil managers). In order to include more possible 
contextual details in the exploration, the next lower organizational level is also in-
cluded in the case study. The embedded unit level of analysis is therefore the control 
relation of top management with middle management (next level management). 
 
This embedded multiple case study method is chosen to recognize possible refine-
ments of the research framework and to make it more compelling and robust. Em-
bedding is seen as a necessary design choice to “prevent that the entire nature of the 
case shifts during the course of the study” and to use it as an “important device for 
focusing a case study inquiry” (Yin, 1994, p. 51). 
 
The embedded analysis is undertaken with a view towards supporting the analysis 
conducted at the more aggregated level. Embedded analysis will therefore result in 
aggregated measures on the main level of analysis. The rationale for this embedded 
design is the access it can give to multiple data gathering (Brownell, 1995). Semi-
structured interviews (using both structured and open questions as predefined ques-
tionnaires) and desk research (to serve a role of convergent validation of other data) 
are used as sources of evidence. Interviews are recorded, and interview reports are 
confirmed by interviewees.  
Selection of cases 
In order to select appropriate cases, a two-step approach is taken. The purpose of 
the first step is to select those organizational activities for which the roles of the 
budget are expected to vary the most. The second step is aimed at selection of the 
most suitable organization(s) for case research.  
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Selection of organizational activities 
The first step in the selection process is the selection of a minimum of four different 
(groups of) organizational activities that are assumed to relate closely to the four dif-
ferent roles of budget use.  
Dutch municipalities use different structures for grouping organizational tasks. Con-
centrating on structures that are used for defining organizational objectives, three 
different types of groups are mainly used: program-, product- , and function-related 
groups. Many municipalities have recently presented integrated outcome-related pro-
gram budgets to define and refine their political objectives. These programs are often 
focused on issues which are frequently thought to be interrelated by the local popula-
tion. Programs can focus, for example, on safety, culture, education, or the local 
economy. Product structures are in general used to determine the more operational 
objectives, targets and performances. Product structures often relate to the specific 
organizational structure, to responsibility centers within the organization, and to spe-
cific product managers. The last structure is the organizational function, and consists 
of pre-defined groups of products. The organizational functions are mandated by 
central government and applied by all municipalities, in order to facilitate processes 
of accountability to society and central government, for example, and of inter-
organizational benchmarks
34. 
As a consequence of this mandated use, organizational activities in principle cover all 
organizational functions and are comparable between different municipal organiza-
tions. This study therefore uses the structure of organizational functions to select 
relevant organizational groups of tasks. A listing of organizational functions has been 
obtained by using the national standard formats for annual reports and budgets for 
local government (the so called “BBV-format”
34).   
 
However, the organizational functions can be heterogeneous; they can contain many 
different types of activities or tasks (with for example different level of routineness of 
tasks) and can relate to multiple types of objectives (with possible different levels of 
uncertainty). During the selection process extra attention is paid to identify these 
possible heterogeneities. 
 
For the selection process, interviews were held with 11 senior managers from various 
large Dutch municipalities (circa 100,000 inhabitants or more). A specially prepared 
selection protocol
35 was used, containing several semi-structured questions. The 
main purpose of the interviews was to identify groups of activities that are assumed 
to relate to the four archetypal roles. Applying the previously defined research 
framework, the selection process mainly collected information on uncertainty and 
ambiguity of objectives and on task uncertainty. The interviews were also used to 
identify alternative suggestions, insights and practices that could be of importance in 
conducting the case research later on. 
 
                                            
34 As a result of the Budget and Accountability Act for provinces and municipalities, in Dutch “Besluit 
Begroting en Verantwoording provincies en gemeenten” or BBV. 
35 Available on request.    42
During the interviews, a checklist of organizational functions was used. This list was 
mainly used by the interviewer, and contained a number of pre-selected functions 
expected to be mentioned by the interviewees. This list was not limiting and during 
the interviews functions could be added to it. Interviews lasted approximately one 
hour, were recorded, and summarized reports of the interviews were communicated 
to the interviewees. 
 
Interviews were held at the municipalities of Schiedam, Alkmaar, Emmen, Zwolle, 
Dordrecht, Hengelo, Zoetermeer, Helmond, Apeldoorn, Leeuwarden, and Tilburg. 
Almost all of the interviews were held solely with the general manager, in some 
cases the concern controller participated. 
 
The interviews revealed some general observations. 
Firstly, all municipalities seem to organize the planning and control process in similar 
ways. Annually updated medium-term plans (often with a planning horizon of five 
years) are used to document the objectives, and programs and products are used to 
structure the objectives. Bi-annual management reports and annual reports are used 
to inform politicians and other stakeholders. The objectives and desirable perform-
ances are described in the medium term plans, in the yearly budget, and in more de-
tail in operational planning documents.  
Secondly, the process of setting objectives is generally perceived as being relatively 
easy. Setting objectives is often a minor concern and given limited effort. Large mu-
nicipalities (belonging to the group of the 26 largest municipalities in the Netherlands) 
are also involved in a more mandatory and centrally-coordinated process of setting 
objectives. This process is part of a national program to allocate special funds to 
main cities. Discussions become more intense only when specific political issues are 
highlighted during the process of objective setting, can. 
Thirdly, setting clear and measurable objectives for all policy fields or political pro-
grams is not always seen as realistic. Objectives can sometimes be vague and diffi-
cult to achieve, caused by the heterogeneity and diversity of the underlying activities. 
The need to make the objectives more specific and realizable is often perceived as a 
long term improvement process, not as an issue that needs urgent attention. Appar-
ently-unrealizable or not fully-realizable objectives are not always adjusted. This 
happens for instance when external factors are perceived as the main cause of the 
failure to achieve. 
 
To recognize the more political perspective of control, ambiguity of objectives is used 
in the selection phase as a key selection criterion, and is captured by the more exter-
nally-oriented aspect of multiplicity. Differences in multiplicity are captured by re-
cording the conflicts over setting and using organizational objectives, as perceived by 
the interviewees. Managers were asked to name a number of functions considered to 
relate the most and the least to the conflicting pressures of stakeholders. Interview-
ees were not asked to evaluate all the functions on the BBV-list, but to name a mini-
mum of four functions (two related to limited conflict and two related to relatively high 
levels of conflict). A list was made by collecting the scores of the eleven interviewees,  
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and functions were grouped by the number of times they were named relative to high 
or low levels of conflict.   
 
Interviewees indicated that the levels of conflict of functions, or parts of functions, 
differed significantly in their organization. Discussing multiplicity, and the level of dis-
pute that is assumed to be associated with it, it appeared to be easier to name func-
tions associated with high levels of dispute rather than with low levels. High levels 
seem on average to be associated with changes in political priorities, often by 
changes in political programs. Significant external uncertainties were recalled, espe-
cially uncertainties related to obtaining funds from central government or to national 
economic trends that can interfere with local social and economical objectives. Activi-
ties that involved intensive consultations and negotiations with citizens and busi-
nesses were also mentioned. 
Analyzing the results of the interviews, perceptions about multiplicity vary considera-
bly between organizations. A number of organizational functions score four or more 
times on high multiplicity: such as spatial planning (7), housing (6), and public safety 
(4). The scores for low level of conflicts were less obvious, and contained functions 
such as: sports, sewerage, and public libraries (see Table 30 in the appendix).  
    
Analyzing the variation in the level of routineness, the observations seem to vary less 
than those related to multiplicity. Interviewees revealed little difference in the per-
ceived level of routineness between different functions. The routineness of almost all 
organizational functions was perceived as relatively high. When the routineness of 
organizational functions appeared to be lower, interviewees explained that this was 
only a temporary situation. It was suggested that functions were temporarily less rou-
tine, due to changes in the organization’s structure or organizational processes. In-
terviewees expected that when these changes where implemented, processes or 
functions would become more standardized and controlled by procedures. In general, 
top managers of municipalities seem to prefer high levels of routineness of tasks. 
When analyzing the results of the interviews, it was taken into account that differ-
ences in the level of routineness are less-explicitly articulated. A number of functions 
can be seen to have relatively high levels of routineness (for example: welfare pay-
ment and sewerage), and consequently low levels of routineness (for example spatial 
planning). Table 31 in the appendix contains the complete list of the named organiza-
tional functions.  
 
Combining the two analyses, a set of four (partial) functions were selected for this 
study. A choice for combination of ‘businesslike context and low task uncertainty‘ and 
‘political context and high task uncertainty’ appeared to be quite straightforward. The 
interviews pointed to Sewerage and Spatial planning
36 as reasonably clear examples 
of these two positions. But the interviews resulted in far less straightforward results 
for the other diagonal of the framework. Welfare Payment
37 was eventually selected 
as a function that relates to a ‘political context and low task uncertainty’, but the inter-
                                            
36 In Dutch: “Riolering en Ruimtelijk beleid”. 
37 In Dutch: “Bijstandsverlening”.   44
views also suggested that aspects of a ‘businesslike context’ could be of some im-
portance too. The selection of the last organizational function could not be made by 
referring to interviews only. Additional consultation with experts in this field was used 
to resolve this issue. Economic Policy
38 was eventually selected as an example of a 
function that is related to a businesslike context and low task uncertainty, because it 
is involved with the function of industry and small business policy. 
Table 2 summarizes the four selected functions in relation to the control contexts and 
the level of task uncertainty. 
 
  Businesslike context  Political context 
Low level  
of task uncertainty 
Sewerage Welfare  Payments 
High level  
of task uncertainty 
Economic Policy  Spatial Planning 
Table 2 Selected functions 
 
Selection of organization(s) 
Four considerations were used in the selecting of an organization: the main purpose 
of the cases, the organizational size, the variety of organizational functions, and fac-
tors to control for.  
 
The desired result of this study is to identify testable hypotheses on the causal rela-
tions between relevant dimensions and factors, not to test them. Consequently, this 
study is not primarily concerned with the reliability of measuring variables, but more 
with the elimination of errors and biases (Brownell, 1995). Explanation building is 
used to compare the theory with the case findings and “revising the propositions to 
accommodate these data and then re-examining the case evidence from the per-
spective of this new proposition” (Brownell, 1995, p. 64). 
The number of organizations could be small because the case study is not relying on 
statistical but on analytical generalization (Yin, 1994). The selection of cases within 
one organization could even be preferable. Limiting the research to one single or-
ganization could eliminate the number of control factors that would otherwise be re-
quired to check for organizational differences. The obvious drawback to restricted 
external validity is the limited use of an objective and replicable selection-process. 
The limited check on factors that are not directly included in the research framework, 
but which can significantly influence the analysis, is also a factor.  
 
Organizational size is another relevant factor (e.g. Otley, 1994, Merchant, 1998). Not 
only is an increase in size assumed to relate positively to the use of formal controls 
but larger organizations also need to institute controls such as documentation, spe-
                                            
38 In Dutch: ”Economisch beleid”.  
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cialization of roles and functions, extended hierarchies and greater decentralization 
down hierarchical structures (Chenhall, 2003).  
This study analyzes the use of formal controls in a hierarchical setting; consequently, 
it is preferable that the selected organization is not too small. The embedded level of 
analysis imposes another restriction on the size of the organization. The cases aim to 
capture different roles of budgets and include three different hierarchical levels (be-
tween politicians and top managers and between top managers and lower level 
management). These three hierarchical levels must be directly related, and prefera-
bly able to capture possible conflicts in values or interest. These conflicts are in gen-
eral expected to occur between politicians and top management or between top 
management and professionals. (Brignall and Modell, 2000). Consequently, the pre-
ferred organizational size ought to facilitate an embedded level of analysis between 
top management and professionals. This restriction excludes very large organiza-
tions with multiple management levels.  
After consulting Dutch local government experts (both academics and consultants), 
the preferred organizational size was found to be a municipality with around 100,000 
inhabitants or more. This selection criterion eliminates relatively small organizations.   
 
The variety of organizational functions is another selection criterion. The selected 
organization must, at least potentially, provide services or products matching the as-
pects witch are the subject of this study. Insiders on BBV indicate that municipalities 
with around 100,000 inhabitants or more differ little in the number and complexity of 
organizational functions. Therefore variety in function is not included as an extra se-
lection criterion.  
 
The validity of research can be improved by including relevant control factors in the 
selection process. Contingency literature on management accounting indicates that, 
amongst other things, environment, technology, size, structure and strategy are rele-
vant factors which can influence the effectiveness of management control (Chenhall, 
2003). Differences in these contextual variables are expected to influence the design 
and the use of the management control system. 
 
Both environment and technology are explicitly integrated in the research framework. 
Ambiguity of objectives is used as an environmental aspect. An indication for am-
biguous or uncertain objectives is derived by using multiplicity as a factor that can 
articulate the presence of possible conflicting or disputed organizational objectives. 
Clearness of objectives is a more direct measure of unambiguous objectives, and is 
used during execution of the cases.  
Technology has many meanings in management accounting literature, and can be 
identified as: complexity, task uncertainty and interdependence (Chenhall, 2003). 
This study uses routineness of tasks as a substitute for task uncertainty.  
Size is already accounted for, which leaves organizational structure and strategy as 
two important contextual factors to be addressed. 
 
Management accounting literature offers many definitions of organizational structure. 
Accounting systems are often seen as part of this, and are often investigational as-  46
pects of centralized or decentralized decision-making in organizations (Chapman, 
1997). This study aims to check for differences in organizational structure by ad-
dressing this aspect in the selection process. 
Decentralization is multi-dimensional by nature, and can be measured in various 
ways. A general way to characterize decentralization is to differentiate the mecha-
nisms for decentralizing general management decisions, i.e. by differentiating be-
tween the use of the functional, divisional, or holding company model (Galbraith, 
1994). A more instrumental way to measure decentralization is to measure the rela-
tive use of profit, production and cost centers by the next management level 
(Christie, 2003). This study is uses the existence of cost centers at operational level 
as an indication of a decentralized organizational structure. 
 
Strategy is a concept that is mainly constructed and analyzed within the setting of 
profit organizations, and is regarded as ill-defined within a governmental organiza-
tional context. Transporting this profit-oriented concept of strategy into the govern-
mental environment requires specific in-depth research, which is outside the scope of 
this study. Therefore, organizational strategy is not included in this study. 
However, in order to recognize possible strategy-related factors, some aspects are 
included in this research. Strategy of profit organizations is often seen as a concept 
that show the organizational strategic preferences and focuses, for example on cost 
control or on product innovation, that are expected to deliver desirable financial “bot-
tom line” objectives (e.g. Miles and Snow, 1978; Simons, 1990). Governmental or-
ganizations, however, lack this “bottom line”. The organizational emphasis is often on 
financial and non-financial performances, on financial budgets and social perform-
ances. Aiming to document possible differences, this study researches financial and 
non-financial performances separately. 
 
In researching organizational control, the possible impact of organizational change 
must also be considered, at least to some extent. Organizations can develop gradu-
ally within a relatively stable environment, or can be involved in sudden and specific 
changes, and changes in, for example, organizational strategy, organizational size, 
or organizational structure can influence the design and use of AIS (see for example 
Shortell and Zajac, 1990). 
Recent changes in organizational size (inhabitants and number of civil servants) and 
organizational structure (i.e. change of the AIS) are measured per municipality
39. 
Desk-research and archival data were used for collecting information, and telephone 
interviews were conducted when data had to be checked or added.   
After applying the above-documented selection criteria, and because they were will-
ing to participate, the municipality of Leeuwarden was chosen as a suitable organiza-
tion within which to conduct the empirical research. 
                                            
39  See Table 33 in the appendix.  
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4. Four Case Studies 
This chapter contains reports on the four case studies. These case studies were 
made within one Dutch municipality, and relate to four different functional groups: 
Welfare Payment, Sewerage, Economic Policy, and Spatial Planning. The chapter 
begins with a brief introduction to the case studies and an overview of planning and 
control in the municipality. The rest of this chapter contains the four individual case 
study reports.  
Introduction 
The municipality of Leeuwarden is the subject of research. The city is situated in the 
northern part of The Netherlands, and is the capital of the province Fryslân. Important 
criteria for selecting this municipality were, amongst others: its size (the town has 
around 100,000 inhabitants), its relatively stable organizational structure in the recent 
past (e.g. no recent mergers with other local governmental organizations, no recent 
large scale re-organizations), and its history of gradual development of planning and 
control systems.  
 
Prior to the start of the four case studies, some intake interviews were held with the 
civil chief executive and the controller of the municipality. The purpose of these inter-
views was to collect information about the four selected functional groups, and to 
compare this information with the findings of the selection phase
40. In general, the 
interviews confirmed the findings of the selection process. No clear indications of ill-
selected cases or organization surfaced at the start of the case studies. 
 
The focus of the research is on the use of performance measures for management 
control, and therefore on the design and use of planning and control and the use of 
performance information within the municipal organization. The planning and control 
instruments, the planning and control process, and the budget process are thus the 
objects of the study.  
Due to the descriptive and exploratory nature of this research, its aim is to embrace a 
wide range of items that relate to the use of performance measures. Central to this 
process of collecting, documenting, and analyzing information is the research proto-
col
41 (see previous chapter). This protocol contains the processes to be followed, the 
activities to be performed, the rules to be followed, and the questions to be asked. 
The protocol is more than a guideline, it defines specific rules that must be re-
spected, and specific information that must be gathered. It also leaves room for the 
researcher to address additional issues and to ask for complementary or supplemen-
tary information. Information is gathered by desk research and interviews. Draft ver-
sions of the interview reports were communicated to the interviewees. The case 
                                            
40 During these interviews the checklist, previously used to select organizational functions, was ap-
plied. 
41 Case study protocol is available on request.   48
study reports were based on the final interview reports, and were discussed with the 
involved persons (for an overview of the interviewed persons see Appendix III  Inter-
viewed persons). 
 
The four case studies were sequentially executed and reported. When relevant or 
useful, additional observations were included during the research. Beforehand it was 
assumed that aspects could differ significantly per case study. Each case study 
therefore documents the specific context of the researched aspects. To enhance the 
comparability between different case studies, they are reported in a uniform format. 
Although this format means there is some repetition, due to common ground within 
each case study, there is still the flexibility to document specific items. 
 
The main stands of the four case study reports are therefore comparable. Each case 
starts with a report of the most relevant strategic objectives, a summary of the legal 
and organizational context of the researched group of activities, and a brief descrip-
tion of the relevant planning and control documents. The use of performance related 
information is then documented from three different organizational perspectives; from 
the viewpoint of the aldermen, the director (civil servant), and the operational man-
ager. Each case study ends with a documentation of the aspects as defined by the 
researched framework. 
 
The next section introduces the planning and control instruments used by the mu-
nicipality. Subsequently, the four cases are presented.  
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Planning and control at an organizational level 
The researched municipality (Leeuwarden) uses a planning and control approach for 
formulating and evaluating its strategic objectives and for controlling the execution of 
these objectives. Central to this approach is the use of various predefined planning 
and control instruments. These instruments can be classified in two groups: once or 
occasionally drawn up instruments (often future-oriented with a time horizon of more 
than one year) and instruments produced within the annual planning and control cy-
cle. 
 
Most of the municipal policies and strategic objectives have a multi-year horizon, and 
many instruments of strategic planning are produced outside the annual planning and 
control cycle. A few typical examples are: 
•  The Executive Program 2002-2006, determined by the executive board (made 
up of the mayor and aldermen), in which the municipal council of Leeuwarden 
(abbreviated as Council) outlines its vision and strategic priorities for the com-
ing years. 
•  The “City Vision 2002”
42, set by the Council, which contains strategic concepts 
relating to living in the city and to the accessibility of the city. 
•  The “Regional Vision”
43, set by the province of Fryslân, with reference to the 
researched Council and the local water board, concerns general themes such 
as strengthening the position of the city in relation to surrounding cities (in 
terms of living, working, culture, health services and education). 
•  The City Covenant, an agreement between the Council and the province of 
Fryslân. 
•  MOP2, the second version of a long term development program, used in a 
“large city
44” covenant between the city and central government. This cove-
nant stimulates and finances projects related to the specific situation of the 
thirty largest cities in The Netherlands. 
•  Several policy documents and plans
45.  
These documents contain specific visions, policies, goals, objectives, and plans. 
These documents are often set up for a specific purpose and focus essentially on the 
aspects relevant to that purpose. Together these documents form the complex, de-
tailed, yet not closely related and even sometimes divergent policies of the municipal-
ity. 
 
The annual planning and control cycle is used to carry out the local government’s 
policies. This yearly cycle integrates the organizational policies into comprehensive 
organizational formats (often relating to the current or coming year), and contains all 
                                            
42 In Dutch the “Stadsvisie”, titled “Sailing under own flag” (“Varen onder eigen vlag”). 
43 In Dutch “Regiovisie Stadsregio Leeuwarden en Westergo zone”. 
44 In Dutch “Grote stedenbeleid” or “GSB”. 
45 Such as the  2001-2004 Art and Culture policy plan, a plan for public school concentration, a plan to 
stimulate the local economy, a parking policy plan, and several medium term programs (e.g. infra-
structural or sewer system programs).   50
the instruments necessary for yearly organizational planning and control. The yearly 
cycle in Leeuwarden is contained in the following instruments (see also Table 3). 
•  The Pre-Budget Report, a brief reflection on the mainly estimated financial or-
ganizational policies. This report gives an insight into the boundaries for the 
coming years, and is used as input for program and budget setting. The dis-
cussion of the Pre-budget report in the Council gives the executive board 
feedback on the need for, or opportunities for, policy changes.   
•  The Program Budget, the main budget of the municipality, documents the 
budgetary results for which the executive board is held accountable to the 
Council. 
•  The Sector Plan, produced by the sector manager and set by the civil execu-
tives, documents the objectives and actions of the Program Budget in more 
detailed and operational terms. 
•  The Interim Report (TURAP), in which the executive board reports to the 
Council the progress of the activities defined in the Program Budget. 
•  The Quarterly Report, in which the sector managers report progress against 
the Sector Plan. 
•  The Sector Account, year end report, in which the sector managers report the 
realisation of the Sector Plan to the civil executives. 
•  The Annual Account and Report, in which the executive board gives an annual 
account of the realisation of the Program Budget. 
 
organizational level  Planning Report 
Council <--> aldermen 
 
Pre-budget 
report 
program budget  interim report 
(TURAP) 
annual account 
and report 
civil executives <--> opera-
tions  
  sector plan  Quarterly report  sector account 
Table 3 Planning and report documents 
 
The planning and control instruments listed are interrelated, often having a similar 
structure and layout, and are often similar in content. Concern Control, an organiza-
tional staff group, co-ordinates the production and setting of the Pre-Budget Report, 
the Program Budget, the Interim Report, and the Annual Account. The production of 
the Sector Plan, Quarterly report, and Sector Account is mainly done by those organ-
izational units directly involved in them. 
 
The Program Budget is one of the central instruments in the yearly planning and con-
trol cycle of municipalities. With the agreement of the Council on the Program 
Budget, the executive board is charged with realising the objectives, performances 
(financial and non-financial) and actions that are laid down in it. The Program Budget 
documents the municipal policies mainly in a summarized form. It often makes only 
passing reference to various related policies, and aims to integrate the various poli-
cies into different programs. 
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Leeuwarden has recently started to use the Program Budget. The first Program 
Budget was for the budget year of 2004. The Program Budget 2005 was in concept 
comparable with the previous version, but encompassed several adjustments and 
developments. The Program Budget 2005 will be analyzed further. 
 
The Program Budget 2005 defines sixteen programs, two of which are strictly finan-
cial in nature (the programs “General grants” and “Incidental expenditures”).The re-
maining fourteen programs are similarly structured. In all fourteen programs three 
questions are posed and answered. The questions are “What do we want to 
achieve?” (related to the objectives), “What are we going to do?” (related to the ac-
tivities and non-financial performances), and “How much is it going to cost?’ (related 
to financial performances). 
 
Every program describes strategic goals, defined by general and main goals. The 
strategic goals aim to define the desired situation from a societal perspective, and do 
not define actions to be taken or cost to be incurred. Table 4 gives an example of the 
strategic goals for the “Housing” program. 
 
Program “Housing” 
Strategic goals: 
General goals: 
A balanced, competitive housing market with sufficient …. supply of houses …. 
Main goals: 
•  Sufficient supply of houses…. 
•  A good living environment for specific target groups … 
•  Cautious use of space in urban zones 
•  Multiple choice for buyers of houses 
Table 4 Examples of strategic goals (source Program Budget 2005, p. 57/60) 
 
 
The objectives of each program are described, and are made measurable by attach-
ing one or more indicators to them. Indicators often have target values; series of 
measures to be attained in the coming years. Table 5 gives an example of the objec-
tives and measures in the program “Housing”, as documented in the Program Budget 
2005.  
 
Objectives  2005 2006 2007 2008 
A New  housing 
Indicator: average number of newly build houses  
 
480 
 
520 
 
520 
 
520 
B  Differentiation of sale vs. rental  
Indicator: Target differentiation  85:15 
 
437:43
 
442:78 
 
442:78 
 
442:78
Table 5 Objectives and measures (source Program Budget 2005, p. 57/60) 
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An overview of the current situation per program is given, and insights into the most 
relevant actual developments and expected consequences of each program are 
documented. References to important policies are also made. The planning of each 
program is made measurable by the documented desired performances. Table 6 
gives an example of the planned performances of the “Housing” program. 
 
Performances  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  Effect 
Structural 
•  Project Zuiderburen  
•  Project De Zuidlanden 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
A/B/C/ 
E/F/H 
Incidental 2005 
Housing market policies and coordination  
•  develop long term housing program, 
•  coordination of and advice over …housing programs 
•  organizing information services 
•  making governmental subsidies available 
•  relation management ….. 
A t/m H 
Table 6 Performances (source: Program Budget 2005, p. 57/60) 
 
Performances are often described in terms of processes to be followed combined 
with indications of the amount of work to be done (e.g. co-ordination of twenty hous-
ing programs). Performances mainly address the planned results or processes in 
general terms, and are often formulated in terms of “to perform, to restrict/ to pro-
mote”. Clusters of performances can relate to specific objectives, or can contribute to 
several different objectives.  
Each program has its own financial budget. This financial budget refers to consoli-
dated products
46, and documents the total costs and benefits. The financial budget of 
a program is defined by the total cost of per program-listed products.  
The Program Budget also contains many additional summaries and appendices, 
such as: 
•  a current overview of the long term development program (MOP) and the me-
dium-term capital spending program (MIP),  
•  several financial sections, with overviews on the development of cost, income, 
financial reserves, tariffs (of several local government taxes), treasury, and  
organizational processes (e.g. human resource management), 
•  appendices, which document in detail financial changes (increases, de-
creases, changes, and additions), for the products as well as the capital 
spending projects. 
 
Every half year the executive board presents an Interim Report
47 to the Council. This 
Interim Report is mainly a variance analysis, only explaining significant financial vari-
                                            
46 Called “policy product” or in Dutch “beleidsproducten”. 
47 In Dutch abbreviated to TURAP.  
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ances between year-end estimates and budgeted values. The Interim Report 2004 
48 
did not report on the (estimated) realisation of objectives and performances. 
The main structure of the Interim Report is comparable with the Program Budget, but 
some remarkable differences in detail appear. For example, the financial variances 
are explained by general ledger groups (e.g. depreciation, interest, personnel cost, 
expenses) instead of using the program and product structure of the Program 
Budget. Only general expenses are explicitly explained per program. 
The Interim Report also documents progress made in the special efficiency project, 
contains lists of new policies to be discussed, and specifies actual discussion points 
and risks. 
 
It is through the presentation of the Annual Report to the Council that the executive 
board accounts for the execution of the Program Budget. The Annual Report 2004 
consists of an annual statement of account and an annual report. The annual state-
ment of account is set up to conform to central government mandated guidelines
49, 
and is mainly driven by the need to be financially accountable. The Annual Account 
has to be certified by external accountants. The Annual Report explains how the pro-
grams have been realized, using financial variances
50 as measures. Realised objec-
tives and performances are often documented, but seldom analysed in detail. Table 7 
gives an example of the way performances are documented. 
 
Objectives Account 
2004 
Budget 
2004 
variance 
A New  housing 
Indicator: average number of new houses 
 
364 
 
400 
 
-36 
B  Differentiation of sale vs. rental  
Indicator: Differentiation 85%:15% 
 
246:118 
 
262:140 
 
-14:-22 
Table 7 Performances in the annual report (source: annual report 2004, p. 77) 
 
Realised performances are in general terms evaluated (with a plus, plus/minus, or 
minus). A plus (+) is used as a sign of an on average positive performance, and is 
not illustrated further. Explanation and illustration of achieved performances only oc-
curs when performances are not valued positively, using a plus/minus (+/-) or a mi-
nus (-). Performances are often process and project-related indicators, and conse-
quently the evaluation of performances mainly relates to more operational aspects. 
The Annual Report 2004 documents evaluations of achieved yearly performances, 
and of expected developments in the coming period.  
The Annual Report presents no financial details and the financial variance analysis is 
comparable with the approach of the Interim Report. The variances are explained by 
groups of general ledger accounts and per program. The variance analysis in the 
                                            
48 The 2005 Interim Report was not available during the field research. 
49 In Dutch “Besluit Begroting en Verantwoording” or BBV. 
50 Between year-end values and budgeted values.   54
Annual Account reports many more financial details. Here all relevant financial vari-
ances are explained. The Annual Account also documents and explains the financial 
year results and the balance sheet.  
The Annual Report 2004 includes a general status report on the progress of the me-
dium-term capital spending planning (documenting main variances between planning 
and actual progress on year end). The Annual Report 2004 has several sections at-
tached to it, with detailed background information and reviews of several specific pro-
jects and developments in the reporting period. Additional information is also present 
in the minutes of the meeting where the Annual Report is presented to the Council. 
The written answers of the executive board
51 document in much more detail some of 
the content and context of relevant political discussions. 
 
In conclusion, a coherent system of planning and control instruments exists at the 
organizational level of the researched organization. Using a step by step approach 
the objectives and performances are incorporated into budgets and accounted for in 
reports. The main purpose of these instruments is to support the Council with the 
planning and evaluation of policies, objectives and performances. 
The Program Budget can be regarded as a central instrument in this yearly cycle. 
The Program Budget provides the Council with a lot of information on objectives and 
performances, explains the relationships between objectives and performances, and 
provides financial information. As documented in the Program Budget, this instru-
ment has only recently been developed and must be regarded as a work in progress. 
Areas for improvement have been announced, and in the near future some improve-
ments will already have been addressed
52. The municipality’s aim is to synchronise 
the Program Budget with the information needs of the Council. To give an example of 
this aim, performances will be documented only when they are viewed as essential 
for the Council
53.  
Budget control 
Budget control, as officially laid down in Leeuwarden’s documented internal control 
mechanism, relates formally to objectives, related performances, and available finan-
cial means. In practice budget control is mainly restricted to internal financial control. 
The internal budget guidelines mainly underline the importance of financial state-
ments and the behavioural restrictions that are attached to budget responsibilities. 
Non-financial objectives and performances are not unimportant. They are present in 
every planning and control instrument, and top managers and controllers who were 
interviewed all stated the importance of realising objectives and performances. The 
detailed internal guidelines, however, mainly describe the rules for attaining financial 
obligations and spending or receiving money. 
 
                                            
51 In Dutch: “Memorie van antwoord n.a.v. de behandeling van de Jaarstukken 2004”. 
52 Such as: improving the relationship between goals and objectives, improving the relationship be-
tween objectives and performances, making performances more “smart” (specific, measurable, realis-
tic, and timely). 
53 Source Program budget 2005, p.6.  
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Financial budgets relate to both cost and income (for products) as well as to cash (for 
capital spending), and define the expected boundaries of financial control for any 
year. These budgets are mandates; the executive board gives responsibility to em-
ployees to use specific resources, but the board remains ultimately responsible for all 
the decisions that are taken. 
 
Budget responsibilities are attached to several organizational levels. Operational 
managers (heads of teams and groups) are often responsible for the direct expendi-
ture of limited amounts, which is laid down in detail. Heads of sectors are often the 
formal budget managers; they account for the realisation of the budget to top man-
agement. The budgets of sector managers are laid down in products
54, which relate 
mainly to aspects such as direct expenses, receiving grants, collecting taxes, decid-
ing on social welfare. Rules of budget control not only relate to management control 
but also to internal control. A sector manager can be responsible for a budget of mil-
lions of euros, but is still obliged to ask his superior manager to sign for expenditures 
in excess of € 25,000,- for example. 
Departmental directors are often responsible for budgets related to personnel. De-
partmental directors are responsible for the number of employees (in full-time equiva-
lents), the financial budgets for employing personnel, and for budgets for temporary 
personnel. Directors are also accountable for budget control of lower level manage-
ment to the executive board. The financial accountability of departmental directors is 
laid down in summary products
55.  
Capital spending budgets are usually assigned to specific project managers, and also 
use rules of management and internal control. For example, the authority to decide 
on tender contracts often rests with departmental directors or members of the execu-
tive board. 
 
In summary, the municipality applies a detailed budget system, with an emphasis on 
financial control. Financial control is executed using pre-defined rules and guidelines, 
relating to budgeting, delegation of decision rights, and internal controls. As a result, 
budget managers have to conform to several detailed instructions. A budget manager 
not only has to meet budgetary limits, but s/he is also restricted in her/his decisions 
on liabilities. This specific and detailed behavioural control system functions at all 
managerial levels in the organisation; from the lowest level of team manager to the 
executive board. At a higher organisational level, budgets are often composed by the 
aggregation of more detailed products. Financial overspending on one underlying 
product is therefore compensated by under spending on other products. This com-
pensation principle is applied to capital spending budgets too. Projects can be clus-
tered in groups, and managers can be assigned to account for the budgets of a 
group. At this group level managers only account for consolidated budgets, and de-
tailed variances of underlying projects are for this reason less important. 
However, budgets of non-consolidated products and projects cannot be adjusted 
easily. Strict and detailed rules must be followed for adjusting budgets, and higher 
                                            
54 in Dutch: “beheerproduct”. 
55 in Dutch: “beleidsproduct”.    56
level managers are always formally involved in the decision to adjust or reallocate 
budgets. 
A financial survey of the municipality 
An indication of the financial position of the municipality of Leeuwarden is docu-
mented in the Program Budget 2004. On page 189 the executive board stated “Al-
though we are not a wealthy municipality, this crisis is manageable”. The context of 
this text is the year 2003, in which the city had to cope with some recent organiza-
tional developments, the national economic downturn, and the budget reductions im-
posed by central government. The municipal organization was going through turbu-
lent times. Due to political tensions the mayor and an alderman had to step down 
from office about 18 months earlier, and at the same time organizational effective-
ness was openly criticized by the Council in the local media. This turbulent period 
resulted in the start-up of several action plans
56.  
 
During the making of the Program Budget 2004 most of these plans appear to have 
been achieved or to be in progress. In 2004 attention was shifting more to the finan-
cial situation of the municipality. The financial reserves were seen as sufficient, but 
the medium term forecasted budget could only balance after the addition of a restruc-
turing program of around €5.6 million. This restructuring program demanded cost re-
ductions in management and services (€2 million), in limiting the range of products 
and services to the public (€2.8 million), and an increase in tax income (€0.8 million). 
Compared to the total organizational budget of €342 million, these budget reductions 
seem to be of limited importance. However, related to the sum of local tax income of 
€32 million (the income that the city can generate on its own account), this restructur-
ing can be qualified as significant (circa 18 percent). 
 
The restructuring program is defined in line with the assumptions of the 2002-2006 
Executive Program. Examples of these assumptions are: 
•  balanced medium term budgets, 
•  increase of municipal tax income, using real estate values for calculating tar-
iffs, are limited by inflation factors and changes in the quantity of real estate, 
•  full cost recovery when service delivery to the public is charged with tariffs and 
prices, 
•  structural and incidental benchmarking with other municipal organisations. 
 
The Program Budget 2005 indicates a sound financial position for the municipality. 
The financial reserves are strengthened (from € 3 million to € 10 million), and the re-
structuring program is on target and on budget. Even a budgetary capacity of €1 mil-
lion is available for new initiatives. The total budget of the organization is circa €320 
million. For more detail on this budget see Table 8. 
 
                                            
56 Such as a plan to improve managerial and service processes in the organization, to increase the 
focus on performances: to downsize the number of employees, and to stimulate the integration of pol-
icy making and policy achievement.  
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  million €  % 
Depreciation and interest  35.0 11 
Subsidies 122.5 38 
Salary costs  67.5 21 
Miscellaneous expenses  95.0 30 
Total 320.0  
Table 8 Budget 2005 
 
The budget for salary cost covers the cost of current and former personnel and politi-
cians. The total personnel formation in 2005 is 1000 full time equivalents (fte). The 
different components of this formation are documented in Table 9. 
 
  fte %
Municipal council, executive board, registry  47.8 5
Concern staff  17.8 2
Welfare 204,4 20 
City development and management   407,7 41 
General affairs  253,6 25 
Fire department  68,8 7
Total 1000,0
Table 9 Number of employees 2005 (source: Program Budget 2005, p. 148) 
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Welfare Payment case study 
Firstly, the context in which social Welfare Payment works will be briefly examined. 
Subsequently, the most relevant planning and control instruments and their embed-
ded objectives and performance measures will be described. 
In order to gain an impression of the use of objectives and performance measures 
the opinions of politicians or managers on three different organizational levels were 
sought: the executive board, the director, and the operational manager. Finally, the 
points which emerged during the research into planning and control documents will 
be discussed. 
Welfare Payment policies 
One of the main tasks performed by the Council's welfare department is the granting 
of social welfare payment, which serves as a safety net for people who cannot sup-
port themselves financially. The policy framework for Welfare Payment is mainly de-
termined by the national Work and Assistance Act, which in turn dictates much of the 
organizational set-up and activities in this field. 
 
The Work and Assistance Act was introduced on 1 January 2004. To prepare for this 
Act at the local level, the municipal council of Leeuwarden adopted a long-term policy 
plan. This policy framework outlined the 2005-2009 period and distinguished be-
tween work and income. Because it is not easy to evaluate policies on work and in-
come separately, these policies are included in the Council's program budgets as 
one program. They form part of a chain of internal and external municipal activities. 
The Work and Income program is of vital importance from a financial point of view. 
Not only because this program has been allocated the highest budget (approx. €100 
million, compared with a total 2005 budget of €430 million), but also because this 
program constitutes a considerable financial risk (up to €5 million a year). This finan-
cial risk is chiefly attributable to the part of the program that relates to supplying in-
come to citizens. It is also connected to any unexpected and unforeseen increase in 
the number of persons entitled to welfare payment and also to other developments 
with regard to relevant government grants. 
 
One of the components of the Work and Income program is called Income Provision. 
It includes providing welfare payment, which is done by the Social Affairs Sector. Be-
sides providing welfare payment, this sector also focuses its attention on limiting the 
number of people starting to claim payment. Its organizational structure is geared to 
the implementation of the Work and Assistance Act, which is carried out by a large 
proportion of the Social Affairs Sector, including a front office, various mid-offices and 
back offices, and a management office. The total number of staff in this sector is 
equivalent to approximately 140 fte
57. 
 
                                            
57 Fte stands for full time equivalents.  
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Over recent years the operational tasks and the working environment of the Social 
Affairs Sector have changed continuously. In the words of an employee “There is al-
ways something going on around here”. Both internal and external initiatives have 
contributed to this process of continuous change. Examples of internal drivers of 
change are: the restructuring of work processes
58, the introduction of a new process 
information system, the impact of an organizational development program on the 
sector, and the increased attention to internal control
59.  The sector has also had to 
respond to external influences, such as: the foundation of the Centre for Work and 
Income (CWI) and the introduction of the Work and Assistance Act. Both have had a 
significant impact on the tasks performed in the sector, on the coordination proc-
esses between the Social Affair Sector and the rest of the municipal’s organization, 
and on the municipal’s role in the work and assistance related chain of activities. An-
other consequence of the Work and Assistance Act was the decentralization of re-
sponsibilities from central to local government, including some material financial risks 
that are attached to the provision of income for welfare purposes. 
Planning- and control documents 
Objectives, desired effects and performance measures relating to Welfare Payment 
are set out in several planning and control documents, such as the Program Budget 
2004 and 2005, the Sector Plan 2004 and 2005, the Annual report 2004 and the 
Quarterly Report of 2005. 
 
The Work and Income program in the Program Budget 2004 includes aims that are 
directly related to Welfare Payment. The Income Provision section, for example, con-
tains a description of the target for a reduction in the number of people who are de-
pendent on Welfare Payment. The aim is to prevent financial deficits by matching the 
estimated Welfare Payments with the known contributions to be received from central 
government. The budget sets out targets for income (€58.4 million) and expenditure 
(€68 million), outlines developments and financial risks that are expected and are 
considered relevant, and lists a number of performance requirements. The deficit of 
income and expenditures (circa €9 million) is covered by other municipal incomes. 
The actual or budgeted number of persons dependant on welfare is not documented 
in the Program Budget 2004 as an objective, but is included in explanatory texts or is 
documented in attachments.   
 
The performance requirements of the Social Affairs Sector are expressed in opera-
tional terms. They are described in terms of future activities, including the number of 
activities to be conducted, e.g.  
•  the number of new payment applications to be dealt with (2500),  
•  the number of current payments to be provided (4000),  
                                            
58 such as: abandoning the city district structure and introducing a city wide customer oriented ap-
proach, resulting, amongst other, in a more pronounced allocation of authority between the sectors 
responsible for Work and Income. 
59 as a response to incidental cases of fraud.   60
•  the number of debtors (2300) and accounts receivable (3000) to be managed, 
and 
•  the handling of welfare frauds (750). 
 
The Interim Report that was presented to the Council halfway through the year 2004 
does not mention any expectation that the budget for Welfare Payment will not be 
complied with, financially speaking. 
 
The Annual report 2004, which was adopted in April 2005, is a complete overview 
showing the extent to which the budget was met. It explains developments with re-
gard to the number of persons entitled to welfare payment and it also outlines the 
financial results. The overview of the number of people shows an increase of 5.6 
percent in 2004. This non-financial result is compared with a comparable average 
national percentage of 10.4 percent. Analysis on variances on annual report versus 
Program Budget, or on national versus local developments is hardly documented. 
Financial results are outlined. These show that additional government grants resulted 
in a credit balance for Income Provision. It should be noted that the annual statement 
of accounts is based on the adjusted 2004 budget. During that year the estimated 
income (€56 million) and expenditure (€65.5 million) were both adjusted downwards 
by approx. 2 million euros. These budget amendments were not explained in the In-
terim Report or in the 2004 annual statement of accounts. They were presented to 
the Council in budget amendment resolutions. 
The Annual Report contains broad assessments of the realization of estimated per-
formance (i.e. good, mediocre, poor), but does not include any further explanation. 
 
The Program Budget 2005 is different from the previous program budgets in various 
ways. In the Income Provision section, for example, the objective (in desired effect) is 
quantified using an estimated increase in the number of welfare payment clients. In 
the budget, the zero measurement for this indicator is 4350 persons entitled to wel-
fare payment and the desired maximum value of the 2005 increase is set at 6% (see 
Table 10). 
 
Objectives Welfare Payment   Reference  2005  2006  2007  2008 
D  Increase in number of Welfare Payment cli-
ents  
Indicator: Increase in number of clients 
 
4.350 
 
6% 
 
3% 
 
1% 
 
Table 10 Objectives of Welfare Payment 2005 (source: Program Budget 2005, p. 52) 
 
With regards to financial frameworks for Income Provision, the budget also outlines 
financial risks to which the municipality might be exposed, e.g. expected develop-
ments with regard to government grants. Total 2005 costs of Welfare Payment are 
budgeted at €68 million, income (grants) at €59 million, resulting in a deficit of circa 
€9 million (see Table 11). This deficit is comparable with the 2004 budget, and is 
compensated by other income.  
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2005  
(*€1000) 
cost income  results 
Labor market and social integration  27.819 -23.734 4.086
Welfare Payment  68.136 -59.175 8.691
Poverty reduction  4.565 -0.229 4.336
Childcare 0.367 0.00 0.367
Total 100.886  -83.459  17.749 
Table 11 Costs Work and income program (source: Program Budget 2005, p. 55) 
 
The list of performance requirements (in terms of operational activities to be con-
ducted) is largely comparable to the list mentioned in the previous budget. Examples 
from this list are: 
•  number of new welfare requests (2.500), 
•  handling of concurrent clients (4.500), 
•  timely, error free, and legal justified payments, 
•  debit control on (formal) clients (5.600), 
• processing  of  fraud  reports  (750) and fraud records (95), 
•  performing a single audit. 
 
In the Social Affairs Sector Plan for a particular year, ambitions from the Program 
Budget are translated into tasks to be performed by the sector in that year. As far as 
Income Provision is concerned, the Sector Plan 2004 contains a lot of performance 
requirements that are expressed in general terms, such as promoting client participa-
tion, developing new policies and regulations. The Sector Plan 2004 also describes 
action points relating to management, i.e. performance interviews, sickness absence, 
mobility and job vacancies, education and training, and the like. In addition, the plan 
sets out applicable financial budgets, reports, administrative and organizational 
points for attention, and also pinpoints consultation opportunities. 
The Sector Plan 2005 can be seen as a further elaboration of the Sector Plan 2004. 
It is strongly emphasized that team leaders should be involved. Relating to the han-
dling of 2,500 new welfare requests, for example, several activities are described in 
more detail (intake, research, reporting, auditing, assigning, administration and ar-
chiving). In addition, the Sector Plan contains a lot of technical definitions, such as 
descriptions of measurement instruments that will be used to measure effects and 
indicators
60.  The Sector Plan makes no mention of objectives (desired effects) for 
2005, and consequently no related performance requirements are translated for the 
sector. The causal relationship between objectives and performance requirements is 
not specified in more detail in the Sector Plan. 
Furthermore, the Sector Plan includes a description of performance relating to client 
orientation and quality of services, and contains additional information on various 
                                            
60 for example, the indicator “increase in number of clients” is defined by: the source of information 
(the name of the information system), the frequency of reporting, the organizational level of reporting 
(sector), and the work list of actions (adjusting the report format).   62
aspects of management. The Sector Plan also contains an outline of relevant capital 
spending projects, a risk section, and a list of various reports that have to be com-
piled throughout the year. These are drawn up for the management, the municipal 
executive board, the Council members, several ministries, the Agency for the Recep-
tion of Asylum Seekers, the Central Bureau of Statistics, and other sectors. 
 
The Quarterly Report for the first three months of 2005 outlines to what extent the 
desired effects, based on the Program Budget 2005, and the desired performance 
based on the Sector Plan 2005, have been realized. This Quarterly report is based 
on the Sector Plan. The report contains quantitative information to clarify the realiza-
tion of aims as well as to explain the sector's performance. Team leaders as well as 
the sector manager use the Quarterly Report as an instrument for rendering account, 
namely to the sector manager and the department manager respectively. 
The Quarterly Reports mainly report on the current situation in the sector, but present 
no analysis of the current developments. Unfavourable developments in the number 
of clients, for example, are accounted for, but the possible consequences of this in-
crease on the financial budget or the internal processes are not explained. Financial 
budgets are accounted for at a consolidated budget level, but provide no insight into 
the budget use of underlying products.   
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Use of objectives and performance measures 
The use of objectives and performance measures is analyzed in two ways. An im-
pression of their use is documented on three different organizational levels (alder-
men, civil director, and operational manager). The most relevant aspects arising from 
this analysis are discussed. 
 
Aldermen 
The Alderman found objective setting and performance measurement important. 
Upon request, the essence of the current organizational objectives could be recalled 
(the development in the number of persons entitled to welfare payment) but he could 
not quote the objective in precise terms (maximum increase of 6 percent in 2005). 
Also the performance measurements were explained during the interview (such as 
the importance of a timely and accurate process of handling new payment applica-
tions and fraud charges). 
 
The alderman perceived objectives relating to Welfare Payment as reasonably clear, 
for both himself and the managers concerned. As he expressed it: “they can be put to 
good use”. 
The alderman said that he was kept up to speed about various important operational 
and process issues within Welfare Payment through a two-weekly meeting with op-
erational level managers. The alderman seemed to see objectives as aims or estima-
tions. Apparently, the scope for policymaking left by legislation (an effect of legisla-
tion) and political discussions determined what objectives would be used. In his own 
words: “The Council can set objectives only to the extent that the law enables it to 
choose different policies”. 
 
The alderman indicated that the perception of the objectives was less clear to the 
elected members of the Council, this notwithstanding the financial importance of Wel-
fare Payment
61. He explained that the Council discussed financial and non-financial 
objectives in different Council committees. The non-financial objectives, being more 
relevant to the political and social issues of Welfare Payment
62, were discussed in 
the Welfare committee of the Council several times. The financial aspects of Welfare 
were assessed in the regular annual planning and control documents, such as the 
Program Budget and the Interim Report. This process sometimes led to a somewhat 
disconnected discussion of financial and non-financial objectives, in the sense that 
financial implications of change on non-financial objectives were not always made 
apparent. The alderman illustrated this point with an example. The Council’s policy 
on Welfare was reductive: the number of subsidized jobs was to be downsized and 
special welfare minimized. As a result of this restrictive policy, people were losing 
their subsidized jobs and becoming entitled to welfare. This was thus counterproduc-
                                            
61 The financial budget of Welfare payment consumed in 2005 circa 65 percent of the Work and In-
come program budget, and made up 20 percent of the total cost of the council. 
62 Examples of political issues were, amongst other, the provision of special welfare and of by the 
council subsidized jobs.   64
tive in terms of achieving Welfare Payment’s objective of minimizing the increase in 
welfare payment. 
The alderman underlined the uncertainty about central government’s financial contri-
bution to local welfare payment. Downwards adjustments of these financial contribu-
tions did not only cause financial problems but also led to the idea of adjustment of 
social and political policies. Discussing financial and non-financial implications in dif-
ferent Council committees resulted in a diminished clarity of objectives for most of the 
Council members. 
 
Desk research gave additional insights into the use of this information by the elected 
members of the Council. The Welfare committee received two reports per year 
(named “monitor WBB”), which account for progress in the past period in detail. The 
committee also received copies of special reports made to inform central government 
of the implementation of the Work and Assistance Act. These reports reported on the 
progress of non-financial performances, for example on the actual development of: 
unemployment, available jobs, reintegration processes, subsidized jobs, poverty, and 
fraud. Information on financial performances was not included. 
All elected Council members received reports on financial progress. These financial 
reports form part of the Program Budget and the Annual Report, and contain limited 
detail on the financial situation of Welfare Payment. For example, the Program 
Budget 2005 announced an expected financial deficit of € 9 million, but did not ex-
plain in simple terms how this deficit was caused or covered. The Annual Report only 
documented a higher than expected financial contribution by central government, and 
a donation to financial reserve accounts due to a surplus on Welfare, but gave little 
explanation of the reasons for this. Only financial surpluses or deficits were to some 
extent documented. 
 
The Council’s interest in variances rather than total budgets was also observed in 
relation to non-financial objectives. Planning and control documents highlighted two 
main groups of non-financial objectives: results-oriented objectives (for the number of 
people entitled to welfare), and process-oriented objectives (amongst others for con-
trolling the legitimacy of welfare payment). The results-oriented objectives appeared 
to be used inconsistently. 
The Program Budget 2004 and the corresponding Annual Report 2004, and the Pro-
gram Budget 2005 and the corresponding Sector Plan 2005 and Quarterly Report 
2005, used different numbers to compute the results-oriented objective, but appeared 
to be consistent as regards the expected change of objectives
63. This underlined the 
notion of the Council’s main interest being in objectives changes, and its lesser focus 
on the actual results.  
The Council was also informed about process-related objectives and performances, 
such as achievements in compliance with legally set transaction terms, or a compari-
                                            
63 For example, the Program Budget 2005 objective on Welfare payment was a maximum increase of 
6 percent, and referred to 4350 persons, resulting in a maximum of 4611 persons (1.06 * 4350) on 
year-end 2005. This Program Budget contained explanatory text, mentioning a reference number of 
4500 persons and a year-end number of 4800. The quarterly Report 2005-I however mentioned a 
reference number of 4250 and a 2005 yearend objective of 4509 (1.06 * 4250).  
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son of the effectiveness of operations between comparable cities (by participation in 
inter-organizational benchmarking projects). Unfavorable changes in performance, 
for example an increase in the number of appeals granted to citizens on Council de-
cisions, were used to critically question the organization. 
 
The alderman indicated that it is not easy to set objectives in relation to the Work and 
Assistance Act. He stressed that the Council can hardly influence employment and 
unemployment trends. The interviewee stressed the importance of the active applica-
tion of the economic policies of the Council, but added that the Council had scant 
economic influence on the decisions of large businesses operating nationally and 
internationally. The Council’s influence on trends in Welfare Payment was therefore 
seen as limited. The total number of people entitled to welfare was also explained 
from a more historic perspective. In the recent past the Council was fased by rela-
tively high levels of unemployment. This level now conformed somewhat more 
closely to national employments statistics. Although in the last 10 years this high 
level of unemployment had decreased considerably, it still remained high compared 
to the average national unemployment rates.  
The alderman explained the use of these types of objectives and statistics by politi-
cians. He explained that objectives can be used in different ways. In his own words: 
“If objectives are not achieved, the objectives were too ambitious, if the objectives 
are achieved, the Council performs excellently”. 
He expressed the opinion that politicians did not use objectives and performances in 
order to prioritize. Priorities were mainly driven by actual developments. 
 
Despite the limited role objectives played at this political level, clear objectives were 
considered to be important. Clear objectives were considered a good means of im-
proving communication. 
The alderman added: ”objectives can lodge themselves in the Council’s collective 
memory”. 
 
Civil Director 
The next level at which the use of objectives and performance measures was dis-
cussed was that of the civil director, who is a professional manager. The civil director 
stated that objective setting and achievement and performance measurement for the 
Welfare Payment area were seen as important in controlling the organization. They 
were seen to be supportive of the Council’s targets, by detailing specific tasks that 
needed to be carried out. She stated that this process not only supported the collec-
tion of specific information (such as information needed for adjusting policies or in-
forming politicians), but also made actual trends visible and analyzable. The use of a 
performance indicator for the percentage of youngsters dependent on welfare was 
used as an example. This performance indicator was used to analyze whether the 
process of reintegration was working as expected, or whether other aspects influ-
enced the trend. 
 
According to the director, these trends provided insight into the effectiveness of 
achieving organizational objectives. She illustrated the use of these trends. The   66
trends were discussed in regularly held departmental management meetings of the 
director and sector heads. The agenda for these meetings often included progress on 
performances, and discussions on more organizational process related performances 
(related to, for example, sickness leave, work load, case load of employees). The 
focus in these meetings was on factors that could be influenced by the department, 
and often included current developments in both the Social Affairs Sector and the 
Work and Income Sector. The sector managers used detailed information on current 
developments to be able to quickly identify signs of developments that required them 
to take supplementary measures. According to the director, objectives and perform-
ances are not used for prioritizing operational tasks: priorities in operations were 
more mandated by actual developments than by pre-set objectives. 
 
The director stressed that the municipal organization cannot control the entire proc-
ess of achieving the objectives of Welfare Payment. It was argued that the Council 
cannot set objectives for which it is solely responsible because, in the Netherlands, 
several parties are jointly responsible for Welfare Payment. She stressed that the 
municipality was doing its utmost to steer the parties involved (the chain partners) in 
the right direction. But if its efforts did not have the desired effect, the municipality 
would have to bear the financial risks and take the consequences of the policies pur-
sued. The director considered the recently announced reduction in central govern-
ment’s financial support for local welfare as a strong motivator for the effective coor-
dination of the parties involved. 
 
The relationship between uncertain financial support by central government and 
achievement of the Council’s objectives was also mentioned by the director. How-
ever, she mainly emphasized the practical operational consequences of this uncer-
tainty, and did not comment much on the possible conflicting political pressures ex-
erted on the objectives. She used the supply of subsidized jobs as an example, and 
explained that the relationship between a decrease in the number of subsidized jobs 
and an increase in people entitled to welfare payment was recognized. Her approach 
was to search for practical solutions, and to find additional financial means within ex-
isting agreements with central government to increase the number of subsidized 
jobs. 
 
Operational manager 
At the lowest level researched two managers were interviewed. The interviewees 
also thought that objectives and performance measures relating to Welfare Payment 
were sufficiently specific. They could not, however, quote the exact formulation of the 
2005 objective as documented in the Program Budget 2005. Welfare Payment was 
seen as an open-ended scheme, mainly influenced by the increase or decrease in 
the number of Welfare Payment clients. The objective of a 6 percent maximum in-
crease was not seen as the main objective for the sector. In the words of a sector 
manager, the main objective was formulated in terms of: “as many people as possi-
ble back to work”. He explained that operational objectives were mainly focused on 
the process effectiveness within the sector. He added that he did not get much sup-
port from organizational objectives and performance requirements when setting pri- 
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orities in his sector. Moreover, the interviewee was not sure about the feasibility of 
the financial objectives. 
 
The uncertainty about financial support from central government was also pinpointed 
by operational managers, but a pragmatic approach was demonstrated. Operational 
managers argued that it was their task to optimize operations within available finan-
cial and non-financial means. In the words of a sector manager: “To make Welfare 
Payment policies more effective demands much creativity from the professional 
managers, but sometimes results in political disputes between elected members of 
the Council”. 
 
The interviewees stressed the importance of specific performance measures. They 
saw them easing the making of clear agreements with external parties
64 and for sup-
porting the sector with relevant process information. The manager of the Work and 
Income sector explained that process control, standardization, and computerization 
were becoming increasingly important, and the development of monthly progress re-
ports was seen as one of the central instruments of control.  
 
Desk research found evidence of this increase in the emphasis on process control 
within the sector.  Previous Sector Plans and Quarterly Reports documented an in-
crease in the description of processes and related performance indicators. For ex-
ample, very few performance reports were made in 2004, but Quarterly Reports were 
standard in 2005. To illustrate, some performance information from the Quarterly Re-
ports 2005 is documented below: 
•  the monthly trend in the number of terminated Welfare Payments, and the 
comparison of this development to the budget, 
•  the trend in the percentage of youngsters on welfare to the budget, 
•  the monthly trend in the number of welfare payment clients compared to the 
budget target, 
•  financial year-end forecast, 
•  workload and sick leave of employees. 
Aspects of budget use 
The previously described opinions of the alderman, the director, and the operational 
managers will be used here to analyze relevant aspects against the research frame-
work. The main level of analysis is organizational, with its focus on the use of objec-
tives and performance measures at the top of the organization. The research frame-
work and its defined aspects will be the focus of the analysis, but if applicable, other 
aspects are also included. 
 
The evidence is presented in a summarized form and analyzed and interpreted by 
the researcher with reference to desk research and interviews where suitable. Per-
sonal impressions and opinions could play a part in the interpretation of the case 
study findings. 
                                            
64 such as the Center of Employment and Income, in Dutch “CWI”.   68
  
Design and quality of the accounting information system 
The municipality’s accounting information system yields both financial and non-
financial information. The financial information relates in particular to the products 
and investments of the municipality, such as the costs and income of products and 
the income and expenses of investment projects.   
Financial objectives and performances are documented in all planning and control 
documents. The Program Budget 2005 for example, contains summarized versions 
of budgeted costs and income for all programs and related products, medium-term 
investment planning, and summaries of several additional sources of income. More 
financial detail is available at an operational level. Sector Plans for example, contain 
budgeted costs and income in detail, and the Quarterly Report 2005 contains de-
tailed variance analyzes (analyzing the variances between actual and budgeted val-
ues). Annual Report and Accounts of both the municipality and the sector contain 
detailed financial information, and present detailed analysis of variations between 
achieved and budgeted values. 
 
In addition, the accounting information system provides a lot of information about 
non-financial objectives and performances. Information about non-financial main ob-
jectives is primarily present in the more strategically-oriented planning documents, 
such as the medium-term policy plan “Expedition Work” and the Program Budget. 
Non-financial performances are often documented in the operational documents. 
Quarterly Reports in particular contain many non-financial performance measures, 
and provide insights into current developments and trends. This information is mainly 
used for process control. Examples of detailed reports are the Quarterly Reports 
2005 of the Social Affairs sector. These reports contain many performance meas-
ures, such as the actual and the budgeted number of terminated welfare payments, 
the number of youngsters on welfare, and the number of payments made for special 
welfare. 
 
Interviews indicated differences in the perceived quality of accounting information at 
different organizational levels. At the top of the organization the quality is perceived 
as lower than at operational level. The information provided to politicians and top 
managers does not appear to meet the requirements sufficiently, and additional in-
formation is often requested. This additional information is provided, but not always in 
time. The quality of information is seen as higher at the more operational level, and is 
also often provided on request. Operational managers are aiming to develop stan-
dard reports that will better fullfill their information requirements. They would value 
the information provided if it was sufficient, accurate, on time and up-to-date. Ac-
counting information is produced at an operational level. The sources of operational 
accounting information are the sectors themselves, and the main drivers for the de-
velopment of operational accounting information are the sector managers. Complying 
with a sector’s own information requirements seems therefore a simpler task than 
complying with the requirements of others. At an operational level, the interviewees 
focus on a scorecard with a limited number of indicators that is used to manage their  
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own sectors and is also used during progress meetings with the director and the mu-
nicipal executive.  
 
To conclude, the accounting information system in Welfare Payments contains both 
financial and non-financial information. This information is detailed, and includes 
budgeted values, achievements on budgets, and additional information. The observa-
tions are tentatively quantified into a score
65. The scope of the accounting information 
system for Welfare Payment is valued by the researcher. Using a 5-point scale, the 
scope is labeled as “above average”
66. The quality of the accounting information is 
valued in the same tentative way as the scope, and is labeled as “above average”
67. 
 
Applied role  
The interviews gave a view of the different ways in which accounting information is 
used in practice; they gave an insight into the roles of performance measures. This 
study has defined five different sub-roles or functions by which archetypal roles of 
performance measures can be recognized
68. These five functions and the related 
archetypal role (indicated between brackets) are: 
•  to diagnose, to compare actual and budgeted performance (answering role), 
•  to learn and to change ways of doing (learning role),  
•  unequivocally signaling of what is important (learning role, ammunition role), 
•  influencing future budget increase (ammunition role), 
•  to report and explain on past performance (rationalization role). 
 
Firstly, the results of the interviews and desk research are now used to assess 
whether the use of performance measures is for diagnostic reasons, that is, for com-
paring financial and non-financial variances in performances. 
 
Budget information is increasingly used to report on the progress of Welfare Pay-
ment’s performance targets. The Quarterly Reports in 2004 and 2005 contained in-
                                            
65 Aiming to make these observations somewhat comparable through the four case studies, these 
observations are represented by a score. This score expresses the observations in a simple and 
summarized form, and reflects the researcher’s personal perception on this subject. This score is to be 
regarded as a subjective, qualitative and aggregated measure. The limitations of this impressionistic 
approach are recognized. Yet they are presented here as additional information, which might give an 
opportunity to aggregated embedded case findings, and present an overall and condensed measure 
at the main level of analysis. This score is not to be seen as a substitute for the other case observa-
tions; it is merely offering an additional label that can be used in further analyzes. 
66 Measurement of the scope of the accounting information system is based on interpretation of all 
relevant documents, which are included in the desk research (for a list of documents included see the 
appendix). The scope is determined by using a 5-point scale, ranging from small (only financial budget 
information related to the current budget period) via average (both financial and non-financial budget 
information related to the current budget period) to broad (both financial and non-financial budget in-
formation on the current and future budget period and additional information. The range between small 
and average is addressed as below average, and between average and broad as above average. 
67 Measurement of the perceived quality of accounting information is based on the remarks of inter-
viewees and on the answers to the set of close questions (based on the EUCS-test of Doll and Tor-
zadeh, 1988) collected during the interviews. The perceived quality is interpreted by using a 5-points 
scale, ranging from 1 as low, 3 as average, to 5 as high. 
68 For more detail on the theoretical definition of the roles and their function see chapter 2, A Theoreti-
cal Research Framework.   70
creasingly detailed performance information on the actual status of the sector, and 
reported on both financial and non-financial performances. 
The use of these reports for diagnostic reasons appeared to be limited. The sector 
reports did contain variance analyses (based on a variance between actual or ex-
pected values and budgeted values), but contained mostly trends of actual achieved 
financial and non-financial performances.  
The financial budgets appeared to function more as a frame of reference than as 
achievable results. Financial budgets were adjusted during the budget period, but in 
order to adjust budgets managers must act according to detailed and explicitly stated 
budget rules. These budget rules relate, amongst other things, to timely and formal 
announcement of desirable budget changes to superiors and to necessary justifica-
tion for these adjustments. Financial control by top managers and politicians is 
mainly applied at a general level using highly consolidated figures (program level) 
and does not often reveal specific developments in Welfare Payment. 
 
Secondly, the use of performance measures for learning, signaling and influencing 
future budgets is assessed.  
 
Evidence of the use of performance measures in budgets, sector plans, and per-
formance reports for signaling is clearly found. The documents mentioned contain 
information that underlines the importance of specific performances, which is used 
for control activities. Examples of information included are: 
•  organizational objectives in the Program Budget and in the Sector Plan on the 
maximum increase in Welfare Payment clients, 
•  charts in the Quarterly Report, displaying the actual progress on the number of 
Welfare Payment clients, 
•  addressing specific activities in the Program Budget and Sector Plan, such as 
the performance of a single audit, 
•  the large amount of process-related performance measures in the Program 
Budget, Sector Plan, and quarterly Report 
Support for this signaling function is found in the interviews. For example, people in-
volved see objectives and performances as important signals for underlining specific 
aspects of policies that require considerable attention. Operational managers also 
indicate that the use of process-related performances helps them to emphasize the 
importance of well-performed operational processes. The presence of several de-
tailed process overviews in the Quarterly Reports is seen as supporting this tentative 
conclusion
69. Managers say that this type of information helps them to make current 
trends more visible, and to make the consequences of operational processes more 
objective. They use process-related performances to inform people outside the sec-
tor about important developments, and as motivators for decisions about operational 
process changes. Trends in the development of the number of Welfare Payment cli-
ents for example, are being used to coordinate the process between the municipal 
                                            
69 For example: composition of the group of people for whom Welfare Payment is ended, number of 
provided payments, number of formal objections lodged on the municipality, case load, workload and 
sickness leave of employees.  
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organization and external chain partners (such as the CWI and the reintegration of-
fices). In these meetings these trends are used as indicators for the effectiveness of 
the Welfare Payment process. 
 
Actual status reports of non-financial performances are also used to inform politicians 
and top managers about the estimated effects on the future financial position of the 
organization. The trend in the number of Welfare Payment clients, for example, is 
used to justify whether a change in policies on subsidized jobs should be considered 
in the near future. Anticipated changes in financial support by central government for 
Welfare Payment is also used to underline the importance of a balanced municipal 
budget to Council members, local press, and local and national politicians. 
 
Thirdly, a brief assessment of the use of performance measures for reporting and 
explaining past performances is presented here. 
 
Performance measures are regularly used to inform various users, such as the Coun-
cil, citizens, local businesses, and governance bodies. The municipality even pro-
duces specially made reports on this subject, the so-called “Monitor work and in-
come”. This report is prepared twice a year, and is a comprehensive overview of past 
developments, such as: local employment, number of welfare payments, and number 
of jobs. These reports contain much information for internal use, but are also written 
for a general audience, and special attention is given to readability and the presenta-
tion of texts and data. Structure, content, and lay-out of this Monitor differs signifi-
cantly from internal reports. 
 
To conclude, all five functions related to the archetypal roles are observed, but to dif-
ferent extents. 
•  Performance measures are only partly used for diagnostic reasons. Only fi-
nancial performances are used in a diagnostic way, and only on highly aggre-
gated budgets. Performance measures are often used in budgets, operational 
planning (in Program Budget and Sector Plan) and as status reports (in Quar-
terly Reports and Annual Reports), and in special purpose reports. 
•  Performance measures are used to learn. Trends in performance develop-
ments are used to discuss possible changes to operational processes and to 
future operational performances. 
•  Performance measures are used to signal unequivocally on important issues. 
Three reasons are identified: to emphasize important issues, to coordinate 
and to adjust the chain of welfare-related processes. 
•  Performance measures are clearly used to influence next period budgets. 
•  Performance measures are used to report on, explain, and account for past 
performances to external parties. 
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Businesslike and political context 
As previously discussed, a more businesslike context is associated with: 
• specific  organizational  objectives, 
•  relatively tight budgetary control (low tolerance for intermediate budget vari-
ances, detailed analysis of budget variances, intensive communication about 
budgets, emphasis on meeting the budget), 
• integration  of  strategic objectives and operational performances (formal organ-
izational planning is coupled with operational control). 
A more political control context is especially associated with a high level of multiplicity 
on objectives. 
The aspects relating to the two contexts are discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
Specificity and integration of objectives 
Specificity of objectives is measured by including three different aspects: the clarity of 
the objectives for the interviewed person and for other people involved, and the clar-
ity of the priority of the objectives for the person interviewed (Hartmann, 1997). 
 
In summary, interviewees perceive the objectives of Welfare Payment as sufficiently 
clear. As discussed previously, there exist slight differences between interviewees, 
but objectives and performances are regarded as clear and measurable. Interview-
ees perceive objectives and performance measures as clearly coupled; objectives 
and performance measures sufficiently explain actions that should be undertaken 
and performances are in general perceived as relevant. 
The findings from the interviews and from desk research, however, are less clear on 
the relationship between objectives and performances. It is often largely unclear 
whether objectives are achieved when performances are met
70.   
 
Interviewees generally said that objectives and performance measures were not 
used to prioritize operational activities. The prioritization of activities appears to be 
more dependent on actual circumstances. 
 
Additional desk research illustrates that objectives and performances can also be 
seen at an organizational and operational level. Objectives and performances named 
in the Program Budget are incorporated in the Sector Plan, and are part of the pro-
gress reports prepared at all organizational levels. All interviewees also referred to a 
comparable set of objectives and performances. Organizational objectives and op-
erational performances therefore could be regarded as coupled. 
 
Multiplicity of objectives 
Multiplicity of objectives is an indication of the presence of multiple, conflicting pres-
sures on organizational objectives by different groups (stakeholders). 
 
                                            
70 To illustrate this remark: many performance measures relate to operational norms, such as the 
number of new welfare requests (2.500) or handling of concurrent clients (4.500). It is however not 
clear if increases of decreases of these norms relate to the achievement of the strategic objective 
(maximum of 6 percent increase of Welfare Payment clients).  
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The Welfare Payment case study clearly shows the presence of different views and 
opinions about organizational objectives. All interviewees described at least three 
different groups of people that have influence over setting and achieving organiza-
tional objectives. These groups are: central government (setting legal rules and de-
termining financial contributions to local welfare costs), the elected Council members 
(restrictive policies on subsidized jobs and special welfare), and management (deci-
sions on operational processes that can influence the effectiveness of the process). 
The formal authority of the Council is not questioned (managers act according to the 
Council’s decisions), but there is a continuous discussion between politicians, alder-
men, and the civil servants on the policies that can contribute to minimizing the num-
ber of welfare payments and the financial risks. 
 
Tightness of budgetary control 
Field research shows that the importance of budgetary control is two-fold.  
 
On the one hand, politicians stress the importance of budgets, and especially of fi-
nancial budgets. Overspending on budgets for which the alderman is accountable to 
the Council (programs and high aggregated products) is regarded as highly undesir-
able. Reporting financial progress to the Council (Interim Reports and the Annual Ac-
count and Report) is perceived by aldermen to be important, and significant effort is 
directed both to the preparation and to the discussion of these reports. The Interim 
Report focuses mainly on financial variances; if no financial surplus or deficit occurs, 
no comment is documented in the report. Variances in non-financial performances 
are not used as reasons for progress reporting to the Council.  
 
On the other hand, financial budgets are adjusted. Managers are allowed to propose 
budget adjustment
71, but within strictly defined rules. Only when budget changes in-
fluence the high aggregated budgets for which aldermen are accountable, is the 
Council involved in the process. Central in this budget adjustment process is the tim-
ing and the explanation. Managers with budget responsibility must inform superiors in 
time (as soon as can be reasonably expected) and must justify budget changes with 
valid reasons. According to all interviewees, validity relates to uncontrollability. If a 
responsible manager cannot be held responsible for specific budget influences, in 
other words when s/he can not significantly control this influence, the justification for 
budget changes is generally regarded as valid. A consequence of this line of reason-
ing is that influences outside managers’ control on budget are considered as less 
important by them. Actually, conforming to budget rules appears to be more impor-
tant then meeting the budget. A clear example of this mechanism is the budget for 
the financial contribution to Welfare Payment made by central government. It is re-
markable that significant budget adjustments, such as the downwards adjustment of 
€2 million in costs and income in 2004, are often only documented in special Council 
memo’s and in the Annual Account and Report, and are not explained in Interim Re-
ports. 
                                            
71 For example, allocate funds between related budgets or request for additional budget.   74
Another aspect of this mechanism is that formal decisions on budget adjustment by 
the Council are often handled in a separate decision-making process, which is often 
discussed separately from the generic planning and control instruments. Decisions 
on budget adjustments are often part of decisions on specific policies or issues. 
Budgeted performances are then just one of the factors the Council has to decide on. 
From a budgetary control point of view, these budget adjustments appear to be of 
less importance. 
 
Non-financial performances are also perceived as important. Objectives and per-
formances are absorbed in Program Budgets, Sector Plans, and Interim Reports. 
Emphasis on meeting the non-financial performance budgets appears to be in line 
with the average; status reports on non-financial performance are frequently pro-
duced, and changes in achieved performances are closely watched and discussed 
throughout the organization at all organizational levels. Variances between actual 
and budgeted performances are, however, less frequently discussed, at least not in 
the researched years. These performance measures can relate to the number of wel-
fare payments, but also to legal terms that must be applied
72. The sector has an in-
ternal control system for monitoring these terms. A number of those non-financial 
performances are also part of an inter-governmental benchmark. This benchmark 
compares the Welfare Payment performances of several local governmental organi-
zations. Relatively negative scores in the benchmark, and consequently unfavorable 
positions in the benchmark, result in special attention to the specifically named per-
formance by alderman and elected Council members. 
 
Interviewees indicated that in general, during budget reviews by superiors, interim 
budget variances on both financial and non-financial performances were to a large 
extent tolerated. Detailed information on the development of actual non-financial per-
formances was, however, discussed intensely at all organizational levels. For exam-
ple, the number and composition of persons entering and leaving the welfare pay-
ment system is closely monitored, reported, and discussed monthly. At an opera-
tional level the frequency is high (every two weeks), at organizational level the fre-
quency is low (twice a year). Only when unexpected events occur (such as an an-
nouncement by central government to decrease financial support for welfare), are 
discussions held more frequently. Progress reviews between aldermen and man-
agement are rarely concerned with financial budget variances. This regardless of the 
importance that both politicians and top managers attach to budgetary control.  
 
To conclude, tightness of budgetary control is qualified as average, which can be 
prompted by these four aspects: 
•  Intolerance of interim budget variances appears to be limited; managers and 
aldermen perceive interim budget variations as limited important. 
•  Detailed budget-item follow ups appeared to be average. 
•  Intensity of budget related discussion is average (monthly), mainly on the de-
velopment of actual non-financial operational performances. 
                                            
72 For example, the time frame in which the municipality must decide on a welfare payment request.  
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•  Emphasis on meeting budget targets is considered as average. Emphasis is 
high at the top of the organization, but mainly for highly aggregated financial 
budgets. Emphasis on meeting budget targets appears to be lower at a more 
operational level, especially when adjustments do not influence the highly ag-
gregated budgets. 
 
Measuring the political and businesslike context 
In order to characterize the control context of Welfare Payment, the above docu-
mented findings on the different aspects are combined. Combinations of aspects 
function as indicators for the presence of a specific control context. 
Aiming to qualify the findings, the findings are interpreted by the researcher and la-
beled in a simple score
73.  
Specificity of objectives of Welfare Payment is perceived as above average
74.  This 
measure shows that objectives are sufficiently clear, relevant, and integrated for the 
interviewees, but are not being used for prioritizing decisions. 
Multiplicity of objectives is valued as above average
75. Conflicting pressures on ob-
jectives by central government, the elected Council members, and operational man-
agement are recognized as relevant factors. 
Tightness of budgetary control is valued as average
76. Combining these factors, the 
control context of Welfare Payment appears to have both a more businesslike and a 
political classification. 
 
                                            
73 This tentative approach to the labeling of findings with a qualitative measure is comparable with the 
measurement of the use of BPM as documented in the previous section. 
74   Measurement of the specificity of objectives is based on interpretations of the interview reports and 
of the desk research (for a list of documents included see the appendix) by the researcher. Specificity 
is measured by using a 5-point scale, ranging from low (all related factors are valued as low) via aver-
age (some of the related factors are seen as relevant and some are interpreted as not or hardly con-
tributing to a high level of specificity) to high level of specificity (all related factors contribute signifi-
cantly to the perception of specific objectives). 
75 Measurement of the multiplicity of objectives is based on interpretations of the interview reports by 
the researcher. Multiplicity is measured by using a 5-point scale, ranging from low (no clear conflicting 
pressures of different stakeholders on the objectives and performances) via average to high (signifi-
cant conflicting pressures of different stakeholders on the objectives and performances). 
76 Measurement of the tightness of budgetary control is based on interpretations of the interview re-
ports and of the desk research by the researcher. Tightness is measured by using a 5-point scale, 
ranging from a low level or loose budgetary control (tolerance for intermediate budget variances is 
seen as high, detail analysis of budget variances is not applied, no intensive communication about 
budgets, no clear emphasis on meeting the budget) via an average level of budgetary control (some of 
the related factors are seen as relevant and some are interpreted as not or hardly contributing to a 
tight budgetary control, measurement is not based on a mathematic weighted average of related val-
ues, but on personal interpretation) to a high level or tight budgetary control (all related factors con-
tribute significantly to the perception of budgetary control).   76
Routineness of tasks 
The operational tasks of Welfare Payment are described by all interviewees as rou-
tine. Tasks are perceived as mainly standardized, with little exceptions to general 
rules, and with known ways to solve exceptions to the rules. Although the interviews 
did not reveal sharp contrasts, the operational managers seemed to emphasize routi-
neness the most. They were the most outspoken on the importance of process man-
agement for achieving the Welfare Payment objectives. 
The routineness of tasks is therefore valued as high
77. 
                                            
77 Measurement of the routineness of tasks is based on interpretations of the interview reports by the 
researcher. Routineness is measured by using a 5-point scale, ranging from (tasks are perceived as 
not standardized, with no general rules, and with no known ways to solve operational decisions) via 
average to high (tasks are perceived as standardized, with no exceptions to general rules, and with 
known ways to solve exceptions to the rules).  
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Summary Welfare Payment case 
Welfare Payment is concerned with providing income to persons entitled to social 
welfare. The Council’s main organizational objective for Welfare Payment is restric-
tive: to limit the increase in the number of clients. By restricting welfare payments, the 
Council basically aims to limit the number of people that are dependent on it, to 
stimulate operational control of Welfare Payment tasks, and to reduce the risk of fu-
ture financial deficits.  
 
Interviewees saw the external environment of Welfare Payment as dynamic, uncer-
tain and uncontrollable. Politicians and managers of the municipality see the devel-
opment of the client population as hard to control. They are also uncertain about the 
effects of the policies set by the Council, the emerging changes in national laws and 
regulations, and the financial contribution of central government to Welfare Payment. 
The internal environment, however, is seen as highly predictable; managers know 
the tasks to perform and see processes as controllable.  
 
The objectives and performances of Welfare Payment are seen as sufficiently clear, 
at both an organizational and an operational level. Conflicting influences on setting 
objectives are clearly present, through the influences of central government (setting 
legal rules and financial restrictions), of Council members (restrictive special welfare), 
and management (effectiveness of operations). Clarity of objectives and conflicting 
institutional pressures on setting objectives appear to coexist is this case. 
Objectives and performances are viewed as integrated between organizational and 
operational level and between financial and non-financial performances. Financial 
and non-financial objectives and performance are used at an organizational level to 
address current developments and trends, and for justifying changes in policies and 
future budgets. Frequent status reports on actual performance and monitoring actual 
trends are valued highly. 
 
The fact that the city bears the significant financial risks of Welfare Payment stimu-
lates an awareness of politicians and managers of the uncontrollability of financial 
and non-financial objectives and performances. Aldermen, communicating with 
elected members of the Council and civil servants, appear to use objectives and per-
formances more as points of reference than as targets. Objectives and performances 
are also used as signals, to express and communicate issues that they perceive to 
be important.  
Performance measures are more important at an operational than at an organiza-
tional level. Performance measures (budgeted, actual, and forecasted) are used as 
signals to the organization to express important trends, for example on the develop-
ment of Welfare Payment clients and on actual workload. Trends are also used for 
process control purposes. Objectives and performances are used for budgeting and 
operational and organizational reporting. Performances are clearly used for status 
reporting, and reporting on current operational trends. The use of performances and 
objectives for variance analysis reasons, comparing actual developments to the 
budget, is only limitedly registered. Actual trends appear to be used for evaluating   78
whether change in processes, performances and objectives should be considered in 
the next budget period. 
Performances also appear to be used for retrospective reporting, to explain to the city 
Council, to governance bodies, and to citizens what has been done and progress 
made.  
 
An overview of the aspects relating to Welfare Payment is documented in Appendix 
VIII  Summary of Aspects.  
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Sewerage case study 
The structure of this section is comparable with the other case study reports. Firstly, 
the context within which Sewerage functions will be briefly examined, and the most 
relevant planning and control instruments together with the embedded objectives and 
performance measures will be described. Subsequently, their use is described by 
documenting the opinions of politicians or managers at three different organizational 
levels: the executive board, the director, and the operational manager. Finally, the 
points that have emerged during research into planning and control documents will 
be discussed. 
Sewerage policies 
The provision of a sewerage system is a legal requirement for municipal councils. A 
national environmental Act mandates local authorities to collect and transport their 
wastewater and rainwater. Under the streets of the city of Leeuwarden there are ap-
proximately 470 kilometers of sewers. These transport the wastewater
78 and rain-
water out of the city.  
 
These systems can be viewed as links in a chain. Rainwater and drinking water (and 
sometimes groundwater) flow into the sewers. The sewer transports it to the waste 
water treatment basins, and the wastewater treatment plant discharges its water into 
the canals and lakes. Sewerage is affected by rainfall (the weather), the amount of 
water supplied (tap water) and the amount of waste transported by it (sanitation, 
waste of businesses), and relates to wastewater treatment (governed by water 
boards), and the required water quality and water level in canals and lakes (governed 
by water boards and provincial governments).  
 
Sewerage is part of the Council’s Environmental program. As stated in the Program 
Budget 2004 and 2005, the main goal of Sewerage is to collect wastewater without 
polluting the environment. Limiting overflow of the sewer systems during heavy rains 
and maximizing wastewater collection are the specific goals of Sewerage. 
 
In 2004 a new mid-term plan was made
79. This plan contained lists of Sewerage pro-
jects that were planned for the coming years. This planning is based, amongst other 
factors, on a recently held inspection of the older sewers (older than 35 years). 
 
The operational activities of Sewerage are managed by the City Development and 
Maintenance department. The District Affairs
80 sector of this department is responsi-
ble for Sewerage policies and operations. This sector is also responsible for the con-
trol and maintenance of roads, bridges, waterways, and green areas (such as parks 
and grass). The sector consists of several teams, of which the Planning
81 team is in 
                                            
78 In 2005 of about 36.500 households and 4200 businesses. 
79 Called the City’s Sewerage Plan (in Dutch “Gemeentelijk Riolerings Plan” or GRP). 
80 In Dutch: “Wijkzaken”. 
81 In Dutch: “Bedrijfsbureau”.   80
charge of Sewerage projects. Small-scale projects are also managed by this team, 
but for larger-scale projects the engineering team in the Spatial Planning and Execu-
tion
82 sector acts as contractor. 
The District Affairs sector includes sector management and five teams (Planning, 
Field Work, Policies and Support, Graveyards, and District Management). The sector 
has a staff of 185 full time equivalents. The municipality’s operational tasks consist of 
planning, coordinating and controlling sewerage projects. Projects to construct new 
or maintain existing sewer systems are mostly executed by external contractors. Only 
minor maintenance work is actually done by the municipality itself. 
Planning and control documents 
Objectives, desired effects and performance measures relating to Sewerage are set 
out in several planning and control documents, such as the Program Budget 2004 
and 2005, the Sector Plan 2004 and 2005, the Annual report 2004 and the Quarterly 
Reports of 2004 and 2005. 
 
Sewerage, as part of the Environmental program, does not have strategic objectives 
specified in the Program Budget 2004. The strategic objectives of the environmental 
program implicitly cover Sewerage. Examples of these strategic objectives are: 
•  to realize a sustainable system for a clean and liveable city, 
•  to aim for a sustainable environment, by minimizing the amount of pollution, 
•  to realize an appealing environment to live in. 
The explanation on these strategic objectives documents the organizational objec-
tives of Sewerage (see Table 12) 
 
Objectives Sewerage   reference 2004 2005 
B1  Satisfaction of citizens with the maintenance of Sew-
erage (measured every two year by a survey). 
42% 42%  44% 
B2  Number of complaints in the registration system, 
relating to nuisance caused by sewer water. 
48 60  55 
B3  Preventing inconvenience by sewer water       
B4 Preventing  inconvenience  caused by factors other 
than sewer water. 
  
 
 
 
Table 12 Objectives 2004, Sewerage (source: Program Budget 2004, p. 115) 
 
These objectives specifically refer to the inconvenience to citizens if sewers malfunc-
tion. In the explanatory notes to these organizational objectives reference is made to 
measures taken to prevent such a calamity
83. 
 
                                            
82 In Dutch: “Ruimtelijke Ordening en Inrichting” or ROI. 
83 For example, to project that deliver excess water storage capacity.   
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The performance requirements for Sewerage are expressed in operational terms, 
such as: 
•  to provide for the continuous removal of waste and other surplus water, 
•  to make operational plans, put out tenders, inspect the sewers, clean the sew-
ers, 
•  to collect wastewater within the city area, 
•  to transport wastewater to the wastewater treatment installation, 
•  to remove waste, caused by sewer overflows, from the bed of the waterways, 
•  efficient control and effective use of the sewers. 
The explanatory notes clarify that the city does not use a special Sewerage tax. The 
coverage of Sewerage costs is provided by a separate part of the city’s housing tax
84. 
As documented in the Program Budget 2004, the city expects to use a special pur-
pose tax for Sewerage in the near future. 
 
The Program Budget 2004, which was drawn up in the autumn of 2003, did not ac-
knowledge risks presented by the current Sewerage policies, but announced a new 
mid-term Sewerage plan, to be set by the end of 2003
85. 
 
The financial objectives for Sewerage are detailed under the heading “Sewerage” in 
the Program Budget. The budgeted product costs in 2004 are about €10 million, 
which is 40 percent of the cost of the Environment program (see Table 13) 
 
2004 costs  income  results 
(*€1000)     
Environmental permissions           1.118             44-            1.075  
Collecting garbage  11.490  9.257-            2.233  
Sewerage           9.998        2.829-            7.169  
Environmental policies              734             83-               651  
Surface and sound              913           213-               700  
Environmental communication               137                 -                 137  
Vermin extermination                30                 -                   30  
Graveyards               699           529-               170  
Mortuary              103                 -                 103  
Canine services              299           378-                79- 
Cadaver disposal                  3                 -                     3  
Businesses               120                 -                 120  
Total 25.643  -13.333  12.310 
Table 13 Costs and income program Environment (source: Program Budget 2004, p. 126) 
 
As Table 13 shows, Sewerage has a deficit of €7.2 million. This deficit is fully cov-
ered by local tax income. It is noteworthy that the coverage of Sewerage costs is cal-
culated by the use of a financial calculation scheme. This scheme equalizes the ex-
                                            
84 Citizens pay one housing tax assessment in which the sewerage costs are included.  
85 This municipal council has set this plan in 2004.   82
penses of investment programs, by using financial funds. Expenses and costs are 
accumulated annually and evaluated with a budgeted norm. Only the cost related to 
the personnel in the sector (such as salaries and office support) is booked directly to 
the profit and loss account. The surplus or deficit between actual and norm is booked 
to these funds at the end of every year. The total deficit for Sewerage in the profit 
and loss account is therefore largely predefined. 
 
The Interim report 2004 does not doubt that the budget for Sewerage will be com-
plied with, financially speaking. 
 
The Annual Report 2004 documents to what extent Sewerage’s objectives were real-
ized. The satisfaction of citizens with the maintenance of the Sewerage (objective 
B1) was measured and appeared to be as expected (norm 42%, actual 40%
86).The 
number of complaints in the registration system, relating to problems with sewer wa-
ter (objective B2) was however higher than expected (norm 60, actual 132). The An-
nual Report explains this high score by saying that the registration system was ac-
tively promoted
87, and that 2004 was characterized by some abnormally high rainfall. 
The achieved performances of 2004 are all evaluated positively (with a plus). How-
ever, further explanation of this performance evaluation reveals however severe de-
lays in the time schedules of projects. These delays appear to have had no effect on 
the evaluation of the performances. The Annual Account 2004 presents the financial 
performances of Sewerage (see Table 14). 
 
2004 costs  income  results 
(*€1000)     
Budget 2004          9.998       2.829-          7.169  
Adjusted budget 2004          8.806       3.789-          5.017  
Account 2004          7.632          462-          7.170  
Result          1.174      3.327-         2.153- 
Table 14 Financial result Sewerage (source: annual report 2004, p. 132) 
 
The Annual Report 2004 limitedly explains the mechanisms behind this row of fig-
ures. It explains that the variance between costs and income is predefined by a kind 
of financial closed circuit scheme, resulting in a deficit that equals per definition the 
budgeted value. If a variance between realized and budgeted costs occurs, the 
amount of income for Sewerage is compensated in accordance with this variance. 
This income is of an administrative nature and represents a booking to an equaliza-
tion fund. 
                                            
86 The measurement of citizens’ satisfaction with sewer maintenance is part of the city’s district signal-
ing system. This signaling system collects data every two years, by asking citizens to react to a written 
questionnaire. The exact meaning of the citizen’s satisfaction measure is not clarified during the re-
search.  
87 The city had put extra effort into promoting the registration desk to the public by actively promoting 
the purpose of the desk and the phone number by which it could be reached.  
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The components that lead to variance of cost are clearly explained. The lower than 
budgeted costs are caused by lower Sewerage project costs (mainly lower deprecia-
tion charges and lower direct expenses). 
 
The Program Budget 2005 is the first program budget with strategic objectives for 
Sewerage: minimum discharge of waste. The organizational objectives are compara-
ble with those in the Program Budget 2004. Two objectives are documented: citizen’s 
satisfaction with Sewerage maintenance (44%) and the number of complaints in the 
registration system relating to problems with water (55) (see Table 15). These objec-
tives are not explained further. 
 
2005 Objectives Sewerage   reference  2005  2006 
B1  Maintenance of sewer drains 
Indicator: Satisfaction citizens 
42% 44%  46% 
B2 Water  hinder 
Indicator: reduction of number of complaints in 
the reporting system 
48 55  50 
Table 15 2005 Objectives Sewerage (source: Program Budget 2005, p. 100) 
 
The aims in the Program Budget 2005 are comparable with those of the previous 
program budget.  Examples are: 
•  maintaining the continuous removal of waste and other surplus water, 
•  making operational plans,  
•  putting out tenders,  
•  inspection of the sewers. 
The Program Budget 2005 explains that in addition to these requirements, Sewerage 
also has to comply with the aims as set by the new mid-term plan (the “GRP 
2004”)
88.  
 
The Program Budget 2005 also contains information additional to the GRP 2004, 
such as the separation of rainwater and wastewater, participation in an inter-
organizational benchmark for Sewerage, and attention to groundwater policies. 
The budget 2005 costs and income of Sewerage are €10 million and € 2.2 million, 
resulting in a deficit of about € 7.8 million (see Table 16).  This deficit is covered by a 
designated part of the local government housing tax. 
 
                                            
88 The previous GRP was used by the city over a longer period of time then originally intended. Desk 
Research revealed that through pressure by central and provincial government a new GRP was com-
missioned. Desk research of this “GRP 2004” plan gave insight into the objectives and performances 
documented in this plan. This plan documents three groups of objectives: related to wastewater, sus-
tainable environment, and maintenance and use. Each group is related to specific objectives. These 
objectives are formulated by using mainly civil technical terms, norms and measurement methods.   84
2005  (*€1000) cost  income  results 
Sewerage        10.000       2.185-         7.815  
Table 16 Costs and income Sewerage (source: Program Budget 2005, p. 109) 
 
The objectives of Sewerage, as documented in the Program Budget 2004, are also 
present in the Sector Plan of the District Affairs sector. The Sector Plan also contains 
a list of performance measures that are more specific then those in the Program 
Budget. The Sector Plan details, for example, that 47,500 drains are to be kept clean, 
467 km of sewers are to be maintained, 30 km of sewers are to be inspected, and 
that several categories of waste are to be disposed. The Sector Plan also describes 
the way the performances are to be measured and reported
89.  For an overview of 
projects to be executed the Sector Plan refers to the previous and to the new mid-
term plan (GRP). Financial budgets (documented in the appendix) provide financial 
detail on ledger accounts, responsibility centres, and products. 
 
The Quarterly Report 2004 and 2005 of the District Affairs sector explains little about 
the achievements of the financial and non-financial performance targets. They do 
mention the increase in sick leave, the amount of temporary personnel, and organiz-
ing job appraisal interviews in the sector. The Quarterly Reports do not provide an 
insight into progress on or any possible delays to or bottlenecks in sewerage pro-
jects. 
 
The District Affairs sector has produced a Sector Account 2004. This Sector Account 
explains the year-end position for detailed costs of responsibility accounts and prod-
ucts, on the number of people employed, and on man hours spent on projects and 
products. Sewerage receives only a few general remarks. 
 
A more functional evaluation of the performance of Sewerage is documented in the 
GRP 2004, but this evaluation refers to the years between 1997 and 2001. Evalua-
tion of performance in the years after 2001 is not given. References in the GRP 2004 
to the year 2002 and beyond only explain relevant developments, but not the 
achieved performance. 
 
Use of objectives and performance measures 
The use of objectives and performance measures is analyzed in two ways. Insight 
into their use is documented at three different organizational levels (aldermen, civil 
director, and operational manager). Then, by referring to these points, relevant as-
pects are discussed. 
 
                                            
89 Measured for example by the district signaling system (one per two years), by visual inspection in 
the field, by registrations of failures or break-downs, by sickness percentage (per quarter). Reported 
for example by the monitor “Large City Policies” (twice a year), and Quarterly and Annual Reports.  
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Aldermen 
Sewerage is of only minor interest to the responsible alderman.  Sewerage, accord-
ing to him, does not need intense political attention. He recognized the importance of 
Sewerage as a vital function for the city, but added that short term political influences 
on this function are limited. In his view, the more practical political discussions about 
Sewerage were held about 10 years ago,. Shortfall in the maintenance of sewers and 
political interest in improving the quality of surface water resulted then in a significant 
and structural increase in the financial budget and a more ambitious improvement 
program. The elected members of the Council do not often discus the financial and 
non-financial objectives of Sewerage. There is, in the alderman’s opinion, no reason 
to discuss Sewerage on a regular basis. 
Political discussions are mostly held during the renewal of the mid-term plan, the 
“GRP”. The alderman said that discussions in the Council on this GRP concentrated 
on three issues: limiting overflow of the sewers, sewers in rural areas, and the finan-
cial budget for the coming years. During these discussions the Council also evalu-
ated the performances of Sewerage in the past year. He added that this evaluation 
showed that almost all objectives were achieved. 
 
According to the alderman the main emphasis nowadays is on stimulating Sewerage 
projects. This is in order to prevent further setbacks in planning. He explained that 
some projects recently failed to be completed on schedule. He underlined that his 
influence on Sewerage was not focused on the achievement of objectives, but on 
mechanisms that could stimulate operations. In his own words “A machine must start 
up and stay running. Detailed budgetary control by politicians does not add value to 
this”. 
 
Political interest is therefore directed more to stimulating operational actions than on 
preventing budget overspending. The alderman referred to the financial scheme of 
Sewerage as the main reason for this limited political interest in financial perform-
ances. The flattening effect of this scheme, spreading financial differences over many 
years, released him from the need to control Sewerage closely. An additional aspect 
is that underspending of the total budget (mainly on depreciation due to delays in the 
executions of projects) is more realistic than overspending. 
 
The objectives for Sewerage are clear to the alderman, but he perceived them as 
having limited importance. He sees objectives as guidelines for the professionals re-
sponsible for operational activities. He added that the Sewerage objectives often di-
rectly related to other policy fields. For example, the objectives for the technical de-
sign of the sewers are defined by the objectives for the quality of surface water. The 
objectives for the quality of surface water are mainly discussed and set in other policy 
fields. Political discussions about Sewerage therefore seem to “disappear”; to shift to 
other political settings.   
 
Civil Director 
The director confirmed the limited political interest in the objectives and perform-
ances of Sewerage. In his words: “This is a political organization, and for Sewerage it   86
is easy to say what has to be done. Sewerage simply must operate adequately, and 
the available money has to be used”. 
He views objectives as specific and clear; the objectives are in line with the desired 
technical quality and available financial means.  
 
The director’s attention is mainly focused on stimulating the progress of Sewerage 
projects; in order to prevent underspending of the budget. He has a limited involve-
ment in the more technical aspects of the projects. His attention is more focused on 
the support and coordination of all civil projects. In his opinion, objectives and per-
formances are of limited importance for controlling these technical projects. He 
stressed the importance of hiring the right persons, and of stimulating the interaction 
between persons. In his words: “professionals can be controlled by ambition and 
passion, not by performances”.   
 
He added that the function of objectives and performance measures for Sewerage 
are mainly for the evaluation of past performances, to evaluate and report on the pro-
gress that has been achieved. 
 
Operational manager 
Operational management
90 underlined the importance of objectives and performance 
measures, but referred mainly to technical objectives and performance measures as 
defined in the mid-term plan GRP 2004. They referred to objectives in technical 
terms, for example: reduce discharge points that are unconnected with the sewer, 
reduce overflow of the system, and build separate systems for waste- and rainwater. 
The more politically formulated objectives, documented only in the Program Budget, 
were not of much value to them (for example on the number of complaints in the reg-
istration system).   
 
Operational managers said that their annual planning is based on the GRP 2004. 
They referred to the GRP 2004 not only for the objectives and performances, but also 
for the list of specific projects that must be realized every year. In their opinion the 
yearly costs of Sewerage are based on this list of projects. 
Interviewees explained that the projects on this list are not automatically put into op-
eration. At the beginning of each calendar year, the list of projects is discussed, and 
the need to start-up a project is evaluated. Technical field-inspection reports are used 
to decide on the technical urgency for actions. Meetings with other sector managers 
give insight into the possibilities of coordinating Sewerage projects with other civil 
and infrastructural projects at specific locations. Projects with a high ranking for tech-
nical urgency and coordinated action are put into the plan for the coming year. Pro-
jects with a low ranking are rescheduled and will appear on future planning lists. Pro-
jects are mostly rescheduled to future starting dates, seldom to earlier starting dates. 
Projects in operation tend take more time too. For example; most of the projects in 
operation in 2005 were based on the previous GRP. 
                                            
90 At operational level three persons were interviewed. Their answers are presented here in a summa-
rized form.  
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Although the registration of public complaints about the sewers is still not of great 
importance to the operational planning of projects, operational managers considered 
this registration system to be important. The registration system has, in their view, 
improved communication between the public and local government. They said that 
people are now better able to express their opinions about the sewers to the local 
government. The managers expected that this registration system would be used to 
prioritize specific Sewerage projects
91 in the future. 
 
Managers discussed the progress of each individual project on a regular basis 
(weekly, monthly, and quarterly). Operational managers perceived project control as 
important, and explained that the organization put emphasis on improving project 
control. The introduction of new project control methods, the new assigned project 
controllers, and the rigid evaluation of project planning were named as examples of 
improved project control. 
All interviewees expressed the view that the financial control of projects had been 
improved significantly over recent years. They all stressed that projects are being 
achieved within budget limits. The control of non-financial performances, especially 
time control, is seen as a point that still needs special attention. They were fully 
aware of the fact that the total costs budgets for sewerage were never overspent, 
and recognized that delays in projects were the main cause. The reasons for these 
delays are, according to operational managers, problems during the start-up of pro-
jects and unexpected situations in the field during the project execution. Digging be-
neath the surface of the city often reveals other things, previously unknown to the 
project manager. Not every cable or pipe is registered, and archeological findings 
often appear unexpectedly. Also, digging up roads often appears to require more co-
ordination and communication than expected
92. 
Aspects of budget use 
The previously described opinions of the alderman, the director, and the operational 
managers will be used here to analyze relevant aspects against the research frame-
work. The main level of analysis is again organizational, with its focus on the use of 
objectives and performance measures at the top of the organization. The research 
framework and its defined aspects will be the focus of the analysis, but if applicable, 
other aspects are also included. 
 
The evidence is summarized and analyzed by the researcher with reference to desk 
research and interviews where suitable. 
 
                                            
91 For example, if overflow of sewers often results in registered complaints in specific districts or 
streets, projects that can reduce this inconvenience can be given a higher priority on the planning list.  
92 For example, because of the desire to minimize traffic inconvenience.   88
Design and quality of the accounting information system 
The accounting information system of the municipality yields both financial and non-
financial information. The financial information relates in particular to the costs of 
products and the expenses of investments by the Council. Financial information is 
documented in all planning and control documents, such as the Program Budget, 
Sector Plan, Quarterly Report, project plans and project reports. The financial infor-
mation for Sewerage often relates to differences between achieved performances 
and budgeted norms (such as the total annual cost budget and the project expense 
budget).  
The accounting information system also delivers non-financial information, and pro-
vides in particular operational planning information (start and end dates, milestones, 
and time planning of projects, and time scheduling of personnel), and information on 
operational progress (such as: on hours worked by personnel and on sick leave). 
Managers use this information to control the operational processes and projects. Ex-
amples of reports for operational use are the Quarterly Reports in 2004 and 2005 of 
the District Affairs sector. These reports contain a lot of detail on the availability of 
personnel
93 and indicate progress against the performance targets of the sector. 
However, these Quarterly Reports rarely refer to Sewerage in particular. 
 
The quality of accounting information is perceived as reasonable at all organizational 
levels. At the political level, the quality of information is perceived as good. Alderman 
and councilors appeared to be satisfied with the information provided in general, al-
though the content of the information did not always match their specific needs. At 
the same time, it seems that the requirement for information about Sewerage by poli-
ticians is very low. Operational management perceived the quality of information as 
lower. It appeared that accounting information did not fully support the requirements 
of managers for controlling large numbers of different projects. Collecting valuable 
information for supervising projects is also considered to be difficult. 
 
To conclude, the accounting information system for Sewerage contains both financial 
and non-financial information. Financial performance information is presented in 
great detail, and relates to budgeted norms and achieved values of individual pro-
jects and products. Non-financial performance information is also present in volume 
and in great detail, and relates to budgeted norms, achieved values, and to additional 
information (such as prognoses) of individual projects. However, the presence of 
such detailed information does not appear to completely fulfill the information needs 
of the operational managers who are responsible for clusters of projects. 
The observations are tentatively quantified into a score
65. The scope of the account-
ing information system for Sewerage is valued by the researcher following the previ-
ously introduced method of assessing the various case findings. Using a 5-point 
scale, the scope is labeled as “average”
66. The quality of the accounting information 
is valued in the same tentative way as the scope, and is labeled with as “average”
67. 
                                            
93 Such as: sick leave, vacancies, temporary personnel, personal performance evaluations and plans, 
and training and education.  
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This valuation of quality aims to express the perception of a high quality of informa-
tion in combination with a limited use at an organizational level.   
 
Applied role  
The interviews gave an overview of the different ways in which accounting informa-
tion is used in practice; they provided insight into the roles of performance measures. 
This study has defined five different sub-roles or functions by which archetypal roles 
can be recognized
94. These five functions and the relating archetypal role (between 
brackets) are: 
•  to diagnose, to compare actual and budgeted performance (answering role), 
•  to learn and to change ways of doing (learning role), 
•  to unequivocally signal what is important (learning role, ammunition role), 
•  to influence future budget increase (ammunition role), 
•  to report and explain on past performance (rationalization role). 
 
Firstly, the results of the interviews and desk research are used now to assess 
whether the use of performance measures are for diagnostic reasons, that is, for 
comparing financial and non-financial variances in performances. 
 
Managers and politicians in Sewerage appear to use performance measures in two 
different diagnostic ways; in a general organizational and in a detailed operational 
way. The total budgeted costs of Sewerage, as defined in the Program Budget, are 
used as a highly aggregated total norm for financial performance. Compliance to this 
norm is perceived as important by all interviewees
95. However, managers and politi-
cians are hardly aware of the actual financial performances of Sewerage. This is 
mainly due to the complex financial scheme in use and the structural underspending 
on Sewerage costs budgets. The diagnostic use of annual financial performance 
measures is thus hardly applied at an organizational level. Only at the end of the mid-
term plan, during the evaluation of this plan, does a more complete financial overview 
appear to exist. However, this overview is retro-active. 
Budgetary control functions at an operational level, as a project control instrument, 
for controlling separate financial and non-financial project performances. Status re-
ports on projects support a diagnostic use for each project separately. The detailed 
budget rules are used to direct project managers to act within the clear project 
boundaries. Tools for controlling all the Sewerage projects on a more organizational 
level, in terms of both financial and non-financial performances, appear to be absent. 
  
Secondly, the use of performance measures for learning, signaling and influencing 
future budgets is assessed.  
 
                                            
94 For more detail on the theoretical definition of the roles and their function see chapter 2, A Theoreti-
cal Research Framework. 
95 For example, (a) projects are only start-up if the expected cost of these projects does not result in a 
overspending of the budget, (b) occurring budget variances per project can be compensated by reallo-
cation of budget of other projects, as long as the total budget stays within to pre-set year norm.   90
Performance measures appear to be rarely used for signaling Sewerage related in-
formation at an organizational level. Status reports often reveal detailed operational 
project information, are produced in a pre-defined format, and focus on information 
relevant for project control purposes. Managers indicated that these status reports 
rarely show to them possible bottlenecks in achieving organizational performances or 
objectives. They perceived the large number of projects and the standard lay-out of 
status reports as one of the main causes of this lack of insight. According to opera-
tional managers, the only way to control multiple projects is to arrange meetings with 
several project managers. Verbal information, collected during these meetings, is 
regarded as the most effective way to manage all the projects. Managers at all or-
ganizational levels often participate in meetings about large projects. These meetings 
appear to provide a forum for coordination and control between supervisors and pro-
ject managers. The available information mostly relates to operational details, and is 
mainly used by project managers. Top management and politicians do not make 
much use of this information. They focus on the prevention of under spending of fi-
nancial budgets and on the stimulation of the start-up of individual projects. For them, 
the information in the Annual Report is the most relevant source of information on 
organizational progress. 
Interviewees see control of Sewerage as an on-going process. The actualization of 
the mid-term plan (GRP) is seen more of the start of a new budget cycle. Desk re-
search on the process of setting the GRP 2004 found no evidence of the use of per-
formance information for influencing future budgets, or for motivating budget in-
creases.  
 
Thirdly, a brief assessment of the use of performance measures for reporting and 
explaining past performances is presented. 
 
The achievement of objectives is reported at the end of each GRP. An evaluation of 
a GRP takes place formally every four years, but this period can be longer when the 
making of a new GRP is postponed. This GRP mainly documents and evaluates the 
achievements of non-financial performances. This retrospective evaluation is dis-
cussed in the Council, and can be regarded as a general organizational evaluation. 
Sewerage also participates in a national benchmark scheme. This benchmark com-
pares financial and non-financial performances between municipal organizations. 
The information from this benchmarking process is reported to the Council, but does 
not seem to trigger any discussion. The reason for this lack of interest in the bench-
mark information by management and politicians has not been explained during this 
research
96. 
 
                                            
96 This lack of interest can be caused by various reasons, for example: councilors have limited inter-
ested in Sewerage (seen as a field for technical skilled professionals, or perhaps because the systems 
itself is mainly below the surface), or citizens have limited interested in Sewerage (coverage of Sew-
erage is included in a housing tax and the sewer system causes little inconvenience).    
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To conclude, performance measures are: 
•  not used very much for diagnostic reasons at organizational level
97. Financial 
and non-financial performance measures are used in budgets, operational 
planning and in status reporting, but the evaluation of performances at an or-
ganizational level only occurs when the mid-term plan (GRP) is renewed. 
•  limitedly used for signaling important issues. Only under-spending of financial 
budgets is used as a signal for stimulating project managers to deliver on time. 
•  hardly used for learning, for changing ways of doing. 
•  not being used for influencing future budget increases. 
•  used for reporting on past performances, and providing insight in more general 
terms into the achieved performances of Sewerage. 
 
Businesslike or political context 
As previously discussed a more businesslike context is associated with: 
• specific  organizational  objectives, 
•  relatively tight budgetary control (low tolerance of intermediate budget vari-
ances, detailed analysis of budget variances, intensive communication about 
budgets, emphasis on meeting the budget), 
• integration  of  strategic objectives and operational performances (formal organ-
izational planning is coupled with operational control). 
A more political control context is especially associated with a high level of multiplicity 
on objectives. The aspects relating to the two contexts are discussed in detail in the 
next section. 
 
Specificity and integration of objectives 
Sewerage appears to have two different types of objectives: political objectives as 
defined in the Program Budget (aimed at inhabitants of the city) and the technical 
objectives in the GRP. Both types of objectives are perceived as specific. The objec-
tives in the GRP, and the related functional demands and technical requirements, 
largely determine the planning of tasks for Sewerage. The objectives in the Program 
Budget relate to the public perception of the effectiveness of Sewerage in running the 
sewers.  
Both types of objectives can be seen as linked. It is reasonable to expect that the 
long-term objectives in the GRP lead to the same point as the objectives in the Pro-
gram Budget.  But this link is not made explicit
98. 
So, in practice both types of objectives can be seen as a relatively loosely coupled 
control system, by which the Council focuses on registered complaints and the man-
agers focus on technical norms. In formal terms this loose coupling is, however, non-
existent. Both GRP and Program Budget are discussed and set by the Council, and 
the Program Budget makes explicit references to the GRP. 
Managers and politicians do not perceive any problems with these two types of ob-
jectives. On the contrary, it is seen as a preferable development. In the words of the 
                                            
97 However it is used diagnostically at the operational level of individual projects. 
98 For example: the registration of complaints is a measurement that is also documented in the GRP, 
but the design of the system relates basically to national defined design norms.    92
responsible alderman: “I can approach this subject in more abstract terms, but pro-
fessionals must think in clear operational terms”. 
The link between Program Budget and GRP is especially clear when looking at the 
formally documented performance measures in the Program Budget 2004 and 2005. 
The Program Budgets makes explicit reference to the performances in the GRP. 
 
To conclude, objectives and performances are specific, although not extensively 
used for control purposes. Integration of financial and non-financial performances is 
only recognized at an organizational level when the GRP is evaluated. Strategic ob-
jectives and operational performances are integrated. 
 
Multiplicity of objectives 
There are no indications of conflicting pressures on organizational objectives. Multi-
plicity of objectives is thus considered to be low. 
 
Tightness of budgetary control 
Budget tightness in Sewerage is limited. It seems that the sensitivity of and interest in 
the financial results of Sewerage is relatively low. Budgetary control relates to Sew-
erage’s products (basically yearly maintenance budgets) and projects (often with a 
multi-year time span). Financial and non-financial information on projects is available, 
but is regarded by managers as of limited use for organizational control. 
 
Financial control is carried out within the organization’s control rules and guidelines
99. 
Product and project managers have to comply with these specific rules and proce-
dures. Tightness of budgetary financial control at operational level is therefore con-
sidered to be high. Budget responsible managers are not allowed to incur more costs 
than budgeted, to spend more cash than budgeted, and can only authorize payments 
up to specific pre-set amounts. These behavioral restrictions at project level do not 
result automatically in tight budgetary control at an organizational level. For example, 
overspending on one project budget can be compensated by under spending on 
other projects. This compensation mechanism is controlled by internal rules, and 
demands the formal approval of senior management. Furthermore, as discussed be-
fore, Sewerage’s budgets are mostly under-spent. Overspending at an organizational 
level seldom occur, which puts limited pressure on budgetary control at an organiza-
tional level. 
The use of a financial scheme, for flattening the cost over a period of at least four 
years, is another aspect that decreases budgetary tightness. Even when overspend-
ing occurs in a specific year, this deficit is booked to a general ledger account. Man-
agers and politicians seem to have no specific knowledge of the function of this 
scheme, and on the mechanisms that define the yearly financial results for Sewer-
age. The general procedure of this scheme was often explained during the inter-
views, but in answers to more detailed questions they all suggested that is was better 
                                            
99 For more information in financial control, see the section “Planning and control at an organizational 
level” in this current chapter.  
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to consult the financial experts (“you should address that question to the finance sec-
tor”).  
 
Non-financial budgetary control relates mainly to the time planning of individual pro-
jects, and to the milestones within the project planning. Management confirmed that 
there are problems with controlling the time aspects of projects. Time planning of pro-
jects has not been well executed and time is not well controlled. Discussing this sub-
ject, managers mentioned several issues such as: delays in starting projects on time, 
time consuming coordination between Sewerage projects and other infrastructural 
projects, and unexpected situations in practice (unknown cables, pipes, pollution, 
archeological findings etc.). 
Information on the progress of individual projects was available, but information for 
controlling non-financial performances at an organizational level seems be largely 
missing. Thus, coordination of projects at a more organizational level appears to be 
hard, and the consequences of not delivering non-financial performances seem to be 
difficult to see. An exception to this general conclusion is the control of Sewerage 
projects in most of the development districts or areas. The development of new areas 
or districts seems to be in control, this despite the fact that the realization of these 
development projects was performed by private parties, outside the direct influence 
of the city Council. 
 
To conclude, tightness of budgetary control is qualified as limited, due to four as-
pects: 
•  Intolerance for interim budget variation appears to be limited, particularly for 
organizational control purposes. However, for various reasons, exceeding an-
nual budgets never seems to happen. 
•  Detailed budget-item follow-ups appear to be limited. Detailed follow-ups are 
applied for operational project control, but this aspect is not of significant im-
portance for organizational control. 
•  Intensity of budget-related discussion is limited; budgets are seldom the sub-
ject of discussion for organizational control. 
•  Emphasis on meeting the budget is considered as average. Meeting the an-
nual budget appears mainly to be important for operational planning purposes, 
and for emphasizing the importance of time control (minimizing under spend-
ing of budgets).   
 
Measuring the political and businesslike context 
Specificity of objectives within Sewerage is qualified as high
74. This measure ex-
presses the findings that objectives are perceived as clear, relevant, integrated, and 
used for prioritizing. Multiplicity of objectives is valuated as low
75. No clear conflicting 
pressures on objectives surfaced during the research. Tightness of budgetary control 
at an organizational level is valued as below average
76. Referring to these measure-
ments, the context of organizational control of Sewerage is mainly characterized by 
businesslike aspects (specificity of objectives). 
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Routineness of tasks 
Interviewees had different views on the routineness of tasks in Sewerage. Tasks 
were often described as “performed in a known way”, easy to forward plan in phases 
and steps, and often repetitive in nature. On the other hand, most of the interviewees 
said that tasks were often performed on an ad-hoc basis. They saw the environment 
of Sewerage’s projects as difficult to predict, both beneath the surface (unknown 
elements) and above (difficult coordination with others). Only in the case of a totally 
predictable environment, would the tasks of Sewerage be described as having a high 
level of routineness. 
 
So, the tasks of Sewerage are seen as basically highly routine, but the implementa-
tion of sewer projects appears to happen on a more ad-hoc basis. Sewer projects are 
planned in advance, but often have to be rescheduled during the execution of the 
projects. The routineness of tasks is therefore quantified as average, expressing the 
high level of technical routineness and the more ad-hoc situation of the actual project 
implementation.  
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Summary Sewerage case 
Sewerage is about collecting and transporting rainwater and waste water, in such a 
way that environmental pollution and overflow of the sewer systems are minimized. 
Although the main organizational objectives of Sewerage are formally aimed at se-
curing citizens’ long term satisfaction, in practice Sewerage is directed by a mid-term 
project plan (GRP).  
 
The external environment of Sewerage is perceived as certain, and political interest 
in Sewerage is very limited. Only, when the Council evaluate the old and set a new 
GRP (every four year or longer), is some political interest documented.  
 
Planning and control in Sewerage is largely carried out in an environment where pro-
fessional engineering knowledge dominates. Objectives and performances are per-
ceived as clear and integrated, and conflicting pressures on setting organizational 
objectives are not seen. Objectives are to a large extent the result of the technical 
norms, knowledge and methods that determine the planning of Sewerage. The tasks 
to perform are often well-known and pre-programmable, but performing tasks on time 
(large projects in particularly) is often organized on an ad-hoc basis.  
 
The use of objectives and performance measures appears to be limited at organiza-
tional level. Financial performance measures are mainly used to set the total yearly 
volume of sewer projects, but the use of financial performance measures for organ-
izational control is limited. Yearly financial variances which occur (between budgeted 
and realized financial performance) are resolved by a technical financial scheme, 
which equalizes financial variances over the plan period. 
Meeting project deadlines is in general considered to be the most important non-
financial operational performance target, but appears hard to achieve. For example, 
start-ups of sewer projects are often delayed, and the execution of sewer projects 
often takes longer than planned.  
 
Operational performance measures are important for the project manager; control of 
individual projects uses operational financial and non-financial performance meas-
ures in detail. These operational performance measures give insight into individual 
projects, but are hardly used for organizational control purposes. 
 
An overview of the aspects relating to Sewerage is documented in Appendix VIII  
Summary of Aspects. 
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Economic Policy case study 
The structure of this section is comparable with the other case study reports. Firstly, 
the context in which Economic Policy is made will be briefly examined, and the most 
relevant planning and control instruments, with their embedded objectives and per-
formance measures, described. Subsequently, the use of objectives and perform-
ance measures is described by documenting the opinions of politicians or managers 
at three different organizational levels: the executive board, the director, and the op-
erational manager. Finally, the points that have emerged during research into plan-
ning and control documents will be discussed. 
Economic Policy 
Economic Policy’s has an influential role in policy documents. Economic Policy is re-
ferred to as central in the Executive Program “Work in Progress” (2002), in the City 
Vision “Sailing under own flag” (2002), and in the Mid-term Development Plan 2005-
2009 (MDP II). 
 
In 1996 Leeuwarden participated in Large City Policy
100 (LCP), a program under the 
supervision of central government, and this appears to have been an important cata-
lyst in furthering the development of its Economic Policy. Both the City Vision and the 
Mid-term Development Plan are supported by LCP. The basic assumptions of LCP 
are, according to the Program Budget 2004, “grounded in the city’s processes”; the 
Program Budget 2004 and 2005 contain the objectives and performances as defined 
by LCP. 
The MDP is an important document in the covenant between the Council and central 
government. It defines the subjects that are stimulated by LCP, and describes the 
economic ambitions of the Council
101. LCP’s budget is made available by central gov-
ernment as a general grant under the name “Economy and Social”. 
The MPD II also documents, in relation to Economic Policy, a number of relevant and 
measurable objectives, performance measurements, and norms. These output 
measures are used to account to central government. 
The central position of the LCP’s objectives can also be recognized in the Council’s 
Economical Plan 2002-2006 (“Leeuwarden, city of all trades”). This plan discusses 
Economic Policy for the city in a comprehensive way, documents the subjects de-
                                            
100 In Dutch: “Grote Stedenbeleid” or GSB. 
101 To give some examples, the MDP II documents: Economic growth in recent years and expected 
future growth will lead to an increase of scale of Leeuwarden in terms of space (development, restruc-
tures), economic (the employment engine of Fryslân), and social development (increase in inhabi-
tants). Leeuwarden aims to be prepared for its future. Growth is important for the city for performing 
and improving its functions well for its own citizens, for cities in the area - also in the future. This will 
enlarge the city’s social economic perspective. 
This is defined in the following main goals: A vital mid-size city with 100.000 to 125.000 citizens with a 
balanced composition. (a) the most important city in the north of the Netherlands, next to the city of 
Groningen, for facilities, employment and living, (b) an urban society, with unemployment and eco-
nomic development comparable to an average norm, (c) an attractive city with sustainable and high 
quality residence for businesses and civilians, (d) an easy assessable city, with an effective transport 
system, (e) a safe and livable city.  
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fined in LCP (such as business climate, business environment, city’s services to 
businesses) and specific actions. 
 
The Council’s Economic Policy is influenced not only by LCP but also by central gov-
ernment current policies. A change of course in economic policy by central govern-
ment has consequences for local authorities. Central government’s regional eco-
nomic policies reveal a shift away from more generic economic support and compen-
sation for “backward”
102 areas, towards realizing economic potentials and eradicating 
major national problems
103.  The cabinet’s plan names the city of Leeuwarden where 
centers of excellence for water treatment
104 and life science should be developed as 
priority.  
  
Economic Policy in the municipality of Leeuwarden is coordinated by the Economic 
Affairs team. This team is part of the Development, Economics, and Real Estate sec-
tor and of the department of City Development and Maintenance. In the past a strong 
link existed between development and economics. One of the main ways to realize 
economic growth was to stimulate tailor-made development solutions. For example, 
by developing top locations for real estate development, and aiming to meet the ac-
commodation requirements of businesses, was (and is) the city capable of attracting 
new business. The city has to compete with many other cities in the region, and is 
using Economic Policy to persuade business to choose Leeuwarden. The link be-
tween development and economics has become less pronounced in recent years; 
and the emphasis of Economic Policy is now less on the development of new districts 
and areas. Economic Policy is now more related to a broad spectrum of municipal 
services, such as traffic, public transport, employability, and development. 
The Economic Affairs team is involved in four activities: services, relation manage-
ment, policies, and subsidy management. The team size was small; only 3 persons 
were employed in 2005. The Development, Economics, and Real Estate sector has a 
staff of about 26 full-time equivalents. 
Planning and control documents 
Objectives, desired effects and performances relating to Economic Policy have been 
set out in several planning and control documents, such as the Program Budget 2004 
and 2005, the Sector Plan 2004 and 2005, the Annual Report 2004, and the Quar-
terly Reports in 2004. 
 
Economic Policy is recorded in the Program Budget 2004 as part of the Economics 
and Tourism program. The strategic objectives of this program partly relate to the 
City Vision and the MDP II
105, but include some additional specific objectives
106.  Ac-
                                            
102 See memo such as: “Integral Governance Plan northern part of the Netherlands”, in Dutch “Inte-
graal Bestuursplan Noorden des lands”, and the “Langman-agreement”. 
103 See cabinets memo “Heights in the delta”, in Dutch “Pieken in de delta”. 
104 Referred to as “Wetsus”. 
105 Such as: enlarging the attraction and capability of the city, and to extend the services to busi-
nesses.    98
cording to the text of the Program Budget 2004, the objectives and the related meas-
ures of Economic Policy are rather specific. The major objectives are documented in 
Table 17. 
 
Objectives Economic Policy   Reference  2004  2005 
A  Increase local employment equal or more 
than increase on national level (nl). 
nl nl 
B  Maintaining current business climate rating  6,4 6,4  
C  Number of new ventures  240 240 
D  Increase in employment in retail  +150 
E  Number of m2 office space to deliver  37500 
Table 17 Objectives Economic Policy (source: Program Budget 2004, p. 43) 
 
The prime objective is to increase employment opportunities. No specific norm is 
documented; the aim is to develop in line with national employment trends. The notes 
for this objective do not reveal a more specific goal, but stress that in 2005 employ-
ment in the city was in line with the national trend. The other objectives detail desir-
able developments in the local business climate, new ventures, retail trade, and of-
fice space. Most of the objectives have target values, but for the year 2004 not all 
targets are available. The Economics and Tourism program provides textual context 
on the state of progress, both on the objectives and the performances. Two groups of 
performances are described, incidental and structural. Incidental performances often 
describe particular development by the municipal organization or in which the organi-
zation participates. Structural performances are described in more general terms. 
Examples of structural performances are: 
•  acquisition of new ICT-businesses, 
•  implementation of a new service point for businesses, and a computer system 
for relation management, 
•  to visit 80 businesses per year. 
 
In contrast to the relative importance of Economic Policy in the Program Budget, 
Economics and Tourism are of only minor financial importance. Table 18 shows that 
the total costs of Economic Policy produce only 7 percent of the total costs of the 
program (€ 1.6 million of the € 22.6 million). The financial heart of the program is De-
velopment and Real Estate
107. 
  
                                                                                                                                        
106 Such as: supporting retail trade with particular services, enlarging recreation opportunities and fa-
cilities. 
107 The total budget of the products Development and Real Estate together makes € 19.3 million, or 85 
percent of the total costs of the program Economics and Tourism.  
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cost and income 2004  costs  income  results 
(*€1000)   
Economic Policy             1.664             513-              1.151  
Markets                180             161-                   18  
Markets stands                  43               92-                  49- 
Real estate             6.341          5.605-                 736  
Development           13.003        14.126-              1.122- 
Recreation terrains                827               72-                 754  
Recreation sailing                  79               60-                   19  
Fairs                  42             100-                  58- 
Tourism                394               99-                 295  
Total 22.573  -20.829  1.744 
Table 18 Costs and income Program Economics & Tourism (source: Program Budget 2004, p. 51) 
 
The Interim Report 2004 does not forecast any budget shortfalls in Economic Policy. 
 
In the Annual Report 2004 many objectives are not fully evaluated. The main reason 
given for this is lack of quantitative data. Some data is included, and shows that pro-
gress in the development of office locations has almost halted. The progress on inci-
dental performances is mainly valued as below expectation (with a plus/minus or a 
minus), the progress in the development of office locations is valued with a minus. 
The progress made towards various structural performances is valued in a more 
positive way, mainly with a plus. Progress in attracting new ICT-businesses, imple-
menting a service point for businesses, and carrying out business visits seem to 
meet the pre-set norms. 
An overview of the financial performances is documented in Table 19. 
 
Costs and income 2004  costs  income  results 
(*€1000)     
Budget 2004          1.664          513-          1.151  
Adjusted budget 2004           2.124          919-          1.205  
Account 2004           1.666          631-          1.035  
result                458            288-             170  
Table 19 Costs and income Economic Policy (source: Annual Report 2004, p. 43) 
 
The Annual Report does not explain the reasons behind the adjustment of the 
budget. Desk research only revealed that the Council agreed the budget adjustment, 
but more as an administrative decision. The Annual Report only explains the financial 
result as a difference between actual costs and adjusted budget. 
 
The Program Budget 2005 completely absorbed the strategic objectives of the MDP 
II. The indicators to measure these objectives are also used. The organizational ob-
jectives in this budget are to a large extent comparable with the objectives of the pre-  100 
vious budget. These objectives are now explained more specifically. To illustrate this, 
a few examples are documented below. 
•  employment growth on a national level 
•  keep the business climate at the current level (rating of 6.4 on a 10-point 
scale) 
•  increase in the rating for new ventures (increase from 6.1 to 6.6 in four years, 
on a 10-point scale) 
•  5 new business activities 
•  optimal use of ICT-functionalities 
Achievements are documented, and the measurements of incidental and structural 
performances are comparable with those in the previous program budget. The Eco-
nomic Policy budgeted costs for 2005 show a decrease of 6 percent against the 2004 
budget
108. 
 
The objectives and performance measures for Economic Policy, as described in the 
Program Budget 2005, are also documented in the Sector Plan 2005 of the Devel-
opment, Economics, and Real Estate sector. This list of performance measures is 
expanded with more operational activities, performances indicators and target val-
ues, and details about internal and external relations. The Sector Plan also contains 
a list of management activities
109, an appendix with financial budget details, a finan-
cial restructuring target, and an overview of meetings to be held and reports to be 
produced. 
 
The Quarterly Reports in 2004 are mirrors of the Sector Plan 2004; they report pro-
gress made. The Quarterly Reports in 2004 explain the progress mainly by qualita-
tive descriptions of the status. Only progress on financial performances, sick leave, 
and vacancies are explained in a more quantitative manner.  
 
The sector produced its own Annual Account 2004, separate from the Annual Ac-
count for the whole organization. This Sector Annual Account often provides explana-
tions on the year-end situation in the sector, and gives a global and qualitative de-
scription of the achieved performances. Reports on the achievements of most of the 
individual performances are not included. The Sector Annual Account does contain a 
detailed overview of the financial performances and variances. The figures in this 
financial review are, however, different from the figures used in the organizational 
Annual Account. This remarkable fact is explained by the fact that the organizational 
account was produced after the sector account, but the reason why these differences 
occurred was not explained. 
Use of objectives and performance measures 
The use of objectives and performance measures is analyzed in two ways. Insight 
into their use is documented at three different organizational levels (aldermen, civil 
                                            
108 Costs €1,571,000, income € 513,000, delta € 1,058,000. 
109 Such as personnel evaluations, sickness leave, vacancies, education and training.   
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director, and operational manager). Then, with reference to these findings, relevant 
aspects are discussed. 
 
Aldermen 
Employment is, according to the alderman, one of the most important political focus 
points. In his view Leeuwarden is a thriving city, a city with sufficient employment. 
The need to excel in economic terms, and perform better than the other cities in the 
region, is seen as an important target for politicians. 
 
The alderman described Economic Policy as a subject that is hard to control. He ex-
plained that Economic Policy relates to various aspects, and to different sectors of 
the municipal organization, and mainly delivers results in the long term. The Eco-
nomic Affairs team’s main task, in his view, is to initiate and stimulate actions in other 
sectors. He associates the tasks of this team with the delivery of high levels of ser-
vices to private companies, with easily accessible offices and an effective working 
urban infrastructure. These are the primary responsibilities of the Spatial Develop-
ment and Traffic and Transportation sector. 
 
He stresses the importance of his personal involvement in this area. Contacts be-
tween the top managers of private and public companies and politicians, and support 
by civil servants for those contacts, are described as critical to an effective Economic 
Policy. 
 
The alderman perceives and other elected members of the Council perceive the ob-
jectives of Economic Policy as clear. For him, a lack of clarity in Economic Policy is 
the way in which these objectives can be met. He sees many options that could lead 
to their delivery. The alderman not only expressed uncertainty about the execution of 
tasks, he also saw the external environment of Economic Policy as uncertain. He 
emphasized that many external circumstances form risks that can prevent achieve-
ment of the Council’s objectives in this policy field. In his view Economic Policy is a 
flexible policy field, which can quickly react to situations and opportunities. The flip-
side of this is that he finds it hard to keep the Economic Affair’s team on a straight 
and focused course. 
 
Civil Director 
The director perceived the objective related to increased employment as clear, and 
added that this objective was measurable and could be monitored. He emphasized 
that this objective must also be met by private companies and not exclusively by the 
municipality. He expressed his view that the municipality can only support busi-
nesses in achieving this objective, and he saw contact management as an important 
organizational function is this regard. The director added that relation management 
had limits. In his words: “You can be out all year, and still not improve the local em-
ployment situation”. 
 
According to the director, Economic Policy can only function well when it is solidly 
embedded in the activities of other sectors of the municipality. He therefore stresses   102 
the importance of personnel from the Development, Economics, and Real Estate 
sector being present at meetings on spatial and infrastructural projects. 
Members of the Development, Economics, and Real Estate sector have less restric-
tion in their job descriptions. In the words of the director: “They are the free spirits of 
the organization”. This role is highly valued by the director. He finds that this freedom 
can have a significant impact on the municipal organization as a whole and on spatial 
development in particular. 
He illustrates this with an example: Economic Policy has limited influence on the ac-
cessibility of businesses in the city, but an easily accessible city is of major impor-
tance to the local economy. In his view the policy area of Traffic and Transportation 
overlaps with Economic Policy. The economic possibilities for Leeuwarden justify ex-
tensive road building schemes. 
 
Operational manager 
The operational managers also perceived the objectives of Economic Policy as being 
clear. They added, in line with the other interviewees, that they perceived the road to 
achieving these objectives as uncertain. The manager of the sector explained that it 
was largely unclear to him what his sector should do in order to achieve higher em-
ployment in the city. In his own words: “The objective is a good one, but I don’t know 
which is the right button to press to make it happen”.   
Nevertheless, members of the Development, Economics, and Real Estate sector 
view their involvement in Economic Policy as valuable. Asking them for the reasons 
for this positive evaluation, they explained that the sector was recently involved in 
attracting new businesses to the city. On the progress towards employment targets, 
however, they valued their involvement less positively. In the words of a manager: 
“The welfare payment in-trays are still full”. 
However, they believe that the municipality will meet the employment objective. Na-
tional developments indicate a decrease in employment of 1.2 percent, and the cur-
rent figures in the city are better. They quickly add that this achievement had very 
little to do with the involvement of their organization, or the city’s policies on this field, 
but more to do with the relatively large number of service organizations within the 
city’s boundaries
110.  
 
According to operational sector management, Economic Policy is not marked by a 
consistent, long-term approach. In their opinion it is not easy to use objectives as 
documented in the Program Budget as a starting point for their operational planning. 
Operational planning is often based on the activities of previous years, and the or-
ganizational objectives are of no value to them in deciding on changes in operational 
planning. 
They see the availability of staff in the sector as very flexible, which allows them to 
react swiftly to emerging situations. 
Managers describe the set of activities related to Economic Policy as complex, 
mainly because so many have to be performed by other sectors of the municipal or-
                                            
110 The decrease in employment was mainly caused by the manufacturing sector, and not so much by 
the service sector.  
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ganization. Motivating personnel in other sectors and coordinating many activities is 
no easy job. A few years ago the emphasis on motivation and coordination was not 
considered to be that important. Economic Policy and Development were then 
closely related and worked as a unit. But Economic Policy is now linked to many or-
ganizational activities, not just to infrastructural projects, but also to things such as 
city marketing. 
Aspects of budget use 
The previously described opinions of the alderman, the director, and the operational 
managers will be used here to analyze relevant aspects against the research frame-
work. The main level of analysis is again organizational, with its focus on the use of 
objectives and performance measures at the top of the organization. The research 
framework and its defined aspects will be the focus of the analysis, but if applicable, 
other aspects are also included. 
 
The evidence is summarized and analyzed by the researcher with reference to desk 
research and interviews where suitable. 
 
Design and quality of the accounting information system 
The accounting information system of the municipality yields both financial and non-
financial performance information. The financial information for Economic Policy is 
particular to the costs of products of the municipality. Financial information is docu-
mented in all planning and control documents, such as the Program Budget, Sector 
Plan, and Quarterly Report. The financial information for Economic Policy often re-
lates to differences between achieved performances and budgeted annual costs. 
In addition, the accounting information system also yields non-financial information. 
This information links to the objectives and performances of Economic Policy and to 
several other aspects (such as statistics, reports on economic development, several 
trends, ad-hoc studies, etc.). Additional information is available, covering a broad 
range of different subjects, and is often more qualitative in nature. 
 
The quality of the accounting information used is seen in different ways. The quality 
is perceived as good at an operational level, despite the fact that they cannot get all 
the information they require. At an organizational level, the information is valued less 
positively. Accounting information is seen as insufficient to provide the right informa-
tion. At the same time top management and politicians say that they do not expect 
that the accounting information system can completely fulfill their requirements for 
Economic Policy. The majority of their information requirements have, in their view, 
relationships with new issues and activities. Accounting information has, in their view, 
more of a systematic character, and delivering ad-hoc information on request is not 
what they expect from this system. 
Interviewees indicated that most of the information is delivered by verbal communica-
tion, in face-to-face meetings. This information is viewed as sufficient and delivered 
on time. 
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To conclude, the accounting information system in relation to Economic Policy con-
tains both financial and non-financial performance information. Plentiful financial per-
formance information exists, and relates to budgeted values, achieved values, and 
additional information.  
The observations are tentatively quantified into a score
65. The scope of the account-
ing information system for Economic Policy is valued by the researcher following the 
previously-introduced method of assessing the various case findings. Using a 5-point 
scale, the scope is labeled as “above average”
66. The quality of the accounting infor-
mation is valued in the same tentative way as the scope, and is labeled as “aver-
age”
67.  
 
Applied role  
The interviews presented a view of the different ways in which accounting information 
is used in practice; they presented an insight into the roles of performance measures. 
This study has defined five different sub-roles or functions by which archetypal roles 
can be recognized
111. These five functions and the relating archetypal role (between 
brackets) are: 
•  to diagnose, to compare actual and budgeted performance (answering role), 
•  to learn and to change ways of doing (learning role),  
•  to unequivocally signal what is important (learning role, ammunition role), 
•  to influence future budget increase (ammunition role), 
•  to report and explain on past performance (rationalization role). 
 
Firstly, the results of the interviews and desk research are now used to assess 
whether the use of performance measures is for diagnostic reasons, that is, for com-
paring financial and non-financial variances in performances. 
 
Budget information is used for operational budgeting and planning (Program Budget 
and Sector Plan) and to report on the progress made against the financial targets for 
Economic Policy. The Quarterly Report 2004, sectors’ Annual Account 2004, and the 
municipal Annual Account can be seen as clear examples of this report function. 
These reports mainly provide insights into the status of the consolidated financial per-
formances, but do not analyze the variances between achieved and budgeted per-
formances or discuss corrective action that could be taken to influence the achieve-
ment of performances in the near future. 
Non-financial performance measures are often used in ad-hoc specially made reports 
and documents. This information relates to a wide range of subjects, and is used to 
analyze current developments or to justify actions to be taken. This additional infor-
mation rarely refers to the achieved non-financial performances of the organization, 
and does not give insight into actual achieved non-financial performances. 
The use of budgeted performance measures for diagnostic reasons appears there-
fore to be limited, and only for financial performances on aggregated figures. 
 
                                            
111 For more detail on the theoretical definition of the roles and their function see chapter 2, A Theo-
retical Research Framework.  
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Secondly, the use of performance measures for learning, signaling and influencing 
future budgets is assessed.  
 
Performance measures are used for signaling, or highlighting important issues in 
Economic Policy. Not only budgeted information, but also additional information is 
collected and distributed. This information comes from various sources, is often 
made for a special purpose, and is used at all organizational levels. This information 
is used in meetings in which politicians, top management and operational manage-
ment decide on actions to be taken. Many of these meetings are responses to real 
opportunities or developments. Information related to Economic Policy is often used 
to analyze and motivate actions. Swift decision processes and timely actions appear 
to be important, combined with delivering support to the alderman in a flexible way. 
Due to the fact that Economic Policy often relates to other policy areas, this ad-hoc 
information is often used in meetings with other sectors, such as spatial planning, 
and traffic and transportation. Standard information appears to be used here to a 
very limited extent. There are indications that this information is used to influence 
decisions in other policy fields, and to influence budget setting in future budget peri-
ods, but specific objective examples are hard to find. 
 
Thirdly, a brief assessment of the use of performance measures for reporting and 
explaining past performances is presented. 
 
The achieved performances are reported to the alderman, the Council, the citizens, 
and central government (a mandated LCP report). These reports are made after a 
certain time period, and present an historic overview of developments in the city in 
the reporting period. The reports to the Council and to the people of the city often 
refer to specific projects or development areas. This type of information is also used 
in a city marketing function, advertising the developments in the city to a broad audi-
ence. 
 
To conclude, not all five aspects of the archetypal roles are observed. 
•  Performance measures are only partly used for diagnostic use. Only financial 
performance measures on aggregated budgets are used in a diagnostic way. 
In particular non-financial performance measures are often used for opera-
tional budgeting, planning and status reporting, but does not relate often to 
the budgets.  
•  Performance measures are used to learn, in a way that performance meas-
ures are used to decide what actions must be undertaken. Learning to 
achieve pre-set goals is not clearly observed. The relationship between the 
objectives, for example employment, and the action to be taken are seen as 
indirect. 
•  Performance measures, often additional non-financial measures, are used to 
signal to all involved people at all levels of the organization. 
•  Performance measures are not observed to be used for influencing next pe-
riod budgets, but seem to have some influence on budgets in other policy 
fields.   106 
•  Performance measures are used for reporting the past, and to explain his-
toric achievements.  
 
Businesslike or political context 
As previously discussed a more businesslike context is associated with: 
• specific  organizational  objectives, 
•  relatively tight budgetary control (low tolerance of intermediate budget vari-
ances, detailed analysis of budget variances, intensive communication about 
budgets, emphasis on meeting the budget), 
• integration  of  strategic objectives and operational performances (formal organ-
izational planning is coupled with operational control). 
A more political control context is especially associated with a high level of multiplicity 
of objectives. 
The aspects relating to the two contexts are discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
Specificity and integration of objectives 
Objectives appear to be perceived as clear and specific by all involved at all organ-
izational levels (sector, department, and alderman). When interviewees were asked 
to name the most important objectives, they all referred to the development of em-
ployment, and almost all also to objectives relating to business climate, new ven-
tures, and the number of businesses moving to Leeuwarden. These objectives were 
perceived to be measurable and had objective measurement instruments. 
Organizational objectives are mainly documented in organizational documents, such 
as the Program Budget and Annual Report, used by the Council and available to ex-
ternal parties (citizens, governance bodies etc.). The more operational documents, 
such as the Sector Plan, only refer to the organizational objectives in general terms. 
The performances of the Program Budget are integrated at an operational level. 
The relationship between organizational objectives and performances are seen by 
many as indirect. They questioned whether, and to what extent, achievement of per-
formances leads to achievement of objectives. For example, the growth of employ-
ment is assumed to be achieved by supporting an internet academy, the implementa-
tion of a business service point, and a relations management system. But the actual 
contribution of these activities is more based on assumptions than on clear evidence. 
 
In spite of the fact that objectives are perceived as clear and specific, they are also 
viewed by those involved as hardly controllable by the Council. For example, the de-
crease in employment is not heavily influenced by the Council’s Economic Policy. 
In general, managers don’t believe that the Council’s Economic Policy can signifi-
cantly influence employment developments. However, at the same time all interview-
ees indicated that the activities of Economic Policy are largely dictated by the objec-
tive of employment increase. Actions are not always based on objectives analysis, 
but are strongly determined by actual situations, they added. 
 
Multiplicity 
There are no indications of conflicting pressures on the organizational objectives of 
Economic Policy. Multiplicity of objectives is therefore considered as low.  
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Tightness of budgetary control 
Budget tightness is limited in Economic Policy. Budgetary control mostly relates to 
meeting annual budgeted costs. Additional non-financial information is available, but 
is regarded as of limited relevance to organizational control. 
 
Financial control is performed within the organizational control rules and guidelines
112 
and product managers have to comply with these specific rules and procedures. 
Tightness of budgetary financial control at operational level is therefore considered to 
be high. Budget responsible managers are not allowed to incur more costs than 
budgeted, to spend more cash than budgeted, and can only authorize financial obli-
gations up to specific pre-set amounts. However, the financial budget of Economic 
Policy is rather small
113, and is not perceived by top management and alderman as 
an important control factor. Financial budgets are seldom discussed within the or-
ganization. 
Furthermore, the majority of the costs incurred or related to Economic Policy are not 
attributed to this policy name, but are part of the budgets of, for example, develop-
ment or infrastructure projects. 
 
Non-financial budgetary control relates mainly to achieving the organizational objec-
tives and the organizational and operational performances. Despite the perceived 
clarity and measurability of objectives and performances, it appears that neither are 
used for organizational control. The perceived limited controllability of the objectives, 
in particular in the short term, and also the limited availability of timely information on 
achieved objectives are given as limiting factors. Information on employability and on 
business climate is only available after a year, and Quarterly Reports and Annual 
Reports therefore miss control information on actual achievement of the objectives. 
The control of the more incidental performances often relates to particular projects 
and actions, performed by the Economy and Real Estate sector, and Quarterly Re-
ports contain progress information on these incidental performances. Status reports 
are provided on operational tasks
114, and desired performances levels are docu-
mented. These reports also contain management-related indicators, for example on 
sick leave, vacancies, and number of employees. Differences between norm values 
and actual achievements are, however, not explained. In the Quarterly Reports refer-
ence is also made to regular meetings held to discuss progress and bottlenecks and 
to decide on actions to be taken.  
 
To conclude, tightness of budgetary control is qualified as limited, due to four find-
ings: 
                                            
112 For more information in financial control, see the section “Planning and control at an organizational 
level” in this current chapter. 
113 Budget cost of Economic Policy only makes about 7 percent of the total cost of the program Eco-
nomics and Tourism. 
114 Such as: making of a master plan FEC, visiting businesses, start-up of a city marketing program, 
and the implementation of a relation management system.   108 
•  Intolerance for interim budget variation appears to be limited, particularly for 
organizational control purposes. 
•  Detailed budget-item follow-ups appear to be limited.  
•  Intensity of budget-related discussion is limited; budgets are seldom the sub-
ject of discussion for organizational control. 
•  Emphasis on meeting the budget is considered as limited. Non-financial budg-
ets, in particular the development of employment, are considered as impor-
tant, but are not used for budget control. 
 
Measuring the political and businesslike context 
The specificity of objectives for Economic Policy is qualified as average
74. This 
measure shows that objectives are perceived as clear and relevant, but at the same 
time does not make clear what activities the organization should be engaged in. Ob-
jectives are also not used for decision making on the priority of organizational activi-
ties. 
Integration between organizational objectives and performances are thus regarded 
as limited. Integrated organizational objectives and performances are present, inte-
gration of organizational and operational performances in particular. 
No clear conflicting pressures on objectives surfaced during the research. Multiplicity 
of objectives is qualified here as low
75. Tightness of budgetary control is valued as 
below average
76. 
 
Referring to these measurements, the context of organizational control in Economic 
Policy is characterized only to a limited extent by businesslike aspects (specificity of 
objectives). 
 
Routineness of tasks 
The activities relating to Economic Policy are described by all interviewees as non-
routine in nature. Tasks often differ significantly and are not often repetitive in nature. 
It is often unclear which tasks should be performed; there seems to be no “known 
road” to follow for the majority of the relating activities. To conclude, routineness of 
task is valued as low.  
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Summary Economic Policy case 
Economic Policy is concerned with stimulation of employment opportunities in the 
city. The Council’s main objective is to increase local employment in line with national 
employment trends.  
 
Judging by the emphasis on Economic Policy in most of the organizational planning 
and control documents, this policy field is highly important for the Council. Objectives 
for Economic Policy are rarely disputed, clear, and appear to be generally accepted.  
 
Objectives are however difficult to achieve. Objectives are seen as limitedly control-
lable; the Council appears only to have limited influence on local employability. Ob-
jectives are also hard to make operational; managers and politicians also find it hard 
to find operational performances that relate to the achievement of the objectives. It is 
often not clear what particular action should be planned in advance. The link between 
organizational objectives and operational action is therefore considered as weak; 
objectives do not give direction for action. Achieving Economic Policy objectives ap-
pears to be complex too; it relates to many other organizational activities outside the 
Economy and Real Estate sector. The focus of Economic Policy is often more on the 
stimulation, motivation, and coordination of activities outside its own sector, than on 
the actual performances of operational tasks. 
As a result, objectives are seen more as strategic mission statements than as per-
formance related control tools. 
 
Many operational tasks of Economic Policy are seen as routine, and are performed 
every year, but emerging actions are important to. These operational actions are 
characterized by flexibility and swiftness, in order to react to emerging opportunities 
or challenges. These ad-hoc projects and activities are supported by the use of a 
broad range of additional information, often generated for particular purposes on an 
ad-hoc basis. This information is used to discuss the importance of Economic Policy 
and the actions to be taken all round the sector. 
 
Achievement of objectives cannot be monitored and analyzed on time because ob-
jective quantitative information on the progress of objectives is only available later. 
Interviewees indicated that using accounting information for control purposes is not 
really seen as an option. Performance measures often relate to historical trends or 
developments, and are often used to motivate emerging actions and to influence fu-
ture budgets. 
 
A comprehensive overview of the relevant aspects of this case study is documented 
in Appendix VIII  Summary of Aspects.   110 
Spatial Planning case study 
The structure of this section is comparable with the other case study reports. Firstly, 
the context in which Spatial Planning is carried out will be briefly examined. The most 
relevant planning and control instruments, with their embedded objectives and per-
formance measure, will also be described. Secondly, their use is described by docu-
menting the opinions of politicians or managers at three different organizational lev-
els: the executive board, the director, and the operational manager. Finally, the 
points which emerged during research into the planning and control documents will 
be discussed. 
Spatial Planning policies 
According to several memos
115 issued by central government’s cabinet, the main 
goal of Spatial Planning is to support civil developments, not only from an economic 
perspective but also from a more social and cultural view point. Several governmen-
tal organizations are responsible for Spatial Planning in the Netherlands. The main 
direction and overall policies are determined by central government. The Spatial 
Planning Act and the Space Memo can be seen as documents describing the current 
vision of national cabinet on this subject. Spatial Planning policy must ensure strong 
cities and vibrant rural communities. Government policy must safeguard important 
national and international treasures like nature, the landscape and cultural history, 
and increase public safety whilst at the same time allowing "space for development".  
 
More detailed planning and the execution of these plans is the responsibility of local 
government, and both provincial and municipal governments are involved in these 
processes. Provincial government is mainly responsible for coordination, in particular 
with regards to Spatial Planning projects relating to more than one city, and super-
vises the municipal organizations’ Spatial Planning activities. The municipal organiza-
tions concentrate on the realization of Spatial Planning within the city borders. Mu-
nicipalities are held responsible for maintaining Spatial Planning policies, and having 
operational instruments for the achievement of these planned objectives.   
 
For the city of Leeuwarden Spatial Planning can be divided into three subjects: zone 
planning, zone development, and strategic vision on development. 
 
A zone plan can be defined as the consolidation of local area planning
116, which can 
be redefined or changed
117. The city has a legal obligation to keep the zone plans up-
                                            
115 Such as: the 5
e Spatial Planning Memo and the Space Memo. 
116 In the words of the Dutch ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (source: web-
site http://international.vrom.nl/): “A zone plan describes the pre-definition of the development of a 
specific area of a city. It describes, for example, if a football stadium or a camping site can be devel-
oped in a specific area, or where houses of offices are to be built. The zone plan is made for both citi-
zens and the municipal organization. Zone plans do not only define the development of an area, but 
also describe aspects such as maximum height and width of buildings. Zone plans should be actual-
ized at least every 10 years. In particular situations the zone plan can be modified or changed by the 
municipal organization.  
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to-date within a 10 year period, and is accountable for this to the provincial and cen-
tral government. It is not anticipated that the city of Leeuwarden will comply with this 
obligation before 2007. In order to increase the progress of the zone plan actualiza-
tion, the city had allocated extra means to it (in particular extra budget for labor 
costs). The operational tasks are performed by specialist, legally trained civil ser-
vants, and these professionals are often supported by other experts in zone plan-
ning
118. The central government mandate to use digital information systems for zone 
planning is also regarded as an important factor. 
 
The city offers support and guidance to people and businesses with their applications 
for formal city approval on zone developments. Specialized civil servants (urban 
planners) research and evaluate submitted proposals, and help to guide the proposal 
through the decision-making processes of the municipal organization.  
 
The third part of Spatial Planning relates to the city’s ambition to strategically restruc-
ture or redefine the available space. This is the field of city development, of ambitious 
global discussions and agreements on the spatial development of the city
119 and of 
more local and specific area restructuring plans. Often many different parties are in-
volved in the making of these plans
120. 
  
Spatial Planning is mainly the responsibility of the Spatial Planning and Development 
sector. The total number of staff in this sector is equivalent to approximately 55 full 
time equivalents. The sector is positioned within the City Development and Mainte-
nance department. 
Planning and control documents 
Objectives, desired effects and performance relating to Spatial Planning have been 
set out in several planning and control documents, such as the Program Budget 2004 
and 2005, the Sector Plan 2004 and 2005, the Annual report 2004 and the Quarterly 
Report of 2004. 
 
The Program Budget 2004 documents in detail the policies for zone planning and 
zone development. The strategic objectives that are explained are: 
•  an up-to-date and adequate regulation of public space, 
•  digitally recorded and maintained planning, 
•  improving living standards in city districts. 
                                                                                                                                        
117 The process of changing a zone plan in the Netherlands is generally addressed as an “article 19 
procedure”, referring to the legal article that defines the formal steps to be taken to change a zone 
plan. In the words of the Dutch ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment: 
A zone plan describes how a specific area of a city development is determined. 
118 Mainly civil engineers and urban developers. 
119 As documented in the City Vision “Sailing under own flag”, the marketing concept “Expedition 
Leeuwarden”, the “Inner City Structural Vision” , the covenant with the province of Fryslân, and the 
LSP covenant with central government. 
120 For example: for the development of an area suitable for the development of a “knowledge cam-
pus” (a selected group of high schools), the municipal organization, the related high schools, the pro-
vincial government, providers of subsidies and grants, and private banks were involved.    112 
 
The Program Budget clearly explains the need to keep the zone plans up-to-date, for 
example by referring to the Spatial Planning Act. This Act mandates local authorities 
to maintain their zone planning at its current level (using a 10 year period). The city 
differentiates between preserving zone plans (minor adjustments of existing plans) 
and more “open” zone plans (describing a new development area). The program 
Budget 2004 also contains a list of zone plans that are under development. Desirable 
trends on zone developments are not explained in detail, but the operational objec-
tives of zone development are documented (describing the number of zone plans to 
make). The Program Budget 2004 also contains a number of performance targets for 
Spatial Planning. A number of performances relate to the Council’s desire to improve 
the quality of zone planning or relate to operational activities
121. The focus of Spatial 
Planning in the Program Budget is on the process of keeping the zone plans up-to-
date, on aspects of the City Vision
122, and on the extra financial means that are des-
ignated for these purposes. The Program Budget 2004 also documents a number of 
risks; for example the limited controllability of the processing time for formal proce-
dures in other governmental organizations, legal claims incurred by changes in spa-
tial plans, and the increase in contractual obligations to meet pre-set time frames. 
 
Spatial Planning is part of the “Spatial Planning, districts and villages” program, and 
together with the product “District approaches” dominates the financial budget of this 
program (see Table 20) 
 
Costs and income 2004  costs  income  results 
(*€1000)     
District actions             1.372             338-              1.034  
Spatial Planning             1.040               20-              1.020  
Geometry                 174               98-                   76  
Registration of public space                  15                   -                     15  
Council advice on  Spatial policies                101                   -                   101  
Total 2.703  -456  2.247 
Table 20 Costs Program Spatial Planning, Districts and Villages (source: Program Budget 2004, p. 40) 
 
The Interim Report 2004, which was presented to Council members halfway through 
2004, does not mention any expectation that the budget for Spatial Planning will not 
be complied with, financially speaking. The Interim Report explains the progress on 
the financial performances, highlights some bottlenecks in general terms, and justi-
fies some decisions still to be made by the city’s Council. The Interim Report gives 
notice of an expected under-spend on depreciation costs, caused by delays in civil 
projects. 
 
                                            
121 Performance measurements describe, for example, the quality of support by civil servants to the 
Council, the new organizational function of development supervisor, operational activities such as 
judging spatial initiatives, or managing projects, settlement of claims, informing citizens. 
122 Relating to the development of the inner city and the FEC-city area.  
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The Annual Account 2004 documents the achievements made in meeting objectives 
and preset performance targets in Spatial Planning. It explains that due to missing 
information on the year end situation, no evaluation is made of the extent to which 
objectives have been achieved. However, performances are evaluated in more gen-
eral terms
123. All other performances are evaluated with a plus. Examples of posi-
tively evaluated performances are: 
•  an up-to-date and adequate regulation of public space, between 1 and 3 plans 
made, 
•  procedures performed in time and on quality targets, sufficient number of pro-
cedures performed,  
•  zone planning, 5 plans adjusted. 
The Annual Account stated that the costs of Spatial Planning exceeded the financial 
budget (see Table 21). It is explained that these higher costs were caused by a dif-
ference in internal cost allocation of overhead and support costs. Previously, these 
costs were allocated to an investment project, but due to changed accounting regula-
tions these costs were now allocated to the cost budget of Spatial Planning. This 
change in regulation appears to have been unforeseen in the Program Budget 2004 
and in the Interim Report 2004. 
 
costs and income 2004  costs  income  results 
(*€1000)   
Budget 2004           1.040             20-            1.020  
Adjusted Budget 2004           1.071             65-            1.006  
Account 2004           1.412           142-            1.270  
Result               341-             77               264- 
Table 21 Cost and Income Spatial Planning (source: Annual Account 2004, p. 123) 
 
The Program Budget 2005 also documents a number of performance targets. The 
performance measures are comparable with the 2004 budget. The performance 
measures are: 
•  zone plans are up-to-date, 
•  between 1 and 3 zone development plans are made, 
•  procedures to change zone plans can be used to speed up internal time con-
suming procedures, 
•  consultations on Spatial Planning are provided. 
The main focus of Spatial Planning appears to be on the development of the inner 
city, and the major projects that are situated in the city centre
124, and in the southern 
districts of the city, such as the “hook” (a relocation of roads, as part of the city ring) 
and the related new development of business districts. 
The financial performances in 2005 are basically comparable with the 2004 budget 
(cost budget of about € 1 million). The change in accounting procedures, which re-
                                            
123 The progress on keeping or bringing zone planning up-to-date is for example evaluated with a 
plus/minus. The detail per explanation however explains that this process is behind schedule, because 
the complexity of plans appears to be higher then earlier expected. 
124 Projects entitled “Olderhoofsterkerhof”, “Nieuw Zaailand”, and “Provinciehuis”.   114 
sulted in a overspending on the 2004 budget, has not resulted in an increase in the 
2005 budget. 
 
The Sector Plan 2004 for the Spatial Planning and Development Sector connects the 
organizational objectives and performances of the Program Budget with more opera-
tional objectives and performances. The organizational objectives and performance 
of the Program Budget 2004 are fully documented in the Sector Plan, and more op-
erational performances are added. The Sector Plans contain, for example, a list of 
zone plans and development plans that are expected to be completed in 2004. The 
Sector Plan also describes which claims should be given extra attention. Furthermore 
the Sector Plan describes the environment of the sector and the planned organiza-
tional changes. It refers to the organizational change project “From bulwark to net-
work”. The responsibilities of project and product managers are explained, and pro-
ject management improvements are described by qualitative aspects. The use of the 
“project tabling meeting” (a meeting to coordinate projects throughout the organiza-
tion) and the presence of a new development supervisor is also documented. The 
Sector Plan also contains a vision of the culture in the sector
125, and explains that the 
main concern of the sector should be focussed on the products of the sector; on Spa-
tial Planning. 
 
The Quarterly Reports in 2004 (numbers I, II and III) provide summaries of the finan-
cial and non-financial performances achieved. Financial performances are evaluated 
by comparing achieved and budgeted performances per cost centre. The realised 
progress of the activities relating to the cost centres is documented by a progress 
indicator, which indicates the progress of activities as a percentage between 0 (start) 
and 100 (all finished). The reports also contain a year-end estimate of financial and 
non-financial achievable performances. For example, the Quarterly Report 2004 II 
(page 8) reported on the progress of the product “Zone planning” amongst others:  
“€ 227.318 budgeted / € 135.363 realised (59%) 
The up-to-date process assumes an average cost price of € 45.000 per plan. Be-
cause several plans ……………… took more time, the budget of these plans is over-
spent. A year-end estimate will be made in the second half of 2004 ……..  in order to 
evaluate if the total cost will be within budget. The costs and control of zone planning 
are currently viewed as very complex…….Aiming to improve the insight in cost and 
time spend, it is proposed to manage zone planning by using more project manage-
ment methods.” 
 
Non-financial performance measures of the Sector Plan are also analysed in the 
Quarterly Reports. The Quarterly Reports give many details and explanations about 
non-financial progress. The reports contain, for example, appendices on the progress 
of individual zone plans, on claim settlements, and on zone development. Quarterly 
Report 2004 III documents, in regard to zone planning, for example a list of zone 
                                            
125 A quote (source: sector plan 2004, page 6): “There exist high levels of functional commitment and 
professionalism, and loyalty to the city council members. Less enthusiasm exists on the management 
and support processes, and about efficiency of support deliverances, the time spend and the effec-
tiveness of their own products.”      
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plans in progress, and provides an explanation of the progress of each zone plan. 
The reports also report on management aspects such as sick leave, vacancies, tem-
porary personnel, and progress of the training plan. 
 
The sector has also made a Sector Annual Report. This Sector Annual Report pro-
vides detailed overviews on the financial and non-financial achievements, and infor-
mation on man hours spent, and the growth in the number of staff. The financial in-
formation complies with the organizational Annual Report. 
Use of objectives and performance measures 
The use of objectives and performances is analyzed in two ways. Insight into their 
use is documented on three different organizational levels (aldermen, civil director, 
and operational manager). Then, with reference to these findings, relevant aspects 
are discussed. 
 
Aldermen 
In the alderman’s opinion the objectives and performances of Spatial Planning are 
important for the fulfillment of its operational activities. She explained that the objec-
tives mainly relate to developing housing and offices and to the process of bringing 
zone planning up-to-date. She emphasized two areas: zone planning and major pro-
jects. 
 
The objective of bringing zone planning up-to-date in 2007 was emphasized. The 
alderman stresses the importance of having up-to-date zone plans, but explained 
that at the same time an objective of being 100 percent up-to-date is unrealistic. In 
the words of the alderman: “A city cannot operate with outdated zone plans, but is 
rather foolish to decide on a zone plan now, only to change it within a year by a spe-
cial article 19 procedure”.  
According to the alderman the process of bringing the zone plans up-to-date is on 
schedule. She explained that extra money and personnel has been made available 
for this process, and she was pleased that recently many zone plans had been pre-
sented at city Council meetings. She also expressed her concerns. In her view, pro-
gress on the preservation of zone plans (with only minor adjustments to existing 
plans) is mainly on time. Zone planning in less documented, or more dynamic, areas 
is less controlled and is often faced with unexpected circumstances. Overspending of 
cost budgets and time planning happens often, she explained. The staff to keep zone 
planning up-to-date is also not yet available. 
 
An example that can illustrate the complexity of a zone plan is the “Zaailand
126” pro-
ject. In this project two Spatial Planning developments meet: the redesigning of the 
inner city and the redefinition of a zone plan.  A brief description of the project: 
Preparations for the Zaailand project started years ago. The intention at the start was 
to extend the number of shops around Zaailand Square. In 2000, the city and a na-
tional bank (ING-bank) came to an agreement on the main concept of the plan. How-
                                            
126 “Zaailand” is a big square in the middle of the city.   116 
ever, when the master plan was almost finished, a legacy from a famous citizen be-
came public. Attached to this legacy was a specific clause that had major impact on 
the Zaailand project. The legacy was to build a new Fries museum at this specific 
location. As a result of this, the whole plan had to be begun again, but now with many 
more parties involved (the provincial government, the municipality, the Fries mu-
seum, a bank, an insurance company, the local retailers, and the citizens of the city). 
Also the Council had to ask the citizens their opinion on the new master plan through 
a referendum. The cost and time schedule for this zone plan are consequently far 
beyond the first budgets. 
 
In the alderman’s opinion it is not possible to manage Spatial Planning just by using 
the objectives in the Program Budget. Most of these objectives are defined by more 
general terms. These objectives are, in the words of the alderman, “can do no harm 
objectives”. She views these objectives as valuable for monitoring specific opera-
tional aspects, but finds this monitoring still an underdeveloped organizational func-
tion. 
  
Civil Director 
The director explained the layers of the objectives of Spatial Planning. 
He saw the first layer as the most concrete layer, relating to the process of updating 
zone planning. The objectives of this process are well known by all involved in the 
city’s organization, according to the director. He perceived the objectives of zone 
planning as fairly specific and sufficiently measurable. He stressed that the actual 
handling of zone planning is done by people in the operationally-responsible sector. 
His responsibilities are mainly related to the effectiveness of the management, coor-
dination, and support processes of Spatial Planning. He emphasized during the inter-
view the importance of coordination and of discussions between the professionals in 
his department. 
The second layer of Spatial Planning objectives is the spatial development of the city. 
The director said that objectives for spatial development were defined in more gen-
eral terms. He referred to the mid-term plan “Sailing sharp”, which in his view con-
nects the long-term city policies with the particular tasks to be performed in the com-
ing years. He emphasized the general nature of spatial development plans; these 
plans should leave room for additional detail later on.  
According the director, communication and the coordination of the organizational 
tasks of Spatial Planning are considered to be important processes. The city uses the 
“project tabling meeting” for this purpose; a meeting of the project managers for civil 
projects, chaired by the director himself. This meeting offers an opportunity for the 
presentation and discussion of all civil project plans by members of the organization 
with different responsibilities and capabilities. This multifunctional meeting aims to 
improve the planning and realization of civil projects. 
The director explained that the third layer of objectives relates to the city’s vision for 
Spatial Planning, as defined amongst others in the City Vision “Sailing under own  
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flag”. This layer relates to more strategic and generally formulated objectives
127. He 
stressed that these objectives are not supposed to describe specific performances 
and operational tasks; these objectives are to be used as general guidelines for fur-
ther detailed planning of particular areas later on. 
The director admitted that most managers did not perceive the objectives in this third 
layer as clear, but added that clarity was not the intention here. He saw the purpose 
of these objectives as the stimulation of dynamic development in the later stages of 
Spatial Planning, or in his own words: “Spatial Planning ought to bring movement to 
the city”. 
 
Operational manager 
Operational managers perceived most of the objectives of Spatial Planning as clear, 
but added that these objectives were not often used for operational control. They 
gave some examples. 
 
The objectives of the process of updating zone planning are completely clear to the 
operational managers, but to them it is largely unclear how they could comply with 
these objectives. As an example one manager said that the sector did not have 
enough operational management instruments to plan and control the current process 
sufficiently. Zone plans are, in his view, mainly standardized processes, executed in 
an uncertain environment in which unexpected events occur often. Planning all the 
necessary tasks in advance is therefore not always possible. Thus schedules and the 
time planning of zone plans are not easy to control. 
 
Another example is the translation of the more generally defined organizational ob-
jectives into specific planned operational tasks. Operational managers interpret these 
objectives as “not yet defined in detail”. Although they support this way of defining 
objectives, and find this method preferable in most situations, they are confronted by 
some operational complications with this method. The lack of specific targets and 
norms hinders operational control, they say. Working with generally defined objec-
tives leads to lengthy discussions during the start-up of new developments. Manag-
ers said that it was much easier to talk about a specific project than to challenge a 
generally stated objective, and they feared opportunistic behavior by their colleagues. 
An area can be sold to a real estate company, for example, before a formal evalua-
tion of the development plans of the realtor have taken place. Managers add that dis-
cussions with realtors on the consequences of generally defined objectives are sel-
dom easy, especially after the contract is signed. 
 
According to the sector manager, the objective to include green zones in spatial 
plans also fuels discussions in the organization. He explains that this objective can-
not be used per individual plan; differences in the city areas (densely populated inner 
city or more suburban areas) cannot be treated equally in this regard. But if an objec-
                                            
127 The objective that defines city borders is used as an illustration. This objective states that the city 
should aim for organic borders. This objective is, according to the director, purposely defined in more 
general terms, which should express the fact that the city is promoting the development of transparent 
districts with many green zones.   118 
tive is not controllable per project, he finds it even harder to control it at an organiza-
tional level. The “Knowledge campus” is used as an example. One of the discussions 
in this project was the balance between building spaces and green zones, and it ap-
pears to have been hard to find the right target ratios to apply on the development of 
both zones. 
 
An additional problem with the use of objectives for controlling operational activities 
is, according to the sector managers, the combination of projects and regular activi-
ties in the sector. It is often unclear to them whether the costs are to be seen as at-
tributable to projects or regular products. This hinders not only operational budgeting 
and planning, but also the financial control of his sector. 
 
To conclude, operational managers indicate that they do not make regular use of ob-
jectives and performances for operational control. The more quantitative objectives 
and performances of the Program Budget appear to be limitedly applied for opera-
tional control. Even the specific objective of bringing 70 percent of the zone plans up-
to-date in 2005 is rarely discussed. There is no regular check on the progress made 
on achieving this target. 
Aspects of budget use 
The previously described opinions of the alderman, the director, and the operational 
managers will be used here to analyze relevant aspects against the research frame-
work. The main level of analysis is again organizational, with its focus on the use of 
objectives and performance measures at the top of the organization. The research 
framework and its defined aspects will be the focus of the analysis, but if applicable, 
other aspects will also be included. 
 
The evidence is summarized and analyzed by the researcher with reference to desk 
research and interviews where relevant. 
 
Design and quality of the accounting information system 
The accounting information system of the municipality yields both financial and non-
financial performance information. The financial information for Spatial Planning is 
particular to the budgeted, realized, and estimated costs of products and expenses 
and income of projects. Financial information is documented in all planning and con-
trol documents, such as the Program Budget, Sector Plan, and Quarterly Report. The 
financial information of Spatial Planning often relates to variances between achieved 
and budgeted costs-related performances and estimated year-end costs. 
 
The non-financial accounting information related not only to budgeted performances 
but also to additional information. Additional information is often used to explain and 
detail situations which arise, and relates to both internal management aspects as well 
as to a wide-scale of more project-related issues. 
 
The quality of accounting information is valued differently by interviewees. At an op-
erational level the quality of information in perceived as insufficient. Operational  
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managers indicate that the supplied accounting information does not meet their re-
quirements: for them the information is not in the right format, and seldom delivered 
on time. At a more organizational level the quality of information is perceived as suffi-
cient. Here, information often appears to be delivered for a specific purpose and in 
specially made formats, and is often provided in a project control setting. 
 
To conclude, the accounting information system of Spatial Planning contains both 
financial and non-financial performance information. Financial performance informa-
tion is present in great volume and in detailed format, and relates to budgeted values, 
achieved values, and additional information. Non-financial information is also present 
in great volume, and often relates to budgeted values, achieved values, and addi-
tional information related to projects. 
The observations are quantified into a score
65. The scope of the accounting informa-
tion system for Spatial Planning is tentatively valued by the researcher following the 
previously introduced method of assessing the various case findings. Using a 5-point 
scale, the scope is labeled as “above average”
66. The quality of the accounting infor-
mation is valued in the same tentative way as the scope, and is labeled as “aver-
age”
67. 
 
Applied role  
The interviews provided a view of the different ways in which accounting information 
is used in practice; they presented an insight into the roles of performance measures. 
This study has defined five different sub-roles or functions by which archetypal roles 
can be recognized
128. These five functions and the relating archetypal role (between 
brackets) are: 
•  to diagnose, to compare actual and budgeted performance (answering role), 
•  to learn and to change ways of doing (learning role), 
•  to unequivocally signal what is important (learning role, ammunition role), 
•  to influence future budget increase (ammunition role), and 
•  to report and explain on past performance (rationalization role). 
 
Firstly, the results of the interviews and desk research are used to assess whether 
the use of performance measures is for diagnostic reasons, that is, for comparing 
financial and non-financial variances in performances. 
 
Managers often use performance measures for gaining an insight into the status of 
Spatial Planning activities. They received monthly information on, for example, the 
number of hours worked, sick leave, and budget use. However, this information is not 
used for organizational control, or in the words of a manager: “currently we do not 
see it coming”. 
 
According to managers, it is not possible to make realistic plans in advance, or to 
properly evaluate the progress achieved on these activities. Every two weeks and 
                                            
128 For more detail on the theoretical definition of the roles and their function see chapter 2, A Theo-
retical Research Framework.   120 
every month a status report is produced, but these reports are mainly used to discuss 
the progress on more management related processes (such as work-load of employ-
ees, or steps in the discussion making process by the elected member of the Coun-
cil). Evaluation of the financial performances mainly takes place bi-annually, during 
the making of the Interim Report and the Annual Report. 
Spatial Planning is often realized through projects, and detailed information on the 
status of projects is often discussed by the members of the project teams. Progress 
on large or major projects is reported regularly three or four times per year, and these 
reports are used during project meetings to discuss specific issues, problems, or bot-
tlenecks. These project reports are made-up in a standard format, and document 
both financial (expense budgets) and non-financial performance measures (for ex-
ample milestones and duration of activities), and contain explanatory notes on par-
ticular items.  
Politicians said that when they received information on the status of Spatial Planning 
projects they had often asked for specific information, but this was often not included 
in the standard report formats. 
  
Secondly, the use of performance measures for learning, signaling and influencing 
future budgets is assessed.  
 
Performance measures appear to be only limitedly used for learning and signaling 
purposes. Status reports seldom contain issues unfamiliar to management and al-
derman, and are used more as status reports than sources of information that can be 
used for decision making. However, performance measures are used for influencing 
future budgets. Clear examples of this influencing function are the reports on the pro-
gress of zone planning. Operational managers explained that these reports were 
specially made to explain to the elected members of the Council that achieving the 
objectives could not be realized within the current budget limits.  
 
Thirdly, a brief assessment of the use of performance measures for reporting and 
explaining past performances is presented. 
 
Performance measures are often used to report on and account for past perform-
ances. Quarterly Reports and the Sector Annual Account contain a mass of informa-
tion. Newsletters are often used to report the progress on projects to people living in 
the city, and reports are also frequently sent to central government about the pro-
gress of specific Spatial Planning projects. 
 
To conclude, performance measures are: 
•  only partly used in a diagnostic way. Only financial performance measures on 
aggregated budgets are used in a diagnostic way. Performance measures, in 
particular non-financial measures, are often used for operational budgeting, 
planning and status reporting, but are not often used for organizational con-
trol of budgeted performances.  
•  limitedly used for learning and signaling, 
•  sometimes used for influencing next period budgets,  
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•  used for reporting the past, and to account to external parties.  
 
Businesslike or political context 
As previously discussed a more businesslike context is associated with: 
• specific  organizational  objectives, 
•  relatively tight budgetary control (low tolerance of intermediate budget vari-
ances, detailed analysis of budget variances, intensive communication about 
budgets, emphasis on meeting the budget), 
• integration  of  strategic objectives and operational performances (formal organ-
izational planning is coupled with operational control). 
A more political control context is especially associated with a high level of multiplicity 
of objectives. 
The aspects relating to the two contexts are discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
Specificity and integration of objectives 
Objectives relating to bringing zone planning up-to-date are perceived on average as 
clear and specific at all organizational levels. However, the formal organizational ob-
jective to bring all zone planning up-to-date in 2007 is only documented in the Pro-
gram Budget and the Annual Report. The Sector Plan and the Quarterly Reports ap-
pear to focus on particular zone plans in progress. As previously discussed, achiev-
ing this objective is perceived by all interviewees as hard. Zone plans often appear to 
be more complex than earlier expected, and fully up-to-date is seen as practically 
impossible to achieve. This objective of zone planning is therefore relevant, but not 
completely clear to participants. Integration between objectives and operational per-
formances appears to be restricted. Objectives also do not determine the priority of 
the tasks to be performed. The pressure exerted by external parties (provincial and 
central government) to achieve the formal stated objective is seen as a major driver 
for speeding up the operational processes and increasing future budgets. 
The objectives relating to zone development and strategic development are per-
ceived as less clear, and limitedly integrated with operational performances. These 
objectives are seen more as strategic, providing general direction, then specific and 
useable for prioritizing operational tasks.  
 
Multiplicity 
There are no indications of conflicting pressures on the objectives of Spatial Plan-
ning. The Large City Policy covenant between the Council and central government, 
and the covenant between the Council and provincial government do not appear to 
result often in conflicting visions on Spatial Planning. When discussions did occur, 
they appeared to concentrate on particular projects, often related to the financial as-
pects of these projects. Conflicts between the elected members of the Council, the 
board of Burgomaster and aldermen, and the civil servants were not revealed during 
the desk research and the interviews. Elected members of the Council are intensively 
involved in operational aspects of Spatial Planning (zone planning and zone devel-
opments), but discussed mainly particular projects and seldom the policies behind or 
the objectives attached to Spatial Planning.   122 
Civil managers do argue about the operational aspects of Spatial Planning, for ex-
ample on the translation of generally defined objectives into operational and specific 
aims. Conflicting interpretation of operational aims is registered. The specific objec-
tives attached to the development of an area of the city are often not formally pre-
defined, and can lead to discussions later on. 
 
Tightness of budgetary control 
Budget tightness is limited in Spatial Planning. Budgetary control relates to products 
and projects, and to financial and non-financial control. 
 
Financial control is performed within the organization’s rules and guidelines for con-
trol
129 and product and project managers have to comply with these specific rules 
and procedures. Tightness of budgetary financial control at operational level is there-
fore considered to be high. Budget-responsible managers are not allowed to incur 
more costs than budgeted, to spend more cash than budgeted, and can only author-
ize payments up to specific pre-set amounts. These behavioral restrictions do not 
result automatically in tight budgetary control at an organizational level. For example, 
overspending on one project budget can be compensated by under spending on 
other projects. Similar processes are also used to compensate for overspending on 
product budgets. This compensation mechanism is controlled by internal rules, and 
demands the formal approval of senior management.  
Financial budgetary control at an organizational level is however perceived as lim-
ited. Managers saw unclear cost allocation and uncertainty in the execution of opera-
tional tasks as the main reasons for this limited control tightness. Operational man-
agers saw financial budgetary control more as an administrative process than a tool 
for organizational control. 
 
Operational managers often did not comprehend the administrative environment of 
Spatial Planning. The discussion about administrative classification of cost can be 
seen as an example. The costs of on-going activities of a sector are booked on the 
costs budgets, and costs or expenses of projects are booked on project budgets. 
However, for operational managers it often appears unclear which particular activities 
are regarded administratively as on-going. The sector also has special funds for cov-
ering special costs, for example the costs attached to the extra capacity needed to 
speed-up the process of zone planning. Operational managers often found it hard to 
differentiate between these special or regular cost categories, and were frequently 
involved in discussions on both budgeted costs and actual cost long after a particular 
budget period was over. Operational budgets appear to be regularly overspent. Op-
erational managers were fully aware of this situation, or in the words of a manager: “I 
am allowed to live above standard”. He added: “It is not easy. Only the costs for 10 of 
the 18 staff members can be reasonably forecasted up front, but the coverage of the 
remaining cost is uncertain to me”. 
 
                                            
129 For more information on financial control, see the section “Planning and control at an organizational 
level” in this current chapter.  
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It appeared to be difficult to plan all the activities relating to Spatial Planning in ad-
vance, and to estimate all the costs that are attached to these activities. Activities 
often seemed to be unavoidable; they just had to be done. Managers often decided 
to execute the desired activities and to accept possible budgetary overspending. 
They used a kind of “alert-system”, when activities of the municipality attracted atten-
tion from the elected members of the Council, people of the city, or the local media, 
these activities are mostly performed first. Managers agreed that this system resulted 
in neglect of the less externally visible activities. 
 
Finally, the limited interest of operational managers in financial budgetary control ap-
pears to be a relevant factor. The professionals at operational levels are described by 
top managers and politicians as “artists, in whose opinion accounting is a derivative 
need”. Managers and politicians saw financial control of public-private development 
projects as much higher. In the words of the alderman: “They do not work faster, bet-
ter, or more efficiently, but it is remarkable that the quality of financial reports is much 
higher there. They can manage the whole project almost entirely by these financial 
reports.” 
  
Non-financial budgetary control of Spatial Planning is also regarded as limited, even 
for the more specific zone planning projects. Although zone planning appears to be 
controlled by a tight project management approach, the actual budgeted target (70% 
up-to-date in 2005) or objective (100% up-to-date in 2007) is not operational. Both 
are absent in operational planning, not monitored during the year, and knowledge of 
how to manage deviations from pre-defined targets appears to be underdeveloped. 
Controlling zone planning in the city center appears to be even more difficult, and the 
“Zaailand” project is used as an example. 
Non-financial performances that are controlled are mostly related to internal man-
agement and support processes, and relate, for example, to hours worked, and 
meeting legally set time-frames in particular procedures. 
 
To conclude, tightness of budgetary control is qualified as limited, which can be justi-
fied by four points: 
•  Intolerance for interim budget variation appears to be limited, particularly for 
organizational control purposes. 
•  Detailed budget-item follow-ups appear to be limited. Detailed follow-ups are 
applied for operational project control, but this aspect is not of significant im-
portance for organizational control. 
•  Intensity of budget-related discussion is limited; budgets are seldom the sub-
ject of discussion for organizational control. 
•  Emphasis on meeting the budget is considered as limited.   
 
Measuring the political and businesslike context 
Specificity of objectives within Spatial Planning is qualified as below average
74. This 
measurement expresses the finding that these objectives were mostly formulated in 
general terms, and were hardly applicable for operational budgeting, planning and 
control, although objectives are perceived as relatively clear and relevant. Multiplicity   124 
of objectives is valuated as below average
75. Only conflicting pressures on the use of 
objectives by different groups in the municipal organization surfaced during the re-
search. Tightness of budgetary control is valued as below average
76. Referring to 
these measurements, the context of organizational control of Spatial Planning is 
characterized by limited businesslike aspects (limited specificity) and limited political 
aspects (limited multiplicity). 
 
Routineness of tasks 
The activities relating to Spatial Planning are described by all interviewees as on av-
erage routine in nature. The tasks of employees are seen as repetitive and known. 
However, in practice employees often have to perform many different and unplanned 
tasks. It appears to be hard for managers to prepare a plan that can be used over a 
long period. Tasks are often rearranged during the year. Tasks appear to be well 
known, but it seems difficult to plan these tasks in advance. To conclude, routineness 
of task is valued as average.  
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Summary Spatial Planning case 
Spatial Planning covers a wide area of activities, but is mainly concerned with sup-
porting and planning civil developments in the city. Spatial Planning is embedded in 
national and regional Acts, programs and governance structures. The Council fo-
cuses on the more practical side of it; on the practical consequences of Spatial Plan-
ning within the city’s borders.  
 
The external environment of Spatial Planning is characterized as complex and not 
easily controllable. Many parties are often involved in Spatial Planning projects (such 
as Council members, citizens, other governmental and non-profit organizations, and 
business organizations), and actual developments in society can easily influence ob-
jectives and operational tasks.  
 
Spatial Planning operates in an internal environment in which professionalism (espe-
cially legal and development), strategy (policy and development of the city), and pub-
lic administration (coordination of Spatial Planning throughout the government) are 
relevant.  
The objectives of Spatial Planning are often more of a strategic nature than for direct-
ing specific operational actions, and are often set in more general terms. Objectives 
are rarely used for decision-making on specific operational tasks. Even when it was 
possible to use more specific objectives (for example for keeping zone planning up to 
date), they were not often used for operational or organizational control. Here objec-
tives were seen as relevant, but were mainly used to justify future budget increases.  
 
Performance measures are used on operational level for budgeting, planning and 
reporting. The reporting function provides status reports and accounts, and supports 
the communication of achieved performances to external parties. These reports often 
provide volumes of additional information. 
 
Spatial Planning is often executed through projects, but achieving Spatial Planning’s 
objectives is often only one of the desirable project results. Developing a new city 
district is not solely focussed on Spatial Planning, but is often also focussed on as-
pects of a more economic or social interest. 
The Council considers project management an important management method and 
special attention is given to it. Project control, controlling individual projects by project 
managers, is well developed. Projects are planned in advance, divided in “go-no go” 
phases, provided with clear milestones, decision-making processes, and clear divi-
sion of authorisation. Projects meet detailed planning and report requirements, and 
appear to function separately from, but not isolated from, the organisational planning 
and control instruments.  
 
A comprehensive overview of the relevant aspects of this case study is documented 
in Appendix VIII  Summary of Aspects.   126 
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5. Analysis and Conclusions 
This chapter documents our exploration of the applied role of budgeted performance 
measures (BPM) in Dutch municipalities. The chapter starts with a brief overview of 
the framework that was constructed to explain the roles of BPM. This answers the 
first research sub-question. 
The actual case study findings are then used to challenge the research framework. 
Firstly, the four case studies are positioned in the Earl and Hopwood framework and 
analyzed in more general terms. The general assumptions of the research framework 
are considered by comparing pre-defined aspects and related empirical findings. 
Secondly, the four case studies are explored in more detail with the aim of refining 
the research framework for use in Dutch municipalities. This analysis answers the 
second and third research questions. The chapter ends with a discussion of the re-
search findings.  
Framework to explain the roles of BPM in general 
This study began with an observation about Dutch local governmental organizations: 
they often applied performance measures in their planning and control systems, but 
seldom used performance measures rationally for output control. In other words: 
Dutch municipalities might use performance measures in their organizational and 
operational plans, budgets, and reports, but what they are used for is far from clear. 
This study observes and aims to explain the roles of performance measures for or-
ganizational control purposes.  
 
The main research question is: What is the role of budgeted performance measures 
in the organizational control of Dutch municipalities?   
 
The main research question is broken down into three more specific sub-questions: 
a)  Which aspects can explain the relationship between different contexts of organ-
izational control (businesslike or political context) and the roles of BPM applied by 
top management and politicians in Dutch local government? 
b)  To what extent do the aspects, introduced under a), explain the roles of BPM in 
Dutch municipalities? 
c)  Do the applied roles of BPM explain the use of BPM by top management and poli-
ticians in Dutch municipalities? 
 
The first research sub-question (a) directed this study to construct a general frame-
work by which different roles of performance measures for organizational control 
purposes could be researched. This initial framework of aspects served as a guide 
and a frame of reference during the case study research, but the explorative nature 
of this research also allowed other factors to be included during the analysis. Ac-
counting and control literature was used as the main source of information for this 
framework. 
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Studying the roles of BPM assesses the relevance of performance measures for or-
ganizational control. The suggestion that performance information has no purpose by 
itself (i.e. that the relevance of accounting information is not determined by those 
who determine the form which it should take), but that relevance is determined within 
the context of its use (Burchell e.a., 1980), is adopted in this study as a central 
theme. 
The role of accounting information use, or “accounting in action”, has not been re-
searched in depth, and only general concepts and some specific empirical tested 
hypotheses can be referred to. The general concepts often refer to more functionalis-
tic pictures of how accounting information facilitates organizational decision-making 
and control (Hopper and Powell, 1985). These general concepts emphasize various 
roles of information use, for example: for informing and influencing decision-making, 
or for attention directing, scorekeeping, and problem solving (e.g. Simon, 1954), for 
output and behavioral control (e.g. Ouchi, 1979) or for diagnostic control and interac-
tive control (Simons, 1990). The more specific concepts relate to the roles of particu-
lar aspects of management control, for example to reasons for budgeting in organiza-
tions (e.g. Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004).  
 
General accounting and control concepts can be used to study public sector organi-
zations (e.g. Anthony and Young, 1994), and contingency theory
130 is used to deter-
mine relevant aspects of accounting and control in those organizations.  
Two different sets of contingent factors are constructed. The first set is labeled as a 
businesslike control context, and aims to capture a rational use of performance 
measures for output or results control
131. Empirical research has found some match 
between the more technical aspects
132 of specific business organizations and the use 
of formal controls. A businesslike control context in this study is mainly associated 
with relatively large organizations, operating in relatively stable environments, in 
which managers perceive objectives as relatively certain. This study uses the follow-
ing aspects to indicate a businesslike control context: 
a.  certain and integrated objectives and performance measures (measured by 
the degree of goal specificity),  
b.  tight budgetary control (measured by the degree of budget tightness).  
 
The second set of contingent factors is labeled as a political control context, and fo-
cuses on the existence of conflicting institutional pressures on setting organizational 
objectives
133. It mainly highlights possible uncertainties or disputes about the goals 
                                            
130 Contingency theory assumes that under specified conditions, particular control mechanisms are 
appropriate. Applying contingency theory in this study, assumes that specific contingent factors in the 
internal and external environment of an organization can explain differences in the role and use of 
performance measures. 
131 This context emphasizes formal organizational structures and processes, on rules and routines that 
serve to bring order and to minimize uncertainty for employees. The private business organization is 
often portrayed as the stereotypical organization that flourishes in this environment. 
132 Such as: organizational size, organizational strategy, uncertainty of objectives, and task uncer-
tainty. 
133 The presence of multiple conflicting institutionally defined pressures on the organizational objec-
tives of local government is often used to explain why performance related organizational control is not 
intensively used (i.e. Pollitt and Boukeart, 2000; Modell, 2001).  
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and objectives of the organization. This study uses the following aspects to indicate a 
political control context; 
a.  ambiguity of objectives (measured by multiplicity of objectives), and  
b.  relatively unintegrated objectives and performance measures (measured by 
goal specificity). 
 
Earl and Hopwood’s (1979) traditional framework of roles of information use and con-
tingent factors led this study to define four archetypal roles. One of the appealing fea-
tures of the model is that it relates archetypal roles to the execution of organizational 
tasks and to the control context. Task uncertainty (measured by routineness of tasks) 
is applied as a factor to explain managers’ knowledge about the means-end relation-
ships of tasks. Earl and Hopwood’s framework relates the “answering” and “ammuni-
tion” role to relatively certain tasks, and the ”learning” and “rationalizing” role to more 
uncertain tasks. 
Earl and Hopwood’s (1979) traditional framework relates also to the control context. 
Two of these roles (the “answering” and “learning” roles) are assumed to be mainly 
related to a businesslike control context, and the other two (“ammunition” and “ra-
tionalizing” roles) mainly to a political control context. Each of the roles is character-
ized by a phrase, and is related to one or more indicative key characteristics. This 
study applies five key characteristics: 
•  to diagnose, to compare actual and budgeted performance (answering role) 
•  to learn and to change ways of doing (learning role)  
•  unequivocally signaling what is important (learning role, ammunition role) 
•  influencing future budget increase (ammunition role) 
•  to report and explain on past performances (rationalization role) 
Case study findings can provide a more specific insight into the roles, and can chal-
lenge the above list of characteristics. 
 
The roles of BPM and the antecedents to the roles (being the control contexts and 
task uncertainty) are seen as the two main constructs of the research framework
134 
(see Figure 3 on page 32). Two remarks are made about the antecedents to the 
roles. 
Firstly, Earl and Hopwood’s framework uses uncertainty of objectives as a single fac-
tor to differentiate between a more or less rational goal-oriented control context. Ap-
plying this rather simple framework, the control context is divided into being more 
businesslike or more political. However, the research framework in this study offers 
more variation. It defines businesslike and political contexts separately, and defines 
both contexts as mutually non-exclusive
135. Using both frameworks together can thus 
result in different analyses. To overcome this hurdle, the roles of BPM are analyzed 
in two sequential phases. In the first phase the simpler Earl and Hopwood framework 
                                            
134 The complete research framework, as documented in chapter 2, consist of three constructs: ante-
cedents of roles, roles of BPM, and BPM use. The last construct, BPM use, is the central subject of 
the third and last research sub-question, which is documented in one of the following sections. 
135 Both contexts relate mostly to different sets of aspects and measurable factors, offering a fairly 
open framework in which a businesslike and political control context can occur to some extent simul-
taneously.   130 
is used to collect empirical information on the archetypal roles. The use of the Earl 
and Hopwood framework enables the selection of case studies, by focusing on ex-
treme values of aspects. Then the empirical findings can be used to gradually unfold 
and challenge the more complex research framework, and to merge theory with the 
complexity and heterogeneity of practice.  
Secondly, task uncertainty is seen as an independent factor in both the Earl and 
Hopwood framework and in the more complex research framework. Task uncertainty 
is thus regarded as unrelated to uncertainty of objectives or to the control contexts. 
 
In the next sections the different roles of BPM use are analyzed and explored. As a 
first step, in order to provide a more general analysis, Earl and Hopwood’s framework 
is used. Then a more interpretive approach is used to challenge the research frame-
work.  
Challenging the Earl and Hopwood framework 
Can Earl and Hopwood’s framework be used to explain the different roles of BPM 
use and related circumstances in Dutch local government? In order to answer this 
question, four different case studies were selected. Selection was mainly based on 
information about the antecedent factors; on uncertainty of objectives and tasks. In-
formation, collected during interviews with civil executive officers of Dutch municipali-
ties
136, led to the selection of four specific (groups of) organizational functions. How-
ever, the interviews did not always deliver clear, contrasting information on the four 
combinations of antecedent factors. Some cases were selected by choosing the best 
suitable. Eventually four case studies were selected: Sewerage, Economic Policy, 
Welfare Payment, and Spatial Planning. Table 22 provides an indicative overview of 
the selected case studies in the Earl and Hopwood framework. 
 
  certainty of objectives   uncertainty of objectives 
low task uncertainty 
Sewerage 
“answering” role 
Welfare Payments 
“ammunition” role 
high task uncertainty 
Economic Policy 
“learning” role 
Spatial Planning 
“rationalizing” role 
Table 22 Case studies in the Earl and Hopwood framework 
The case studies provided a wide range of findings from one Dutch municipality (the 
city of Leeuwarden), and delivered a set of more qualitative measures. Measures and 
findings are used in two different analyzes: a more general analysis and a more de-
tailed exploration. The general analysis aims to explain the roles of BPM by using the 
traditional Earl and Hopwood framework. Here the focus is on predefined and meas-
ured aspects of the antecedents and the roles of BPM. Then a more interpretive ap-
proach is used, which allows the case study findings to explain the roles of BPM in 
more detail.   
                                            
136 The selection interviews were not aimed to provide insight into the roles of BPM. Information on 
actually applied roles was only collected during the case studies.    
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The next sections document the general analysis of the case studies. Cases are po-
sitioned into the framework by using control contexts and routineness of tasks as di-
mensions. Per case a comparison is made between its originally assumed position, 
its estimated position during the selection phase, and its actual position during the 
case research. Then the applied roles per case study are briefly discussed. This sec-
tion concludes with a general analysis. 
Sewerage 
 
Figure 4 Position of Sewerage 
 
Initially, the search was for a case study that could represent box 1 in Figure 4; a 
situation associated with a businesslike control context and relatively certain tasks. In 
this situation, objectives and tasks are expected to be certain and undisputed and 
“algorithms, formulae and rules can be derived to solve the problem by computation” 
(Earl and Hopwood, 1979, p 8). The preferred position of a representative case was 
expected to be near the X-mark in Figure 4. 
 
Interviews during the selection phase suggested selecting Sewerage. Sewerage ap-
peared to be related to clear objectives and to routine tasks. Sewerage was therefore 
considered as a representative case. The S-mark in Figure 4 symbolizes the position 
of Sewerage during the selection phase, which is comparable with the preferred posi-
tion (the X-mark in Figure 4). 
 
The actual position of Sewerage, based on the case study findings, supports the as-
sumption of a businesslike control context and the absence of a political control con-
text to a large extent. Objectives and performance are seen as specific (by clear, 
relevant, and integrated measures), and conflicting influences on objectives are not 
found. However, the organizational control of Sewerage is not profound. Sewerage 
appears to operate largely in isolation from the rest of the organizational control 
processes, and budgetary tightness is limited. The Sewerage case indicates an av-
erage level
137 of routineness, which only to some extent seems to conform to the as-
                                            
137 For more detail on the measured aspects, see Appendix VIII  Summary of Aspects.  
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sumed position in the selection phase. The A-mark in Figure 4 represents the actual 
position of Sewerage in the framework. This actual position is used to analyze the 
case study in general terms. 
 
The traditional Earl and Hopwood framework assumes that the role of performance 
measures at the A-mark is somewhere between providing answers
138 and assisting 
learning
139. However, the Sewerage case study findings only partly confirm these 
assumptions. The use of performance measures for providing answers is only partly 
observed; performance measures are used as budget targets and for monitoring 
achieved performances (operational reporting), but the use for variance analysis for 
organizational control seems to be limited. The use of performance measures for as-
sisting learning is not observed. The rationalizing role
140, on the other hand, appears 
to be present in general terms. Table 23 provides an overview of the expected, as-
sumed and observed roles in the Sewerage case study. 
 
roles answering  learning  ammunition  rationalizing 
initially expected      
assumed at actual position         
actually observed  partly     general 
Table 23 Roles related to Sewerage 
Economic Policy 
 
Figure 5 Position of Economic Policy 
A case study that was initially supposed to represent box 2 in Figure 5, should relate 
to a businesslike control context and relative uncertain tasks. In this situation, objec-
tives are expected to be certain and undisputed but tasks are uncertain. “Here MIS 
can not provide the answer but they can go part of the way, providing assistance” 
(Earl and Hopwood, 1979, p 8). The preferred position of a representative case was 
expected to be near the X-mark in. 
 
                                            
138 By emphasizing the variances between planned and achieved performances. 
139 By using performance measures for signaling or for learning-to-do. 
140 Using performance measures for organizational reporting on past performances. 
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The interviews during the selection phase did not provide strong indications for one 
particular organizational function. Economic Policy was selected after some consid-
eration. Economic Policy could be associated to some extent with clear objectives, 
absence of a political context and to uncertainty of tasks (the S-mark in Figure 5). 
 
The actual position of Economic Policy, based on the case study findings, differs 
from the position in the selection phase. Economic Policy only limitedly supports the 
assumption of a businesslike control context. Objectives seem to be clear and rele-
vant, but are not perceived as controllable, and could not be easily translated into 
operational terms. The limited amount of budget tightness indicates also a less busi-
nesslike control context. Disputes about organizational objectives, on the other hand, 
are not observed. This absence of a political control context is seen as a match with 
the initially expected position. The case observations indicate a low level of routine-
ness, which conforms to the initial preferred position of the case. The A-mark in 
Figure 5 represents the actual position of Economic Policy. This actual position is 
used to analyze the case study in general terms. 
 
The traditional Earl and Hopwood framework assumes that the role of performance 
measures at the A-mark is somewhere between assisting learning
141 and assisting 
rationalizing
142. The Economic Policy case study findings, however, do not fully con-
firm these assumptions. The use of performance measures for assisting learning is 
only partly observed; signaling is clearly observed, but learning-to-do appears to be 
absent. The use of performance measures for rationalizing is present in general 
terms. The answering role is also observed, but only partly and to a limited extent. 
The ammunition role appears to be present, but only to a limited extent
143. Table 24 
provides a summary of the expected, assumed, and the observed roles. 
 
roles answering  learning  ammunition  rationalizing 
initially expected        
assumed at actual position         
actually observed  limited  partly  limited  general 
Table 24 Roles related to Economic Policy 
                                            
141 By signaling or for learning-to-do. 
142 By using information for reporting on past performances.  
143 The ammunition role is mainly used to influence future budgets in other departments.   134 
Welfare Payment 
  
Figure 6 Position of Welfare Payment 
 
The preferred case study for representing box 3 in Figure 6 should relate to a political 
control context and relatively certain tasks. Here objectives are expected to be uncer-
tain or disputed but causation is certain, and “the information systems serve to pro-
mote and articulate particular interested positions and values” (Earl and Hopwood, 
1979, p 10). The preferred position of a representative case was expected to be near 
the X-mark in Figure 6. 
 
Interviews during the selection phase provided some diffuse indications. Welfare 
Payment was related to low tasks uncertainty, but appears highly associated with 
both a political and a businesslike control context. Welfare Payment was eventually 
selected as an example of political control and certainty of tasks (the S-mark in 
Figure 6 indicates its assumed position). 
 
The actual case findings confirm the diffused analysis of the control context of Wel-
fare Payment during the selection phase. The findings confirm the existence of a po-
litical control context clearly (by disputes about financial and non-financial objectives 
between different institutionally defined groups). At the same time, a businesslike 
context also appears to be present (objectives and performances are seen as suffi-
ciently clear, mutually integrated and relevant). Using an integrated, single scale for 
expressing the different control contexts, the position of Welfare should thus be near 
the S-mark in Figure 6. This however neglects the nuances of the case study find-
ings. Therefore, the actual position of Welfare is now symbolized by two marks. The 
A-marks in Figure 6 represent the actual position of Welfare Payment in the frame-
work, and express the presence of two different control contexts. These actual posi-
tions are used to analyze the case study in general terms. 
 
The traditional Earl and Hopwood framework assumes that the role of performance 
measures at the A-marks relates to providing answers
144 (the A
1-mark) and ammuni-
                                            
144 By emphasizing the variances between planned and achieved performances. 
1 3
2 4
Welfare Payment
businesslike political 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
t
a
s
k
s
context
X S A1 A2
X = position in initial theory
S = position in selection phase
A = estimated actual position
1 3
2 4
Welfare Payment
businesslike political 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
t
a
s
k
s
context
X S A1 A2
X = position in initial theory
S = position in selection phase
A = estimated actual position   
     135
tion
145 (the A
2-mark). The Welfare Payment case study findings, however, do not 
confirm this assumption completely. The use of performance measures for influenc-
ing next period budgets is clearly observed. The answering role is only partly ob-
served; it only relates to the use of performance budget targets and operational re-
porting but not to the use of variance analysis. However, performance measures are 
also used for assisting learning and rationalizing. Table 25 provides a summary of 
the expected and observed roles in the Economic Policy. 
 
roles answering  learning  ammunition  rationalizing 
initially expected      
assumed at actual position       
actually observed  partly  present  present  present 
Table 25 Roles related to Welfare Payment 
Spatial Planning 
 
Figure 7 Position of Spatial Planning 
 
Box 4 in Figure 7 relates to a political control context and uncertain tasks. Here ob-
jectives and tasks are expected to be uncertain, and information is used to legitimize 
and justify actions that have been decided upon. The preferred position of a repre-
sentative case was expected to be near the X-mark in Figure 7.  
 
Interviews during the selection phases suggested selecting Spatial Planning; it was 
clearly associated with a political context and to uncertain causation. The S-mark in 
Figure 7 indicates that its assumed position in the selection phase is close to the pre-
ferred position. 
 
However, empirical research showed that the Spatial Planning case provides only 
limited support for the assumption of a political control context (limited conflicting 
pressures exerted on the objectives). The limited presence of a businesslike control 
                                            
145 By influencing future budgets.  
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context, on the other hand, does conform to initial assumptions
146. The case findings 
indicate an intermediate or average level of routineness of tasks. The A-mark in 
Figure 7 represents the actual position of Spatial Planning. This actual position is 
used to analyze the case study in general terms. 
 
The traditional Earl and Hopwood framework assumes that the role of performance 
measures at the A-mark is somewhere between providing answers
147, assisting 
learning
148, providing ammunition
149, and assisting rationalizing
150. The Spatial Plan-
ning case study findings confirm these roles to some extent. The use of performance 
measures for rationalizing is clearly observed, and the use for influencing future 
budgets and status reporting is also present. A limited use of information for signaling 
purposes is also observed. Table 26 provides a summary of the expected and ob-
served roles of Spatial Planning. 
roles answering  learning  ammunition  rationalizing 
initially expected       
assumed at actual position         
actually observed  partly  limited  present  present 
Table 26 Roles related to Spatial Planning 
Combining the case studies 
The next step is to analyze the cases together, based on measured antecedents and 
roles indicated above (see Figure 8). Analyzing four different case studies (held si-
multaneously within a single organization) by using a rather simplistic framework can 
never result in strong conclusion about this framework. This analysis is likely to un-
dervalue the documented richness and variety of the case study findings, and is 
methodologically unsuited to robustly challenge the framework. Nevertheless, this 
summarized and general analysis can give some insights and directions that can be 
used in a more detailed discussion later on. 
 
First, the four cases researched appear to represent less extreme positions than was 
expected during the selection phase. The aim at the start of the empirical research 
was to select clear cases, associated with extreme positions with respect to the con-
trol context and task uncertainty. This aim builds on the assumption that, by re-
searching an extreme position, the framework could best be challenged. However, 
the actual positions of the case studies seem to be less obvious. The marked area in 
Figure 8 is an indicative visualization of the area that is covered by the case study 
findings in reality. A case with a clear businesslike control context and certain tasks, 
or with a clear political control context and uncertain tasks, seems to be largely miss-
                                            
146 The relationship with a more businesslike context of control of Spatial Planning is diffuse. Objec-
tives are relevant and in general terms clear, but often not integrated with operational performances, 
and financial and non-financial performance measures are often not connected or balanced with each 
other. The tightness of budget control is also considered as limited. 
147 By emphasizing the variances between planned and achieved performance measures. 
148 By signaling or for learning-to-do. 
149 By influencing future budgets.  
150 By using performance measures for reporting on past performances.   
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ing. This will force this study to be more modest in drawing conclusions on the rela-
tionship between the roles of BPM and the control contexts. 
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SE = Sewerage, EP = Economic Policy, WP = Welfare Payment, SP = Spatial Planning 
Figure 8 Actual positions of cases 
 
More specifically, the use of a dichotomy of control contexts does not lead to obvious 
results in this research. Welfare Payment relates to both contexts, whereas Eco-
nomic Policy and Spatial Planning have an intermediate position with respect to the 
control context. Only Sewerage is recognized as clearly businesslike. Measures of 
task uncertainty, however, seem to be far more obvious. Causality appears to differ-
entiate the four cases more clearly, and points to Welfare Payment as an example of 
certainty of tasks, and to Economic Policy as having a high degree of uncertainty of 
tasks. Concluding, the cases have more clearly contrasting positions only with regard 
to task uncertainty. The positions with regard to the control contexts (at least as 
measured in this study) produce mainly confusing or limited variation. 
 
The main reason for applying the traditional Earl and Hopwood framework was its 
assumed ability to address several roles of BPM use, and to relate specific roles to 
specific situations. Table 27 gives on overview of the assumed and observed roles 
per case study.  
     roles    
case study    answering  learning  ammunition  rationalizing
Sewerage  assumed       
  observed  partly     general 
Economic Policy  assumed      
  observed  limited  partly  limited  present 
Welfare Payment  assumed      
  observed  partly  present  present  present 
Spatial Planning  assumed         
  observed  partly  limited  present  present 
Table 27 Differences in roles of BPM 
Table 27 shows the differences between the assumed and actual observed roles of 
BPM. Assumed roles are often partly and sometimes only limited observed or absent,   138 
and roles are observed in situation where they were not assumed. These differences 
suggest that relationship between a particular position in the Earl and Hopwood 
framework and the various roles of BPM is less straightforward than thought. 
Not only are the positions of the cases in the framework puzzling, the empirical re-
search suggests that in practice the various roles of BPM are also not exclusively 
related to specific situations
151. Analyzing the roles of BPM by using Earl and Hop-
wood’s assumptions, and four case studies, perhaps provide some answers, but also 
point to various important questions. The Earl and Hopwood framework offers no 
clear insights. Perhaps the use of the more complex research framework can take 
this analysis further. In the following sections the case study findings are used to 
analyze and explain the roles of BPM-use in Dutch municipalities in more detail.  
                                            
151 Table 27 suggests that actual observed roles differ clearly from (the by the Earl and Hopwood 
framework) assumed roles. Most of the cases, except Sewerage, can be related to (part of) the four 
archetypal roles.  
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Findings that explain the applied roles 
In the previous section, the four cases researched were positioned in the traditional 
Earl and Hopwood framework and related to archetypal roles of BPM. This section 
uses the research framework in order to explore the various case study findings sys-
tematically and in more depth. Findings for each case are briefly summarized below, 
and are used to further explore and explain the applied roles of BPM.  
Summary of case studies 
As previously indicated, the Welfare Payment case relates to both a businesslike and 
a political control context. Organizational objectives and performances are perceived 
as clear and integrated, with relative certain causation between tasks and objectives, 
but objectives are at the same time disputed by stakeholders. Members of the Coun-
cil (adjusting welfare policies), central government (restricting financial contribution), 
and civil managers (controlling operational processes) exert influence on organiza-
tional objectives. This influence can be regarded as institutional pressure, but does 
not appear to result in ambiguous objectives. Uncertainty within the external envi-
ronment, instead of ambiguity of objectives, is surfacing as a relevant factor. Politi-
cians and managers perceive objectives as clear, in the sense that they understand 
their meaning and consequences. However, they lack insight into future external de-
velopments. 
Politicians and managers made reference to external uncertainties, but often consid-
ered them to be uncontrollable. Future developments in the number of clients entitled 
to welfare and the future financial contribution of central government are in their opin-
ion largely uncontrollable by the municipality. As a result organizational objectives 
and performances are used more as signals and as points of reference, than as 
achievable year-end targets. At an operational level a similar situation exists: infor-
mation about actual developments seems to be more relevant than variance between 
budgeted and actual performances. 
The internal environment of Welfare Payment is seen as standardized and certain. 
When the number of welfare clients is known, tasks are clear, the expected workload 
per employee can be estimated, and the financial consequences are clear. 
 
High political risk seems to drive performance measurement use in the Welfare Pay-
ment case, rather than the uncontrollability of objectives or the certainty of task exe-
cution. Welfare Payment represents a serious risk factor for the executive committee, 
both in financial terms and in terms of proper execution of the law. Politicians’ aware-
ness that future developments in Welfare Payment can seriously harm the municipal-
ity (and the Council members), puts Welfare Payment in the spotlight, and drives the 
need for monitoring actual performances. Adequate monitoring enables the organiza-
tion not only to learn (by estimating future developments and changing operational 
tasks), and to influence future budgets (using financial forecasts), but also to report in 
detail on past performances. Diagnostic use of BPM for organizational control is 
mainly observed in relation to financial budgets and in general terms. 
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Sewerage operates in a relatively certain political and financial situation. Organiza-
tional objectives are clear and integrated with operational performances. Causation 
of civil technical tasks is high; the regular operational tasks are considered as rou-
tine, and projects are fully programmable in a technical sense. The external environ-
ment of Sewerage is also to a large extent certain. Political interest is limited and 
politicians do not consider Sewerage as politically risky. Objectives and tasks to per-
form are defined in advance. Conflicting pressures or disputes over organizational 
objectives are not observed. However, time management of large sewer system pro-
jects is seen as uncertain. It appears to be hard to deliver large Sewerage projects 
(new sewer systems or large maintenance projects) on time
152. The need to combine 
sewer system project with other infrastructural projects, the difficulties in the co-
ordination of and communication about Sewerage projects (both within the organiza-
tion, and between the municipal organization and external parties) are given as the 
main reasons for this uncertainty. 
Organizational control is rather loose, and is mainly focused on preventing financial 
underspending (by stimulating coordination and time management of large projects). 
Financial or non-financial organizational risks are not observed. Financial control at 
an organizational level appears to be limited (due to a complicated financial scheme). 
Malfunction of the sewer systems (resulting in unsatisfied citizens) is not observed. 
At an operational level project control appears to be well organized and tight. The 
role of BPM use is limited, with some use for operational reporting, but mainly it is 
used for organizational reporting on past performances. The diagnostic use of BPM 
for organizational control is mainly observed in relation to financial budgets and in 
general terms. 
 
The Economic Policy case study describes a situation in which objectives are clear 
and certain, but barely operational. Many involved see the main organizational objec-
tive (more employment opportunities) as out of the municipal’s control. They felt that 
external influences mainly determined the growth, and especially the decline, of em-
ployment in the city. The objectives are also regarded as non-directive; the link be-
tween organizational objectives and operational actions is weak and diffuse. Objec-
tives are seen more as strategic mission statements than as performance related 
targets. However, Economic Policy is a key issue for the municipal council. Aldermen 
and civil managers are frequently involved in Economic Policy related activities, and 
its objectives are seen in many council documents. 
Economic Policy’s main task is to stimulate employment through influencing other 
policy fields within the municipal organization or external business organizations. At 
an operational level, Economic Policy is characterized by both routine tasks (e.g. 
regular co-ordination, participation in internal meetings, business visits, communica-
tion, and research) and by non-routine actions (mainly new opportunities and special 
projects). 
Control, both financial and non-financial, is rather loose. At an operational level the 
financial budgets are relatively small and operational control is not considered very 
                                            
152 Sewerage projects appear to be hard to deliver on time, because they often have to be executed in 
combination with other projects, such as road (re)construction.  
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important. At an organizational level the focus appears to be more on swift reactions 
to opportunities than on controlling performances. 
The use of performance measures for budgeting or reporting operational status is not 
emphasized. Performance measures are mainly used to signal to others, to underline 
the importance of specific actions, to influence future budgets, and to communicate 
historic facts and past performances. The diagnostic use of BPM for organizational 
control is mainly seen in relation to financial budgets and in general terms. 
 
The Spatial Planning case study describes a situation in which a wide spectrum of 
tasks is executed in a complex environment. Spatial Planning has both routine tasks 
(e.g. keeping regulation and zone planning up to date) and non-routine tasks (e.g. 
new spatial development, or major projects). Its external environment is highly institu-
tionalized (e.g. by national Acts) and often unpredictable (formal objections by citi-
zens or developments in society can easily influence what needs to be done).  
Spatial Planning is regarded by politicians as important and municipal politicians of-
ten participate in operational decision making. Some particular objectives are clear 
and integrated with performances, but most of the objectives are deliberately stated 
in more general terms. Organizational objectives appear to be purposely ambiguous; 
in this way tasks can be reactive and mapped against these general objectives his-
torically.  In this case ambiguity seems not to be a response to conflicting institutional 
pressures on organizational objectives, but more a strategic choice. 
At an operational level, project control appears to be important and many specialists 
or professionals (e.g. civil engineers and lawyers) are employed. Professionals seem 
to dominate the operational culture, and are seen as a special group of persons (by 
politicians and top management, and by themselves). Conflicts between operational 
and organizational levels are not observed. 
Organizational objectives and performances are seldom integrated with operational 
tasks. Operational project control is emphasized and appears to be loosely coupled 
with organizational objectives. Financial and non-financial organizational control is 
characterized as rather loose.  
Performance information is used for budgeting and operational reporting, but mainly 
it is used for operational control purposes. It is also used for influencing future budg-
ets, and also largely for organizational reporting on past performances. The diagnos-
tic use of BPM for organizational control is mainly observed in relation to financial 
budgets and in general terms. 
 
The empirical findings of the case studies can now be used to challenge and perhaps 
redesign the research framework. This is conducted in three steps. First, the arche-
typal roles of BPM are briefly discussed, and broken down into the more specific 
roles of BPM use. Then the applied roles are discussed, focussing on similarities and 
differences. Lastly the discussion is summarized, in answer to the second sub-
research question: “To what extent do the aspects, introduced under a), explain the 
roles of BPM in Dutch municipalities? 
.   142 
An explanation of the way BPM is used  
The four case studies provided some puzzling and confusing information about the 
definition of the archetypal roles of BPM use, and on the relationship between these 
roles and their environment. They were also regarded as suggestions or as a source 
of inspiration which could help this study to explore the roles of BPM in more detail.    
 
The “answering” role, for example, helped this research to focus on the rational use 
of information systems
153. Research findings found but limited use of this “answering” 
role. Only highly aggregated financial performances are controlled in this way. Politi-
cians and managers seldom rely solely on formal information systems for organiza-
tional control purposes. They are often personally involved in aspects of operational 
decision making, and frequently contact operational managers in order to obtain ad-
ditional information. BPM are seen as valuable, but seldom provided the complete 
answer. Researching the “answering” role in more detail was enabled by studying 
three of its functions or sub-roles: targeting (budgets), monitoring (operational report-
ing), and variance analyzes. The use of BPM for targeting and monitoring is fre-
quently seen in all the case studies. Targeting appears to provide norms (for budget-
ary control) and points of references (e.g. for communicating important issues), and 
monitoring mainly provides information on actual operational developments. Monitor-
ing gives Council members and managers information on actual performances and 
about the status quo, but provides limited advice on the route to choose
154.  
 
Applying the “learning” and “ammunition” roles helped this study to articulate the use 
of performance measures in a more social setting
155. The research model initially as-
sumed that the “learning” and “ammunition” roles were used under clearly different 
circumstances. “Learning” was expected to relate to specific objectives and to limited 
knowledge on how to achieve them, and “ammunition” was expected to relate to un-
certain or disputed objectives and certainty in task execution. However, empirical 
findings cannot separate the two archetypal roles that clearly. In practice, both roles 
appear to relate to some extent to each other. Welfare Payment in particularly is as-
sociated with both roles, but both roles are also observed in Economic Policy. In or-
der to explain these observations, the two roles are broken down into three functions 
or sub-roles: learn-to-do, signalling, and influencing future budgets (budgeting). The 
three sub-roles appear to be applied under different circumstances, which are dis-
cussed later. 
 
Only the archetype “rationalizing” role was researched in its initial form. This role, 
with its function of legitimizing organizational performances by providing organiza-
tional reports on past performances, is not broken down further. 
                                            
153 This role suggested that, under relatively certain conditions, the information system contains all the 
necessary information to control the organization. Thus managers get their answers merely by using 
the formal control system. 
154 Discussions with managers and controllers seem to indicate that the difference between knowing 
where you are and knowing what to do is not often recognized. 
155 These roles were built on the assumption that, under more uncertain circumstances, organizational 
control is more dependent on social control systems.  
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In summary, in aiming to explain the roles of BPM in more detail, the roles are de-
fined by several more specific sub-roles. Seven sub-roles of BPM use are included in 
this research: targeting (budgets), monitoring (operational reporting), variance ana-
lyzes, learning-to-do, signalling, influencing future budgets (budgeting), and reporting 
on past performances (organizational reporting). 
Explaining the applied (sub-) roles of BPM, some similarities 
As previously discussed, some sub-roles of BPM are documented in all the case 
studies. The use of BPM for variance analysis, targeting performance budgets, op-
erational reporting, influencing next period budgets, and organizational reporting ap-
pears to be used in all policy fields. 
 
The diagnostic use of BPM for variance analysis is observed in all the case studies, 
mainly for organizational control of highly aggregated financial performance meas-
ures
156. However, this way of using performance measures is seen far less in the 
control of financial operational budgets. Responsible operational managers mostly 
comply with strictly defined budget rules. Financial budgeted performances can be 
altered, or budget overspending can be explicitly or implicitly accepted, so long as 
the rules are applied properly. 
The use of BPM for variance analysis is seldom applied for controlling detailed finan-
cial or non-financial performances. This despite the presence of variance analyses 
information in many documents. Other components of the “answering” role are more 
frequently observed. Targeting of budgeted performance measures (budgets) and 
monitoring of actual achievements (operational reporting) are observed in all the 
case studies. Both sub-roles of information use are more or less comparably applied 
in the researched cases. Only Welfare Payment uses status reporting comparatively 
more intensively. 
 
The use of BPM for influencing next period budget (as part of the “ammunition” role) 
appears to be applied in all the cases, except Sewerage. This function of BPM use 
relates to the budgeting process
157. Information on achieved actual and estimated 
future performances is used for influencing or motivating members of the Council to 
adjust next years performance budgets in a desirable direction. Influencing next pe-
riod budget is used most in Welfare Payment, but this function is also documented in 
Economic Policy and Spatial Planning. 
Sewerage seems to be the exception to this rule, but is using a multi-year planning 
and control cycle. Its yearly budgets are set by a mid-term plan, setting budgets for 
the next four years or longer. Influencing the next period budget is in this case re-
                                            
156 By applying this diagnostic control function, politicians are using the accounting information system 
to ensure that financial organizational performances are (or will be) within some general budgeted 
targets. 
157 Budgeting is the process of setting budget targets. Budgeting can be approached as top-down 
(budget targets are in line with pre-set organizational objectives) or as bottom-up (organizational ob-
jectives are altered in line with the developments of budget targets). Both approaches are assumed to 
be functioning together to some extent.   144 
ferred to as influencing the next mid-term plan. At the time of this research the mid-
term plan had just been renewed, and therefore influencing the next mid-term plan 
was not seen.  
 
Organizational reporting is also documented in all the cases, especially Welfare 
Payment, Economic Policy, and Spatial Planning. In Sewerage this function of ra-
tionalizing and legitimizing past performances is used less. 
 
To summarize, the four cases researched suggest that this organization does apply 
some kind of standard way of using BPM throughout the organization, regardless of 
the precise technical, political and social task environment. The way BPM is used for 
organizational control appears to have some kind of a minimum level, related to a 
restricted set of roles of BPM-use used to a minimum extent. Organizational control 
is apparently running in the lowest gear here
158. The case study findings also illus-
trate situations in which, in addition to this use of standard roles, standard roles of 
BPM more intensively occur, or are supplemented by other roles of BPM.  
This standard use of particular sub-roles of BPM was not initially expected; the re-
search framework did not make any assumptions about it. Adjustment of the frame-
work on this point should be considered. 
Explaining the applied (sub-) roles of BPM, some striking differences 
Some sub-roles of BPM turn out to vary significantly between the four case studies. 
Variations seem to be most contrasting regarding the learning-to-do function, but also 
the use of BPM for signalling
159 appears to vary between the four cases.  
 
The learning-to-do function of BPM appears to be most pronounced in Welfare Pay-
ment. The politicians and managers who are responsible for Welfare Payment are 
confronted with serious financial and political risks and unpredictable circumstances. 
Enforcing control over future financial performances is for them without doubt a major 
issue, but compliance with laws and procedures is also important. Performance 
measures are central. Politicians and managers responsible for Welfare Payment try 
                                            
158 What is driving the content and the extent of use of these standard roles of BPM-use is not investi-
gated in this study, but some suggestions can be made.  The content can, for example, be influenced 
by the nationwide implementation of businesslike planning and control instruments in Dutch munici-
palities in past decades. This implementation project has had significant impact on the planning and 
control systems of Dutch city councils, and resulted in similar use of planning and control instruments 
in many local governmental organizations (Van Helden, 1998; Van Helden and Ter Bogt, 2001; Ter 
Bogt, 2004). This standard way of using BPM can also be influenced by the more institutional defined 
rules and regulation, regarding accountability or account given purposes (Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2000).  
An additional remark is made. If organizations rely mainly on this standard role of BPM, they do not 
differentiate much between different policy fields, and their planning and control systems are less likely 
to facilitate politicians and managers in their control of operational tasks in more uncertain or unpre-
dictable environments. It is assumable that this standard role of BPM mainly facilitates the control of 
routine tasks in a stable environment, and less the control of less pre-programmable tasks in a unsta-
ble environment.  
159 Signaling is seen as a function of both the archetypal “learning” and “ammunition” role. The differ-
ence between both archetypal roles is defined by the presence of “learning to change ways of doing” 
or “influencing next period budgets”. Learning to change ways of doing stresses the intention to 
change processes, influencing the next period budget stresses the intention to change future budgets.  
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to react to changes caused by the unpredictable external environment, and use BPM 
for signalling and learning. They use status reports intensively for monitoring actual 
operational developments, discuss performance trends, signal emerging changes, 
and analyze operational processes in order to find alternatives that can bring them 
closer to their objectives. Two observations are made. 
Firstly, process-related performances are perceived as controllable, but results-
related performances are not. The municipality sees itself as in control of operational 
processes, but also as having limited control over the total amount of welfare to be 
paid and the financial compensation it is to receive. In this environment the use of 
BPM for learning seems to flourish; it seems to facilitate politicians and civil manag-
ers in adjusting objectives or altering operational tasks
160.  
Secondly, managers said that they can predict the results of tasks to be performed in 
advance. As a result, they can estimate the results of operational changes fairly ac-
curately. For example, an expected change in the number of welfare clients is used 
to estimate a change in operational costs and expenses for welfare payments. How-
ever, according to the research framework, learning-to-do was mainly expected in an 
environment in which managers are uncertain about the causality between tasks and 
specific objectives. It therefore seems odd that managers use BPM for learning-to-
do, when they seem to know what to do. 
What seems to be important in this case is that this learning-to-do does not often 
lead to significant instant changes. Many operational processes in Welfare Payment 
are pre-programmed and are often constrained by national rules and protocols or by 
local policies. Many different organizations are also operationally involved in a chain 
of welfare-related processes. Changing this kind of process is therefore not easily 
done. As a result, operational changes seem to be mostly applied to future years; in 
the following budget period. Continuing this line of reasoning, managers seem to 
know what to do today, but are learning how to pre-program the future. 
 
Economic Policy, on the other hand, was expected to relate to the learning-to-do 
function, but case findings did not confirm this function at all. The objectives of Eco-
nomic Policy are perceived as relevant, clear and undisputed, but nobody knows ex-
actly how the municipality can achieve them, and the achieved performances are 
only measurable after some time. In this situation, signalling seems to be important. 
Signalling facilitates the communication and coordination of the operational tasks. 
Responsible aldermen and civil servants apply signalling to influence (or to motivate 
or to pursue) others to act according to their plans, of which the exact results are 
hard to predict
161. 
 
                                            
160 This more timely information means the Council is better informed and appears to make organiza-
tional control tighter. However, frequent operational monitoring and reporting is not making the unpre-
dictable controllable. More objective information on actual developments is basically making the 
Council members more aware of the current challenges to resolve, but does not seem to resolve 
them. 
161 Learning suggests some kind of trial-and-error process. In the Economic policy case, however, it is 
not always clear which decision will lead to the achievement of the organizational objectives. In a 
changing environment, this kind of learning can thus also be based on more intuitive or judgmental 
processes.   146 
Analysing Welfare Payment and Economic Policy together, another observation can 
be made. Both are described by specific and relevant organizational objectives, and 
by operational control that is aimed at achieving these specific objectives. Opera-
tional control in both policy fields is, however, mainly reliant on process/project and 
social control mechanisms. Politicians and managers are personally involved in op-
erational and organizational decision-making and control, and seem to enforce inte-
gration between operational tasks and organizational output control.  
Perhaps one could speculate that this suggestion can be put in more general terms. 
That is, if unpredictable changes in the external environment or unpredictable conse-
quences of operational tasks are hindering the achievement of precise and relevant 
organizational objectives, politicians and managers are likely to use BPM for un-
equivocally signalling what is important and for learning to change ways of doing. 
Learning is, however, conditional. Further research is necessary to explore this in 
more depth. 
 
The Spatial Planning case study reveals a different situation. Spatial Planning is 
characterized by some specific but mostly ambiguous objectives, and by operational 
tasks that are barely directed or defined by specific organizational objectives. 
The majority of the organizational objectives and performances of Spatial Planning 
are purposefully vague, leaving room for operational activities to be filled in later. 
Loose coupling between operational and organizational control seems to be an im-
portant characteristic here. Not only are operational performances and organizational 
objectives supporting a loose coupled control system, but also the communication 
between politicians and Spatial Planning management seems not to achieve tight 
integration of operational and organizational control. Signalling appears to facilitate 
the more ad-hoc communication needs of politicians, top management and opera-
tional managers. In Spatial Planning, signalling seems to be used predominantly to 
express various interests and values. This could be caused by the complex and insti-
tutionalized external environment of Spatial Planning, but the existence of different 
organizational cultures (between politicians and operational professionals) could also 
be an influence. An additional aspect is that politicians are often involved in the more 
operational aspects of this policy field. Spatial Planning seems to offer politicians op-
portunities, for example to act, to be informed, to articulate issues, or to communicate 
with their electorate. Associations with the use of BPM for learning-to-do are however 
not made.  
 
One remark has to be made on a missing variation in the empirical research. The use 
of BPM for diagnostic variance analysis was mainly expected in Sewerage. Organ-
izational control in Sewerage is however hardly evidenced; the findings suggest that 
BPM in Sewerage is not used much for organizational control. This loose organiza-
tional control within Sewerage is perhaps attributable to the fact that this policy field 
is perceived by politicians as peripheral; with limited political ambitions and risks at-
tached to it. The applied complex financial accruals and the civil engineering nature 
of the sewer system tasks can possibly contribute to explaining this situation also.  
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Summary, aspects that explain roles of BPM 
The case study findings give support to aspects of the research framework, but also 
challenge the framework. Some aspects of the framework do seem to explain the 
way performance information is used for organizational control in Dutch local gov-
ernment. However some other aspects could rather be regarded as a starting point 
for further exploration.  
 
The indicated archetypal roles were not considered to be fully applicable to this em-
pirical research, and adjustments were necessary. Accounting theory and research 
findings suggested breaking down the archetypal roles of BPM use into different sub-
roles of BPM use. As was indicated before, seven different sub-roles of BPM use are 
applied:  
•  performance targeting (budget), 
• variance  analysis, 
•  status reporting (operational reporting), 
•  learning to change ways of doing (learning-to-do), 
•  unequivocally signaling of what is important (signaling), 
•  influencing next period budgets (budgeting), and 
•  reporting on past performances (organizational reporting). 
 
Some of these sub-roles of BPM use are applied limitedly throughout the four case 
studies. The standard sub-roles of BPM, recognized in this study, are: high level fi-
nancial variance analysis, budgets, operational reporting, influencing next period 
budget, and organizational reporting. These sub-roles can be described as standard 
roles of BPM. This study makes only limited suggestions on the extent to which these 
sub-roles are used. Additional research can give more detail, and can explain these 
standard roles of BPM more specifically. 
 
There is no evidence for the diagnostic use of variance analyses in the four cases, 
except for controlling high level financial performances. This suggests that perform-
ances are seldom controlled at arm’s length; textbook forms of organizational result 
or output control are limitedly applied in the four cases
162. Politicians and managers, 
controlling their organization, do not often rely solely on the performance information 
system. Formal task controls (such as process and project control) and informal or 
social controls (such as personnel and cultural controls) appear to operate to-
gether
163. BPM are often applied as norms in behavioral control systems, or are used 
for various reasons in the social setting of civil servants, politicians, and civilians. 
 
Aiming to include some more social control oriented sub-roles of BPM use, this study 
uses learning-to-do, signaling, and influencing next period budgets
164. These three 
                                            
162 This conforms to the findings of, for example, Bordewijk and Klaassen (2001), Van Helden (2001), 
Ter Bogt (2005).  
163 See for example Ouchi (1979), Hofstede (1981), Merchant and Van der Stede (2003). 
164 Influencing next period budget is regarded as a standard function of BPM-use, but the extent of use 
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sub-roles are somehow interrelated, as demonstrated clearly by the Welfare Pay-
ment case study findings. This suggests that the Earl and Hopwood’s archetypal 
“learning” and “ammunition” roles are more closely related than was initially as-
sumed
165. The Welfare Payment and Economic Policy case studies have demon-
strated that learning-to-do is conditional; learning-to-do is mainly expected when 
some kind of feed-back mechanism can evaluate performances by specific objec-
tives, and when organizational tasks can be adjusted accordingly. 
 
Many factors can influence the use and relevance of these three more social control 
oriented sub-roles of BPM
166. Case findings suggest that political interest or political 
risks are surely one of them. Sewerage is an example of a policy field in which politi-
cians have limited interest in using BPM at all. The involvement of politician’s in the 
reduction of Welfare Payment risks, or in stimulating the potential of Economic Policy 
showed political interest in achieving the main organizational objectives. The Spatial 
Planning case study pointed both to the specific opportunities this policy field offers 
to politicians to be personally involved in particular projects or tasks, and to the use 
of BPM to express specific issues. The findings in this case study suggest that sig-
naling, learning-to-do, and influencing future budgets are not always applied for con-
trolling organizational objectives, but are also used for facilitating specific operational 
tasks or political actions
167.  
 
The research framework assumes that the roles of BPM are related to task uncer-
tainty and a context of organizational control. Task uncertainty (expressed as the 
means-end relationship of tasks) provides explanations of the four case studies. 
However, the relationship between the case studies and the particular roles of BPM 
was more diffuse. Consequently, task uncertainty does not appear to clearly explain 
the roles of BPM in the four cases. The findings also suggest that two factors instead 
of one single factor explain a means-end relationship. Routineness of tasks ex-
presses the programmability of tasks, but the ability to evaluate operational tasks or 
performances on their contribution to organizational objectives appears to be impor-
tant too. This “contribution to objectives” is a new factor, and could be included in a 
revised research framework. 
 
Further adjustments to the framework could be suggested with regards to the con-
cepts and measures of the different contexts of control. A businesslike control con-
text was intended to express the technical rationale of control, by focusing on certain, 
                                            
165 This shows a resemblance to the concept of interactive controls (Simons, 1995, 2000). Simons 
defines his interactive controls by the interactive way managers use it. As he put it: “Interactive debate 
and dialogue takes places at all levels of the organization as new information is studied and analyzed. 
This ongoing discussion highlights the need for changing ways of doing things, changing value propo-
sitions, or even changing aspects of the business strategy” (Simons, 2000, p. 217). 
166 For example, measurability of tasks and outputs, political interest in the performance, scale of the 
organization, street-level discretion and linkage between objectives and performance indicators (Ter 
Bogt, 2004; Van Dooren, 2005).  
167 The use of BPM is likely to have more functions that defined by only organizational control. This 
study is however mainly concentrated on organizational control. Further research can explore this in 
more detail.  
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specific, and undisputed organizational objectives and integrated performances. 
Case findings do suggest that specific (measured by the factors: clarity, relevance, 
and integration) organizational objectives and operational performance measures are 
important characteristics of a businesslike control environment. Uncertain and undis-
puted objectives, however, appear to be less applicable in this study. Three remarks 
can be made. Firstly, uncertainty of objectives and unpredictability or uncontrollability 
of the external environment seem to overlap and were hard to separate in the four 
cases. Secondly, certainty of objectives is not clearly related to specific objectives 
and performance measures. The Welfare Payment case study, for example, shows 
that an uncertain or unpredictable external environment can even be regarded as 
stimulating a business rationale of control; the need to achieve unpredictable but 
specific objectives seems to force the organization to control in a more technical ra-
tional way. Thirdly, undisputed organizational objectives do not seem to relate to a 
businesslike control context (as in the Spatial Planning case).  
 
Using a political control context in this study was far from unproblematic too. The po-
litical control context was based on the notion that objectives are disputed and uncer-
tain, conflicting pressures of institutional parties on objectives exist, and on the im-
portance of political processes for organizational control. Welfare Payment particu-
larly illustrates a situation in which objectives are disputed but also unambiguous, 
and control is characterized as rational and goal-oriented. Spatial Planning illustrates 
a control context that is more characterized by the presence of ambiguous objectives 
than by disputed objectives. Therefore, it could possibly be assumed that rather the 
uncertainty or disputability of objectives, ambiguity of objectives best characterizes a 
political control context
168.  
Another factor was the potential confusion about the use of the word “political”. The 
use of the word “political” in “a political control context” and “a political control 
mechanism” suggests some similarity, which can cause some misunderstanding. In 
this study a political control context relates mainly to an institutional organizational 
setting in which achieving specific objectives is not put at a premium. Political control 
as a mechanism is a social control mechanism that can be applied in any control 
context
169. Re-naming the control contexts can thus be of some practical help
170. 
 
To summarize, this empirical research shows that certainty, predictability, or indis-
putability of objectives do not clearly relate to the technical rationale of control. Char-
acterizing a businesslike and political control context by using aspects of organiza-
tional objectives, as has been applied in this study, appears to explain a businesslike 
control insufficiently. Findings suggest a more bottom-up relationship; the use of op-
                                            
168 According to Hofstede (1981, p. 194) ambiguity of objectives is “the most critical criterion for man-
agement control” .He suggested three reasons for ambiguity: conflicts of perceived interest and val-
ues, lack of knowledge about means-end relationships, and environmental turbulence. 
169 Political control mechanisms, as informal control mechanisms, can be applied in a businesslike or a 
political control context.  
170 For example, by making reference to objective-focused (instead of a businesslike) or task-focused 
(instead of a political) control context.   150 
erational performances for achieving relevant and specific organizational objectives 
seems to be particularly important
171. 
 
The previous reflections bring about various suggestions for adjusting the research 
framework. Some more specific suggestions for a renewed framework are docu-
mented in one of the following sections. 
Observations with respect to the use of BPM 
Research question c) aims to explain the use of budgeted performance measures 
through the applied roles of BPM. The research framework had constructed BPM use 
by the design characteristics and quality of the accounting information system. The 
design characteristics measure aspects of scope and timeliness. In this study, infor-
mation on the design of AIS was collected by looking at the use of: (a) financial or 
non-financial pre-defined quantitative targets (budget), (b) information on actual ac-
complishments (actual), (c) variance information between actual and budget, and (d) 
additional information (on past performances, estimates, forecasts, and future 
events). Information on the quality of AIS was collected by using user satisfaction as 
a surrogate measure.  
 
Case study findings illustrated the use of different types of performance measures, 
but the measures of both design and quality of AIS appear to differ only to limited 
extent. Financial performance measures was used in all researched cases and ap-
peared to be fairly consistent throughout the cases.  
 
Variety in the use of non-financial performance measures appeared to be rather lim-
ited. In all the cases an emphasis on actual and budgeted performance measures for 
organizational control was registered. Only the Economic Policy case study revealed 
a limited use of actual performances, which conforms to the notion that the actual 
performance of Economic Policy is hard to measure within a short time-frame. Addi-
tional information was included in all cases, except the Sewerage case study. 
 
The cases showed limited variation in the quality of performance measure use. Con-
sequently, no assumptions could be made on the relationship between the quality of 
and the roles of BPM, but some additional interpretations could be made. 
 
Scope is measured by capturing: financial and non-financial, actual, budget, variance 
between actual and budgets, and additional information
172.The scope of performance 
measure use was valued in all four case studies as average or above, but differences 
in scope between the cases were limited. All case studies reported the use of finan-
cial and non-financial performance measures, and of the use of actual performances. 
Information on budgets appeared to be more prominently used in the Sewerage and 
Spatial Planning case than in the Welfare Payment and Economic Policy case stud-
                                            
171 This is in line with Hofstede’s (1981) suggestion that management control should relate to opera-
tional activities, and not to different types of organizations. 
172 such as estimates, forecasts, and future events  
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ies. In the Welfare Payment and Economic Policy studies, the emphasis appeared to 
be more on actual information. Additional information (such as forecasts, estimates, 
and other information) was seen in all case studies, except the Sewerage case study. 
Thus, it seems that scope of performance measure use does not present clear sug-
gestions about the relationship between roles and use of BPM. 
Towards an adjusted framework 
The findings and explorations of this study produce some indications and sugges-
tions which address the way performance measures are used in Dutch municipalities. 
The scientific significance of these results could be exaggerated if they are used to 
make firm assumptions and propositions. The following adjustments are therefore to 
be regarded merely as suggestions. These suggestions are formulated as hypothe-
ses
173 and need to be robustly tested in the future. 
 
The relevance of objectives and performances
174 for organizational control is likely to 
be the most important aspect for explaining the way performance measures are 
used. Objectives and performances must be relevant to the persons who are in-
volved in organizational control. But what defines relevance for organizational control 
is less straightforward. Case findings suggest that relevance of objectives and per-
formance for organizational control is primarily dependent on the interest of politi-
cians; performances are relevant for organizational control when a policy field is po-
litically sensitive
175. Objectives and performance measures, related to a politically 
insensitive policy field, seem to have limited use for organizational control.  
 
Research findings suggest that a policy field is politically sensitive if the tasks or ac-
tivities of this policy field are perceived by politicians as offering opportunities or 
causing risks.  
If a policy field’s tasks offer politicians opportunities, they are likely to offer the possi-
bility of fulfilling their political ambitions. Taking the Spatial Planning case findings as 
an example, politicians are involved in setting specific objectives and performances 
(setting a few of them in specific terms, but mostly in more ambiguous terms), are 
personally involved in some operational tasks, are using specific information about 
particular issues of political importance to address particular interests and for com-
munication with citizens. But to what extent these opportunities lead to organizational 
control, is not explicitly documented in this case study. If these opportunities are fu-
elled by local party political programs or by governance bodies (e.g. by central gov-
ernment), they will probably lead to the setting of objectives and budgeted perform-
                                            
173 All hypotheses relates to organizational control in Dutch local governmental organizations. 
174 Relevance, as documented in the initial research framework, is measured as a factor of specificity 
of objectives and by budgetary tightness. Both aspects were assume to indicate the perceived impor-
tance of objectives and budgeted performances for organizational control, but provide hardly any con-
trasting information on this subject. 
175 The relevance of political involvement, sensitiveness or interest for organizational control is also 
documented in public administration literature, and is often regarded as an aspect that explains per-
formance measurement use (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Van Dooren, 2005).   152 
ance targets
176. But politicians can see different opportunities between setting and 
achieving objectives and performance targets; the interest in setting objectives can 
differ considerably from the interest in achieving organizational results
177. 
 
Next to opportunities is the perception of risk surfacing as another cause for a policy 
field to be regarded as politically sensitive. Taking the Welfare Payment case study 
as an example, political risk can be related to significant financial deficits, operational 
malfunction that can lead to interventions by governance bodies, and the possibility 
of being held accountable for underperformances. 
 
Sewerage appears to be a policy field with limited politically sensitive tasks; politi-
cians see little opportunity or risk attached to them. Two observations were made 
here: (a) politicians appear to have a limited interest and involvement in the opera-
tional tasks, and (b) organizational control is loose; a desire to ensure the achieve-
ment of organizational objectives seems to be largely absent. 
The Sewerage case findings show that the roles of BPM are restricted to a set of 
standard roles
178, which are also observed in the three other cases. However, in 
these three other cases the use of some standard roles is often more intense (the 
use of BPM for budgeting and progress reporting) and is supplemented with other 
roles of BPM. 
 
Hypothesis 1  
Municipalities apply a set of standard roles of BPM-use throughout their organization, 
which can be regarded as a minimum set of (sub-) roles used to a minimum extent. 
Standard roles of BPM-use relate to diagnostically applied bottom-line financial con-
trol, to influencing and setting budgeted performance targets, and to reporting per-
formance progress at an operational and organizational level. 
 
The Sewerage case findings show that the main reliance on the standard roles of 
BPM-use relates to situation in which organizational control is loose, and the contri-
bution of tasks or performances to organizational objectives is perceived as relatively 
certain or predictable.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
If the tasks of a policy field are perceived as politically insensitive, then only the stan-
dard roles are being applied, the contribution of operational tasks or performances to 
organizational objectives is perceived as predictable, and organizational control is 
loose.  
                                            
176 In Spatial Planning, for example, specific objectives are set for bringing zone-planning up-to-date, 
in order to comply with national law. 
177 Organizational decision-making relates to organizational action, but “it would be naïve to assume 
that the connection was always a tight one” (Pollitt, 2001, p. 939). Pollitt (2001, p.940) added “In public 
administration, even determined implementation (action) does not necessarily lead to uniform or ex-
pected results”. 
178 These (sub) roles relates to the process and result of budgeting (influencing budgets and setting 
budget targets), to reporting progress (at operational and organizational level), and diagnostic use of 
highly aggregated financial (bottom-line) performances.  
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The Spatial Planning and Economic Policy case studies both document examples of 
political opportunities. In both case studies politicians appear to be more interested 
and involved in particular operational tasks than in controlling organizational objec-
tives. Organizational objectives appear to play a role, but are mostly used in a more 
social and political way. For example: objectives and performances are used for sig-
nalling unequivocally what is important and for influencing future budgeted perform-
ances. Both case studies also illustrate situations in which project control is important 
for operational control and organizational control is characterized as loose. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
If a policy field offers politicians an opportunity, politicians are interested in particular 
organizational objectives and operational performances or tasks, and are often per-
sonally involved in particular operational tasks. Organizational control is expected to 
be relatively loose.  
 
The case study findings provide some comprehensive suggestions on the aspects 
that can lead to the roles of BPM use in a politically risky situation. At least two con-
cepts seem to be useful: the businesslike control context and the organization’s abil-
ity to learn. 
 
Initially, the businesslike control context was defined by characterizing organizational 
objectives. Certainty, low levels of ambiguity, lack of multiplicity, and predictability 
were aspects used to define or measure this control context. Case study findings, 
however, suggest that the control context is basically dependent on the contribution 
of operational tasks or performance to achieving specific organizational objectives
179. 
This assumes that objectives give direction or motivation to operational tasks or per-
formances, and the integration of objectives and performances. This suggestion is 
used to redefine the businesslike control context.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
In a businesslike control context, operational tasks or performances contribute clearly 
to the achievement of specific objectives.  
 
This businesslike control context is seen the most clearly in Welfare Payment. Using 
this case study to characterize the businesslike control context in more detail, the 
following suggestions can be made: perceived political risks, objectives and perform-
ances are specific or unambiguous, organizational and operational objectives and 
performances are relatively integrated, limited task uncertainty, and organizational 
control is relatively tight. In this control context, all the documented (sub-) roles of 
BPM-use are applied. 
 
                                            
179 The suggestion that, for a meaningful classification from a management control viewpoint, the or-
ganization has to be broken down to the level of operational activities is also made by Hofstede 
(1981).   154 
Hypothesis 5 
A businesslike control context is mainly expected when a policy field is perceived as 
politically risky. Here control is tight. The roles of BPM-use relate to more intensively 
applied standard roles, and to signalling and learning. 
 
The findings of the Economic Policy case can be used to refine this politically risky 
situation. In Economic Policy the achievement of organizational objectives is per-
ceived as relevant, however control of achievements is hardly possible. Politicians 
perceive both the risks of underperformance (although they can not easily be held 
accountable for it) and the opportunities offered. Here the control context is charac-
terized as businesslike to some extent. Particular operational tasks (e.g. actions and 
special projects) are important and objectives are mostly used to signal important 
issues or specific interests. Economic Policy is used as an example of a politically 
risky policy field in a limited businesslike control context. 
 
Hypothesis 6 
If tasks are politically risky, but the control context is less businesslike, the emphasis 
of organizational control is on executing particular operational tasks. 
 
An additional observation can be made. Economic Policy and Spatial Planning differ 
on ambiguity of objectives (unambiguous and respectably mostly ambiguous) and on 
integration of organizational objectives and operational performances. However, they 
seem to differ far less on control context (intermediate businesslike or respectably 
political), and both appear to describe situations in which the interest of politicians is 
on particular operational tasks or performances. The applied (sub-) roles of BPM in 
both policy fields also show reasonable resemblances.  
 
Hypothesis 7 
If the emphasis is on particular operational tasks or performances, the roles of BPM 
relate to the standard roles and to signalling. 
 
Case study findings show that an organization’s ability to learn to change ways of 
doing is conditional. Learning-to-do is expected when an organization is able to 
change operational processes as a response to progress evaluation. If achieved per-
formances cannot be monitored and evaluated in time, and when tasks or processes 
cannot be adjusted in time, learning-to-do does not seem to be possible.  
 
Hypothesis 8 
Learning will only occur when an organization is able to change operational proc-
esses according to performance evaluations. 
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Figure 9 Adjusted research framework 
 
Figure 9 gives an overview of the adjusted framework. The four case studies can be 
positioned in it.  
The tasks in Sewerage appear to be politically insensitive (no political risks or oppor-
tunity), and Sewerage is positioned at A. Only the standard roles of BPM are being 
applied. 
The tasks of Economic Policy (some political risks, offering political opportunities) 
and Spatial Planning (no clear political risks, offering political opportunities) are re-
garded as politically sensitive, and both case studies are positioned at B. Organiza-
tional control is directed to ‘involved in’ and ‘achievement of’ particular objectives and 
performances. Standard roles of BPM are emphasized and signalling is applied. 
The tasks of Welfare Payment are seen as politically risky and the control context is 
businesslike. Organizational control is directed to achieving organizational objectives. 
This case study is positioned at C. Standard roles of BPM are more intensive (in par-
ticular influencing next period budget, budget targeting, and progress reporting) and 
signalling and learning are applied. 
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Discussion 
Still little is known about the way performance measurement and control is used in 
Dutch local government. Even after studying one organization in more detail, as in 
this study, only a few firm statements can be made. This is no surprise; both the sub-
ject and the methodological approach of this study were not expected to deliver ro-
bust results. Nevertheless, this exploration of the role of accounting in action, of the 
way budgeted performance measures contribute to organizational control, has re-
sulted in several conclusions and suggestions that can lead to an increased under-
standing. It has also addressed several points that should be discussed further. Two 
additional insights are discussed in the following section: the feed-forward of formal 
control, and differences in information use. 
Feed forward control 
It appears that operational performance reports are often used to evaluate and influ-
ence future instead of current processes and budgets.  
 
Control theory often assumes that status reports are used for the evaluation of the 
achievements in the current budget period
180; that they are an intertwined process of 
influencing operational processes with the purpose of ensuring achievement of or-
ganizational objectives and performances. The case study findings indicate that the 
actual applied control scheme often does not function as a mainly cyclic process, but 
as a longitudinal process; as a process of evaluating achieved performances for in-
fluencing the next period budget and processes
181. 
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Figure 10 Evaluation of budget and process 
 
                                            
180 Evaluation (a) in Figure 10. 
181 Evaluation (b) in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10 illustrates this mechanism. Reports on actual performances are often used 
to evaluate the next period budget and sometimes to change future operational proc-
esses. Budgets therefore appear to be based more on previous operational budgets 
and the forecasted consequences of current achievements, than guided by a top-
down process of translating organizational strategy and objectives into action.  
 
Individual case studies reveal more detail on this evaluation process. It appears that 
evaluation in order to change future processes and budgets is mainly seen in the 
Welfare Payment and Sewerage case
182. Both case studies relate to a businesslike 
context, indicated by specific objectives and low levels of task uncertainty. In a less 
businesslike control context the control processes appear to differ. In the Economic 
Policy and Spatial Planning case studies, decisions on (change of) budgets and proc-
esses seem to relate more loosely to this evaluation process. Setting performance 
targets seems to be based less on reports of actual operational achievements
183. As 
a consequence, future budgets seem to be mainly based on the evaluation of current 
budgets. However, this tentative analysis needs to be researched further before firm 
conclusions could be drawn.  
Performance information use 
The cases provided some additional insights into the differences in perception of the 
perceived level of quality of information use between the top of the organization and 
the operational level. The Welfare Payment and Economic Policy case study, for ex-
ample, demonstrated situations in which operational managers perceived a higher 
level of quality than top management and politicians. The Sewerage and the Spatial 
Planning case studies demonstrated a reverse situation. Here top management and 
politicians perceived the quality of information higher than operational management. 
However, often top management and politicians did not seem to use this information. 
Some more detailed interpretations can be made about this point. The Welfare Pay-
ment case, for example, demonstrated the relevance of performance information for 
organizational control. Process control is emphasized, and process-related informa-
tion is regarded as important. Operational management is recognized as the driver of 
the process-related information requirements; they are involved in the process of 
continuously improving management information. Operational management ap-
peared to be quite satisfied with the available information. Operational performance 
score cards had been developed and actual performance information was perceived 
by these managers as being increasingly sufficient, accurate, and timely. Higher in 
                                            
182 Both case studies differ significantly on this subject. In the Welfare payment case study, the evalua-
tion of operational performances (i.e. increase of welfare payments) results in changes in future proc-
esses (adjustments in special welfare) and operational and organizational budgets (changes in per-
formance targets). The Sewerage case study documents that evaluation of operational performances 
mainly relates to changes in future processes (for example to coordination and communication proc-
esses) and to operational planning (reschedule of projects).  
183 In the Economic policy case study, operational reports contain sparse information about perform-
ance variations. Actual information on achieved performances is often not available, and politicians 
and civil managers perceive performance targets and operational tasks as not directly related. The 
Spatial planning case findings illustrate that politicians and managers do not often apply performance 
targets for operational control.     158 
the organizational hierarchy, however, this information was valued less. Top man-
agement and responsible politicians expressed the need for more specific reports; 
the available standard operational performance information was not perceived as 
fully meeting their needs. Thus, this case demonstrated a situation in which perform-
ance-related information was produced by operational managers mainly for the pur-
pose of operational control. This information was valued by these managers, but their 
superiors valued the usability of this information less. 
The Sewerage and the Spatial Planning case studies documented the reverse situa-
tion: a higher perceived quality of management information at the top of the organiza-
tion. The case study reports did not document specific reasons for this effect, but 
some interpretations can be made. For example, both cases documented the domi-
nant use of projects for the execution of operational tasks. Two aspects of projects-
related organisations, in comparison with product-oriented organisations, can be of 
importance here. 
Firstly, authority of decision making in projects can differ significantly from that for 
products. Decision making in major projects is often directed to the top of the organi-
sation, resulting in the direct involvement of top management and responsible politi-
cians. This aspect is clearly documented in the Spatial Planning case study. Alder-
men, Council members, and civil directors participated actively in many projects, 
ranging from zone planning to zone development. 
Secondly, management information of projects can differ significantly from product-
related information. The cases documented standard approaches for planning and 
reporting of both projects and products at an operational level. At an operational 
level, products and projects are planned and reported by using pre-defined standards 
and rules, but on an organizational level, both planning and reporting approaches 
seem to differ. Products appeared to be regularly planned and reported in an aggre-
gated standard form by applying standard rules, but projects were reported often on 
a more individual basis. Specific information on major projects was documented in all 
organizational planning and reporting documents. 
Combining these two interpretations, top management and politicians seem to be 
more directly involved in the management of projects than in that of products, and 
seem to receive more non-standard information on projects than on products. This 
could explain the relatively higher level of user satisfaction at the top of the organiza-
tion in these situations. 
On the other hand, operational managers have to manage many individual projects, 
which often cannot be easily aggregated. The Spatial Planning case study docu-
mented this challenge most clearly. Operational managers of Spatial Planning re-
called the limited availability of management information for managing large numbers 
of projects. Information to support the operational management of a portfolio of pro-
jects was not well developed, which could explain a lower level of user satisfaction at 
an operational level. 
The above interpretations of the differences in perceived quality in the organization 
give some additional insight into information use, but do not reveal the relationship 
between the information use and the roles of BPM, or between the information use 
and the antecedents of the roles of BPM (the control context and the routineness of 
tasks).  
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Limitations  
The interpretations, suggestions and conclusions in this study must be evaluated by 
taking into account the strengths and limitations of this research. 
 
The main strength of this study is its combination of theoretical foundation and case-
based research methods. The theoretical foundation offers a sound basis for concep-
tualizing management control and accounting information use. The case research 
approach offers an analysis of both quantitative and qualitative findings, which was 
helpful in connecting the open research framework with several theories and empiri-
cal findings. 
 
This study also has some serious limitations. A more general limitation is related to 
the subject of this study: the relevance of budgeted performance measures for man-
agement control. The domain reached by management control is huge
184, and formal 
controls are only a part of the management control devices. But formal controls can 
not be studied in isolation; they are used by and for people and social and cultural 
forms of control are always present and relevant in one form or another. And lastly, 
budgetary control is only one type of formal control and is always operating in socially 
and politically characterized situations. Researching the relevance of budgeted per-
formance measures for organizational control, and the role of performance measures 
attached to them, is thus likely to be incomplete or imprecise. 
This study is incomplete because of its applied methodology (a more functional ex-
plorative case research approach) and focused use of theories (mainly mainstream 
accounting and organizational theory), and many behavioral scientists will miss the, 
in their opinion essential, theories (e.g. economics, sociology and psychology) and 
interpretive analyses. This study is imprecise, among other things, because of its in-
ability to quantify organizational control in general (which is, to my opinion, an omis-
sion in management accounting theory), and its choice not to quantify the relative 
importance of budgetary control in achieving organizational control (which was seen 
as beyond the scope of this research).  
 
This general limitation is accompanied by some more specific ones. This study has 
researched one particular organization within a specific timeframe, and composed a 
static picture of this organization. Limited information is presented on the historical 
and future developments of the researched organization, and the change in informa-
tion use through time is not shown. The organization could be going through a proc-
ess of change, with pertinent influences on this research, without being observed by 
the researcher. The selection of the organization and the case protocols have paid 
special attention to this issue, and did rule out major changes, but can not rule out 
this effect completely. 
The study of only four groups of organizational functions researched is another limita-
tion. This has limited this study to some pre-defined important tasks, but leaves many 
tasks unaddressed. An additional aspect of this selection of one organization, one 
                                            
184 It relates to “all the devices that managers use to ensure that the behavior and decisions of people 
in the organization are consistent with organization’s objectives and strategies” (Merchant, 1998).   160 
timeframe, and four organizational functions is that findings are hard to evaluate ob-
jectively. References to other organizations, tasks, and developments in time, are 
basically missing. Objective calibration of measurement instruments is therefore re-
placed by subjective interpretation.  
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6. Samenvatting (Nederlands)  
Inleiding 
Politieke bestuurders van Nederlandse gemeenten (zoals de gemeenteraadsleden, 
de burgemeester en de wethouders) leggen vaak veel nadruk op prestatiemeting. Zo 
staat in het collegeprogramma 2006-2010 van de gemeente Rotterdam: “Het college 
maakt scherpe keuzes en stelt prioriteiten. De nadruk ligt op de uitvoering. Er worden 
meetbare doelen gesteld waarover het college achteraf verantwoording aflegt”. Deze 
gemeente noemt dit “de Rotterdam aanpak”, maar ook bij vele andere gemeenten is 
al meerdere jaren een dergelijke boodschap te vinden. Collegeprogramma’s, pro-
grammabegrotingen, voortgangsrapportages, of andere belangrijke documenten van 
gemeenten leggen de laatste jaren de nadruk op het realiseren van vooraf vastge-
legde meetbare resultaten. 
 
Prestatiemaatstaven beogen doelstellingen en resultaten meetbaar te maken en met 
prestatiemeting kan de gemeente de beschikking krijgen over concrete en feitelijke 
prestatie-informatie. De interesse voor meetbare resultaten en prestaties is niet toe-
vallig. Overheden zijn al jarenlang bezig om de eigen organisatie op basis hiervan 
aan te sturen. Niet alleen om hiermee beter te gaan presteren, maar ook om op basis 
hiervan aan de eigen inwoners beter verantwoording af te leggen. Het bedrijfsleven 
fungeerde hierbij als rolmodel, waarbij het beeld van het commerciële bedrijf als een 
efficiënte en effectieve organisatie werd benadrukt (Hood, 1995). Van bedrijven werd 
namelijk verondersteld dat zij in staat waren om de door de klant gevraagde produc-
ten te maken tegen minimale kosten. Immers, de “tucht van de markt” zou er voor 
zorgen dat alleen de succesvolle bedrijven konden overleven. 
 
Overheidsorganisaties moesten dus meer “bedrijfsmatig” gaan werken, en de plan-
ning en de beheersing van de organisatie (planning en control) moest “verzakelijken”. 
Kijkende naar de Nederlandse gemeenten, kwam de nadruk te liggen op de techni-
sche en rationele aspecten van beheersing. Managementinformatie (zoals prestatie-
maatstaven) werd gezien als objectieve informatie die gebruikt werd voor rationele 
besluitvorming (zie bijvoorbeeld Van Helden en Ter Bogt, 2001; Ter Bogt, 2005). Het 
feit dat bedrijven eveneens uit groepen mensen bestaan, dat de organisatorische 
beheersing wordt uitgevoerd door mensen en met mensen, en dat politiek en macht 
ook in het bedrijfsleven belangrijke factoren zijn, leken naar de achtergrond te ver-
dwijnen. In de formele beheersing kwam de nadruk te liggen op meetbare “targets”, 
prestatiemeting, het analyseren van de verschillen tussen realisatie en targets, en 
het waar nodig bijsturen door en “afrekenen” van managers. 
 
In de afgelopen jaren is regelmatig onderzoek gedaan naar het gebruik van meetba-
re prestaties voor resultaatbeheersing bij gemeenten. Als dan resultaatbeheersing 
gedefinieerd werd vanuit het hiervoor beschreven technische gezichtpunt, werden 
vaak somber klinkende conclusies getrokken. Zo bleken prestatiemaatstaven zelden 
gebruikt te worden bij het motiveren en belonen van managers, en verschillenanaly-  162 
se (vergelijking van gerealiseerde met geplande prestaties) bleek geen grote rol te 
vervullen bij de organisatorische beheersing. Er werd geconcludeerd dat prestatie-
maatstaven hoofdzakelijk een symbolische en rituele functie hadden; resultaatbe-
heersing was wellicht meer een verhaal dan een feit (zie bijvoorbeeld Bordewijk en 
Klaassen, 2001; Pollitt, 2001). 
Deze conclusie sluit echter niet goed aan bij de mening van menig politicus en amb-
telijk manager bij Nederlandse gemeenten. Zij gaven juist aan dat prestatie-
informatie nuttig is gebleken bij het verbeteren van de informatievoorziening, en on-
derstreepten het belang van prestatiemeting voor de beheersing van de organisatie. 
 
Dit onderzoek concentreert zich op de hiervoor omschreven situatie. De onderzoeks-
vraag luidt: “Wat verklaart de rol van prestatiemeting bij de organisatorische beheer-
sing van Nederlandse gemeenten?” 
Onderzoekmodel 
Om deze onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden is eerst een literatuurstudie uitgevoerd. 
Het was de bedoeling om theorieën te selecteren die de rol van prestatiemeting in de 
praktijk konden verklaren. Deze theorieën moesten in staat zijn het gebruik van pres-
tatiemeting in een technische en een meer sociale en politieke context te verklaren. 
Echter, een voor dit onderzoek goed uitgewerkte theorie was niet voorhanden. Hier-
door heeft dit onderzoek zich geconcentreerd op het opstellen van een theoretisch 
model en het verkennen van de bruikbaarheid ervan in de praktijk. Het robuust toet-
sen van het model, bijvoorbeeld met behulp van statistische analyses, is daarmee 
buiten de kaders van het huidige onderzoek gekomen. 
 
Als startpunt voor het onderzoeksmodel is het traditionele basisraamwerk van Earl 
en Hopwood (1979) gebruikt. Dit is een weliswaar eenvoudig raamwerk, maar het 
biedt belangrijke aanknopingspunten voor het onderscheiden van verschillende rollen 
van prestatie-informatie. Er worden twee contingentievariabelen geïntroduceerd: on-
zekerheid over doelstellingen en onzekerheid over de uit te voeren taken. Bij twee 
waarden (“hoog” of “laag”) voor elk van deze contingentievariabelen leidt dat tot vier 
mogelijke combinaties van rollen van prestatie-informatie. In een matrix uitgezet, 
worden aldus vier cellen onderscheiden.  
In de eerste cel is er zekerheid over de doelstelling en over de taken waarmee de 
doelstellingen kunnen worden gerealiseerd. In deze situatie wordt verwacht dat het 
informatiesysteem alle antwoorden levert, en de verwachte rol wordt “weten” ge-
noemd. Organisatorische beheersing is hier gebaseerd op het technisch gebruiken 
van het informatiesysteem; de te behalen prestaties worden vooraf vastgesteld, en 
het informatiesysteem geeft alle informatie die nodig is om de organisatie bij te stu-
ren. 
Bij de tweede cel zijn doelstellingen zeker, maar zijn de uit te voeren taken onzeker. 
Nu probeert men te ontdekken of de uit te voeren taken leiden tot het halen van de 
doelstellingen. De bijbehorende rol wordt hier “leren” genoemd. De “weten”- en “le-
ren”-rol gaan beide uit van een meer technische kijk op sturen en beheersen. Vanuit 
een overheidsstandpunt kan gezegd worden dat deze rollen toegepast worden in een 
meer zakelijke of bedrijfsmatige beheerscontext.  
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De twee overige cellen beschrijven een situatie waarin de onzekerheid over de doel-
stellingen hoog is (bijvoorbeeld als de doelstellingen niet duidelijk zijn opgeschreven, 
of als er onenigheid in de organisatie is over de betekenis van de doelstellingen). Nu 
wordt verwacht dat het informatiesysteem anders gebruikt gaat worden en dat de 
invloed van politieke processen op de beheersing belangrijker wordt. Deze situatie 
wordt in dit onderzoek een politieke beheerscontext genoemd. Bij deze context wor-
den twee rollen verwacht: de “beïnvloeden”-rol en de “verantwoorden”-rol. “Beïnvloe-
den” wordt verwacht als de taakonzekerheid laag is; het informatiesysteem wordt hier 
gebruikt om invloed uit te oefenen op toekomstige financiële doelstellingen en presta-
ties. “Verantwoorden” wordt verwacht als er onzekerheid is over zowel de doelstellin-
gen als de taakuitvoering. De verwachting is hier dat het informatiesysteem alleen 
gebruikt kan worden om aan de omgeving uit te leggen dat de uitgevoerde taken zin-
vol zijn geweest. Figuur 1 geeft een overzicht van het basisraamwerk. 
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Figuur 1 Basisraamwerk  
Om dit basisraamwerk geschikt te maken voor verder onderzoek, is het aangepast 
en uitgewerkt. De belangrijkste aanpassing heeft betrekking op de definitie van een 
bedrijfsmatige en een politieke beheerscontext. In het basisraamwerk wordt hiervoor 
één aspect gebruikt: doelonzekerheid. Het gevolg hiervan is dat beide contexten el-
kaar uitsluiten en dat slechts één aspect een belangrijke rol speelt. Zoals eerder ge-
noemd, is het te verwachten dat het technisch en rationeel gebruik van prestatieme-
ting (hier aangegeven als een bedrijfsmatige beheerscontext) ook voorkomt in een 
meer politieke omgeving. Het onderzoeksmodel moet dus ruimte laten voor een der-
gelijke redenering. Om dit mogelijk te maken is de beheerscontext aan de hand van 
meerdere aspecten gedefinieerd. Een bedrijfsmatige beheerscontext wordt nu ge-
kenmerkt door: zekere en eenduidige doelstellingen, integratie tussen organisatori-
sche doelstellingen en operationele prestaties, en strak budgetbeheer. Een politieke 
beheerscontext wordt gekenmerkt door onzekere en meerduidige doelstellingen, de 
aanwezigheid van tegenstrijdige invloeden op deze doelstellingen, weinig integratie 
tussen organisatorische doelstellingen en operationele prestaties en los budgetbe-
heer.  
Praktijkonderzoek zou kunnen uitwijzen welke factoren in de praktijk van belang zijn, 
en welke rollen wellicht gelijktijdig aanwezig zijn. Om de verschillende rollen in de 
praktijk te herkennen, zijn de rollen verder uitgewerkt. Zo is van elke rol een karakte-  164 
ristieke beschrijving gegeven, en zijn aannames gemaakt over het hierbij horende 
gebruik van prestatie-informatie. 
 
Het hiervoor toegelichte onderzoeksmodel is gebruikt in een onderzoek, met als 
hoofddoel om de toepasbaarheid van het onderzoeksmodel in de praktijk verder te 
verkennen. Hiervoor zijn vier casussen binnen één gemeentelijke organisatie gese-
lecteerd. Het streven was om vooral casussen te selecteren die zo goed mogelijk 
een extreme positie in het basisraamwerk van Earl en Hopwood, en daarmee de vier 
verschillende, vooraf verwachte rollen zouden vertegenwoordigen. Dit heeft geleid tot 
het selecteren van vier casussen welke maximaal verschillende waarden zouden 
hebben voor beheerscontext en taakonzekerheid. De selectie is uitgevoerd aan de 
hand van interviews met de gemeentesecretarissen van 11 grote Nederlandse ge-
meenten (met circa 100.000 inwoners en meer). De geselecteerde casussen (en de 
vooraf verwachte rol) zijn: Riolering (“weten”-rol), Economisch Beleid (“leren”-rol), 
Bijstandsverlening (“beïnvloeden”-rol), en Ruimtelijk Beleid (“verantwoorden”-rol). 
 
Het praktijkonderzoek vond plaats bij de gemeente Leeuwarden. In het onderzoek 
stond het gebruik van prestatiemeting voor organisatorische beheersing centraal. Dit 
is de redenen dat vooral de relatie tussen de top van de organisatie (de wethouders) 
en de direct ondergeschikte ambtelijke laag (de ambtelijke topmanager) in het onder-
zoek is betrokken. Om aanvullende informatie te verzamelen is ook de relatie tussen 
ambtelijke top en de operationeel managers onderzocht. De interviews zijn in 2005 
en 2006 gehouden en hebben hoofdzakelijk betrekking gehad op de planning en 
rapportages behorende bij het begrotingsjaar 2004. 
Analyse 
De analyses van de casussen zijn op twee niveaus uitgevoerd. Als eerste is een glo-
bale analyse uitgevoerd, met als doel om de algemene relaties (zoals verwacht was 
in het basisraamwerk van Earl en Hopwood) te beoordelen. Daarna zijn de casussen 
in meer detail geanalyseerd, met als doel om aanvullende informatie en verklaringen 
te vinden. Hierna worden beide analyses kort samengevat. 
 
De algemene analyse geeft aan dat er drie belangrijke knelpunten in het basisraam-
werk blijken te zijn.  
 
Ten eerste blijkt uit de onderzochte casussen dat de relatie tussen de rol van presta-
tiemeting en de onderkende omgevingsfactoren (de beheerscontext en de taakonze-
kerheid) niet eenduidig was. Bepaalde rollen, of onderdelen ervan, zijn in alle casus-
sen gedocumenteerd. Zo bleek de verwachte relatie tussen zekerheid over doelstel-
lingen en taakuitvoering en de “weten”-rol (zoals werd verondersteld in het Earl en 
Hopwood  basisraamwerk) niet aanwezig te zijn. Zelfs bij Rioleringen, gepositioneerd 
in een omgeving waarin de “weten”-rol het meest duidelijk aanwezig zou zijn, werd 
prestatiemeting nauwelijks gebruikt als een belangrijke bron van organisatorische 
beheersing. Daarnaast overlapten, zoals eerder was verwacht, een bedrijfsmatige en 
politieke context elkaar. De Bijstandsverlening-casus geeft bijvoorbeeld aan dat te-
genstrijdige invloeden op de gemeentelijke doelstelling niet leidden tot meerduidige  
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of onduidelijke doelstellingen en prestaties. Tegelijkertijd bleek hier dat het gebruik 
van specifieke doelstellingen en prestaties de onbeheersbaarheid van de doelstellin-
gen niet verminderde, en een stimulans was om de voortgangsrapportages te verbe-
teren. Uit de Ruimtelijk Beleid-casus komt naar voren dat meerduidige doelstellingen 
ook in een weinig politieke beheerscontext aanwezig waren, en dat meerduidigheid 
van doelstellingen een functie had bij het stimuleren of ondersteunen van toekomsti-
ge ontwikkelingen. 
Dit diffuse beeld kan beïnvloed zijn doordat de casussen in de praktijk niet de eerder 
verwachte extreme posities in het basisraamwerk bleken in te nemen. De Econo-
misch Beleid en Ruimtelijk Beleid casussen kunnen niet duidelijk aan één van de 
contexten gerelateerd worden, en de Bijstandsuitkering-casus heeft kenmerken van 
zowel een bedrijfsmatige (specifieke en geïntegreerde doelstellingen) als een politie-
ke (tegenstrijdige invloeden op de doelstellingen) beheerscontext. 
 
Ten tweede zijn de rollen in de praktijk niet vaak als geheel waargenomen, terwijl 
delen van rollen (subrollen) vaak wel herkenbaar waren. Als voorbeeld, de “weten”-
rol zelf is vrijwel niet geobserveerd. Alleen met betrekking tot beheersing van organi-
satorisch sterk geaggregeerde financiële prestaties is deze rol aangetroffen, en wel 
binnen alle casussen. Echter, als de onderdelen van de “weten”-rol (normstelling of 
budget targeting, voortgangsrapportage, en verschillenanalyse) in de analyse worden 
betrokken, dan blijkt dat met name verschillenanalyse nauwelijks een functie had bij 
de organisatorische beheersing. De overige subrollen zijn in alle casussen wel waar-
genomen. Ook bij de “leren”-rol (op te delen in: signaleren en leren te veranderen) en 
de “beïnvloeden”-rol (op te delen in: signaleren en beïnvloeding toekomstige budget-
ten) waren de subrollen in de praktijk beter herkenbaar dan de rol zelf. 
 
Ten derde blijkt uit de casussen dat er weinig variatie was in het gebruik van verschil-
lende soorten prestatiemaatstaven, zeker als vooral de planning en control documen-
ten op organisatorisch niveau in beschouwing worden genomen. In alle vier de ca-
sussen bleken prestatiemaatstaven redelijk vergelijkbaar in soort en gebruik. De in-
formatie over financiële en niet-financiële prestaties, in begrotingen, voortgangsrap-
portages en verantwoordingsrapportage, was in alle casussen redelijk vergelijkbaar 
in hoeveelheid en kwaliteit. Een duidelijke relatie tussen de rol van prestatiemeting 
en het gebruik van prestatiemaatstaven kwam daarmee niet naar voren.  
Wel kwam naar voren dat in sommige gevallen prestatiemeting gebruikt werd voor 
leren en signaleren, en dat deze informatie op een meer interactieve manier werd 
gebruikt.  
 
Om inzicht te krijgen in het gebruik van prestatiemeting om te (signa)leren, is een 
meer gedetailleerde analyse uitgevoerd. 
  
“Leren” en de onderdelen “signaleren” en “leren te doen” is het meest duidelijk gedo-
cumenteerd in de Bijstandsverlening-case. Verantwoordelijke politici en managers 
werden hier geconfronteerd met serieuze financiële en politieke risico’s en onvoor-
spelbare omstandigheden. De beheersing van toekomstige financiële prestaties was 
van groot belang; de gemeente liep grote financiële risico’s als gevolg van onzekere   166 
ontwikkeling van het aantal bijstandsgerechtigden en de toekomstige financiële bij-
dragen van de Rijksoverheid. Maar ook een juiste uitvoering van de wet (Wet Werk 
en Bijstand) was belangrijk. Politici en managers trachtten te reageren op deze situa-
tie, en bleken prestatiemeting te gebruiken voor signaleren en leren. Prestatiemeting 
bleek vaak geschikt als signaal, of zoals een wethouder het uitdrukte “prestaties nes-
telen zich in het collectieve geheugen”. Tegelijkertijd werd er ingezet op het verbete-
ren van de operationele voortgangrapportage. Een vorm van operationele balanced 
scorecard werd ontwikkeld, met als doel financiële en niet-financiële prestaties beter 
meetbaar te maken en in samenhang te rapporteren. Ook werd een maandelijkse 
rapportage ontwikkeld om zo snel mogelijk geïnformeerd te zijn over de ontwikkeling 
van de gerealiseerde prestaties. Opvallend was dat deze voortgangsinformatie niet 
zozeer leidde tot het direct bijsturen van operationele processen of huidige prestatie-
budgetten. Een voortgangsrapportage werd eerder gebruikt om beslissingen te ne-
men over toekomstige budgetten en bijbehorende processen. Signaleren, leren te 
doen, en beïnvloeden van toekomstige budgetten, waren in deze casus dus gelijktij-
dig aanwezig. 
  
Ook de casussen Economisch Beleid en Ruimtelijk Beleid geven aanvullende inzich-
ten met betrekking tot de “signaleren“-rol. In beide casussen werd prestatiemeting 
duidelijk gebruikt in de communicatie tussen politici en het operationele manage-
ment. Bij Economisch Beleid gaf de werkgelegenheidsdoelstelling voor alle betrok-
kenen duidelijk aan wat het overkoepelende eindresultaat moest zijn (of zoals de 
gemeente het zelf noemt, gaf het “gewenst effect” aan). De hierbij behorende presta-
tiemaatstaf gaf echter geen concrete richting aan de uit te voeren werkzaamheden. 
Het gebruik van prestatiemeting voor het aanpassen van processen, of “leren te 
doen”, ontbrak hier volledig. Wel bleek de prestatiemaatstaf toegepast te worden als 
impliciete motivatie in menig beleidsvoorstel. In de Ruimtelijke Beleid-casus bleek 
prestatiemeting niet zozeer betrekking te hebben op de overkoepelende hoofddoel-
stelling, maar gaf deze eerder richting aan specifieke projecten binnen dit beleids-
veld. Prestatiemaatstaven werden hier gebruikt om het belang van bepaalde beslis-
singen binnen specifieke projecten te benadrukken. Ook “leren te doen” bleek hier te 
ontbreken. In beide casussen participeerden politici actief in operationele acties.  
Reflectie 
Samengevat, laten de vier casussen zien dat bij de organisatorische beheersing van 
gemeenten, een bepaalde mix van (onderdelen) van rollen van prestatiemeting stan-
daard aanwezig was. Deze standaardrol is een samenstelling is van de volgende 
onderdelen: 
•  de gehele “weten”-rol (budget targeting, voortgangsrapportage, en verschil-
lenanalyse) met betrekking tot geaggregeerde financiële prestatiemaatstaven; 
•  delen van de “weten”-rol (budget vaststellen, voortgangsrapportage) voor alle 
overige begrote prestatiemaatstaven; 
•  een deel van de “beïnvloeden” rol (beïnvloeden van komend budget), voor alle 
begrote prestatiemaatstaven; 
•  en de “verantwoorden” rol, voor alle begrote prestatiemaatstaven. 
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Op basis van dit onderzoek wordt geconcludeerd dat het basisraamwerk van Earl en 
Hopwood niet zonder meer bruikbaar is om de in de casussen gevonden situaties te 
verklaren. Een eenduidige relatie tussen de rol van prestatiemeting en contextuele 
factoren (zoals onzekerheid over doelstellingen en taakuitvoering) is niet aange-
toond. In tegendeel, prestatiemeting vervult eerder een standaardrol die in alle situa-
ties aanwezig is.  
 
In aanvulling op deze standaardrol komen leren en signaleren voor, maar alleen in 
specifieke situaties. De Bijstandsverlening-casus geeft daarbij aan dat leren en sig-
naleren relaties hebben met aspecten van een “bedrijfsmatige” (zoals specifieke en 
geïntegreerde doelstellingen en prestaties) en een “politieke” (zoals conflicterende 
invloeden op doelstellingen) beheerscontext. Dit duidt op een zakelijke beheersing in 
een als politiek gekenschetste beheersomgeving. 
 
Het onderzoek geeft aan dat het gebruik van prestatiemeting voor leren en signale-
ren gerelateerd is aan het beheersen van politiek gevoelig activiteiten. Politiek ge-
voelig heeft hier betrekking op de aanwezigheid van politieke risico’s (financiële en 
uitvoeringsrisico’s, zie de Bijstandsverlening-casus) of politieke kansen (actieve par-
ticipatie van politici in operationele activiteiten, zie de casussen Economisch Beleid 
en Ruimtelijk Beleid). Leren is alleen aangetoond in een situatie waarin organisatori-
sche doelstellingen en prestaties richting geven aan uitvoerende activiteiten (zie de 
Bijstandsverlening-casus).  
 
Opgemerkt wordt dat deze resultaten gebaseerd zijn op slechts vier verschillende 
casussen in één organisatie, binnen één tijdsperiode. Aanvullend onderzoek zal mis-
schien kunnen aantonen in hoeverre de hier gevonden conclusies houdbaar zijn voor 
meerdere taken bij meerdere gemeenten. 
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7. Appendixes 
Appendix I  Tables 
Construct Aspect  Assumed  value  Measures 
Businesslike context  Uncertainty of objectives  (Relative) low  Goal specificity 
  Ambiguity of objectives  (Relative) low  Multiplicity  
 Integrated  BPM  (Relative)  integrated Goal  specificity 
  Tightness of budgetary control  (Relative) tight  Tolerance for deviation 
     Detailed  follow-ups 
     Intensity  of  discussions 
      Emphasis on targets 
Political context  Uncertainty of objectives  (Relative) high   
  Ambiguity of objectives  (Relative) high   
  Integrated BPM  (Relative) disintegrated   
  Tightness of budgetary control (Relative)  loose   
Task  Uncertainty  Routiness    task analyzability and num-
ber of exceptions 
BPM roles  Role description    phrase 
BPM use  Design of AIS    financial/ non-financial, 
actual/budget, variance, and 
additive information. 
  Quality of AIS    ease of use, content, accu-
racy, format, and timeliness 
Table 28 Constructs and aspects 
 
 
 
Information\ Roles  Answering role Learning  role Ammunition  role Rationalizing  role 
(I) Actual  expected expected   emphasis 
(II) Budget  expected expected  emphasis  
(III) Variance  emphasis expected    
(IV) Additive   emphasis    
Table 29 Information-related aspect of BPM use 
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high multiplicity
185 low 
7  Spatial Planning  Child care  0 
6  Housing  Social and cultural policies and support  0 
4  Public safety  Environmental care  0 
3  Roads  District and villages development  0 
2  Industry and small businesses  Traffic control  0 
2  Welfare Payment and Income provision Roads 0 
2 Spatial  development  Housing  0 
2  Development and  Real estate   Development and  Real estate   1 
1  Traffic control  Public safety  1 
1 Public  transport  Spatial Planning  1 
1 Sports  Welfare Payment and Income provision  2 
1  Social and cultural policies and support  Industry and small businesses  2 
1  Environmental care  Public transport  2 
0  Primary schools  Waste collection and disposal  3 
0 Public  libraries  Arts  3 
0 Arts  Primary  schools  3 
0 Child  care  Building  permits  4 
0  Waste collection and disposal  Public libraries  4 
0  Sewerage and water disposal  Sewerage and water disposal  4 
0 Building  permits  Sports  4 
Table 30 Level of multiplicity 
 
 
high  routineness
185  low 
5  Welfare Payment and Income provision Child care  0 
5  Sewerage and water disposal  Arts 0 
4  Building permits  Environmental care  0 
3 Roads  Primary  schools  0 
3  Public transport  Public libraries  0 
3  Public libraries  Public transport  0 
3  Primary schools  Waste collection and disposal  1 
2 Sports  Welfare Payment and Income provision  1 
2  Waste collection and disposal  Building permits  1 
1 Public  safety  Sewerage and water disposal  1 
1 Child  care  Sports  1 
1  Housing  District and villages development  1 
0  Traffic control  Development and  Real estate   2 
0  Industry and small businesses  Industry and small businesses  2 
0 Arts  Public  safety  2 
0  Social and cultural policies and support  Roads  2 
0 Environmental  care  Housing  2 
0  Spatial Planning  Social and cultural policies and support  3 
0  District and villages development  Traffic control  3 
0  Development and  Real estate   Spatial Planning  5 
Table 31 Level of routineness 
                                            
185 Number of times selected by interviewees.  
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C1  Does the system provide the precise information you need? 
C2  Does the information content meet your needs? 
C3  Does the system provide reports that seem to be exactly about what you need? 
C4  Does the system provide sufficient information? 
A1  Is the system accurate? 
A2  Are you satisfied with the accuracy of the system? 
F1  Do you think the output is presented in a useful format? 
F2  Is the information clear? 
E1  Is the system user friendly? 
E2  Is the system easy to use? 
T1  Do you get the information you need in time? 
T2  Does the system provide up-to-date information? 
Table 32 EUCS instrument questions 
 
 
City 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   00 - 04 
Alkmaar 92.836  93.022 92.992 93.390 94.130 1,4% 
Almere 142.765  150.398 158.902 165.106 170.943  19,7% 
Amersfoort 126.143  128.035 129.720 131.221 132.955  5,4% 
Apeldoorn 153.261  153.683 154.859 155.741 155.979  1,8% 
Arnhem 138.154  139.329 140.736 141.528 141.747  2,6% 
Breda 160.615  162.308 163.427 164.397 165.831  3,2% 
Delft 96.095  96.180 96.936 96.588 95.653  -0,5% 
Dordrecht 119.821  120.021 120.222 120.043 119.578  -0,2% 
Ede 101.700  102.405 103.708 104.771 105.482  3,7% 
Eindhoven 201.728  203.397 204.776 206.118 207.910  3,1% 
Emmen 105.972  107.422 108.367 108.198 108.251  2,2% 
Enschede 149.505  150.449 151.346 152.321 152.996  2,3% 
Groningen 173.139  174.250 175.569 177.172 179.216  3,5% 
Haarlem 148.484  148.377 147.831 147.097 146.931  -1,0% 
Haarlemmermeer 111.155  113.553 118.553 122.902 127.392 14,6% 
Heerlen 95.147  95.149 95.004 93.969 93.451  -1,8% 
Leeuwarden 88.887  89.453 90.516 91.284 91.357  2,8% 
Leiden 117.191  117.022 117.170 117.689 118.884  1,4% 
Maastricht 122.070  122.163 122.005 121.982 122.449  0,3% 
Nijmegen 152.200  153.705 154.616 156.198 157.490  3,5% 
's-Gravenhage 441.094  442.356 457.726 463.826 469.402 6,4% 
's-Hertogenbosch 129.034  130.477 131.697 132.501 133.628  3,6% 
Sittard-Geleen 97.950  97.950 97.953 97.806 97.486  -0,5% 
Tilburg 193.116  195.819 197.358 197.917 198.753  2,9% 
Venlo 64.864  90.500 91.400 91.780 92.042 41,9% 
Utrecht 233.667  256.420 260.625 265.151 270.089 15,6% 
Zaanstad 135.762  136.115 137.669 139.464 139.733  2,9% 
Zoetermeer 109.941  110.129 110.500 112.594 114.131  3,8% 
Zwolle 105.801  107.373 109.000 109.955 110.866  4,8% 
© Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek,Voorburg/Heerlen 08-06-2004 
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Appendix II  Researched documents 
General municipal documents   
English Dutch 
Executive program 2002-2006  Collegeprogramma 2002-2006 
Description of products (Program Budget) Productomschrijving  Programmabegroting 
Description of products (Sector plan) Productomschrijving  Sectorplan 
Guidelines Annual Report  Richtlijnen Jaarrekening 
Quick scan Program Budget  Quick Scan Programmabegroting 
  
 
Municipal documents 2004 en 2005 
English Dutch 
Input Pre-budget Report 2004  Input Kaderbrief 2004 
Financial Position 2004  Financiële positie 2004 
Pre-budget Report 2004  Kaderbrief 2004 
Program Budget 2004, key decisions  Beslisdocument Programmabegroting 2004 
Program Budget 2004  Programmabegroting 2004 
Response to Council’s questions on Program 
Budget 2004 
M van Antwoord Programmabegroting 2004 
Interim Report 2004  TURAP 2004 
Annual Report 2004  Jaarrekening 2004 
Response to Council’s questions on Annual Re-
port 2004 
Memorie van Antwoord Jaarrekening 
Executive Program 1002-2006  Collegeprogramma 2002-2006 
Description of products (Program Budget) Productomschrijving  Programmabegroting 
Description of products (Sector plan) Productomschrijving  Sectorplan 
Medium-term objectives 2005-2009  Meerjarenbeleidskader 2005-2009 
Input Pre-budget Report 2005  Input Kaderbrief 2005 
Financial Position 2005  Financiële positie 2005 
Pre-budget Report 2005  Kaderbrief 2005 
Program Budget 2005, key decisions  Beslisdocument Programmabegroting 2005 
Program Budget 2005  Programma Begroting 2005 
Response to Council’s questions on Program 
Budget 2005 
M van Antwoord Programmabegroting 2005 
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Operational documents Welfare Payment 2004 en 2005 
English Dutch 
Sector Plan 2004  Sectorplan 2004 
Operational Audit Social Affairs  Operational Audit Sociale Zaken 
Operational Report 2004  Verslagen van uitvoering 2004 
Sector Plan 2005  Sectorplan 2005 
Interim Report 2004-I  Kwartaalrapportage - I 
 
Operational documents Sewerage 2004 en 2005 
 
English Dutch 
Sector Plan 2004  Sectorplan 2004 
Quarterly Report 2004-I  Kwartaalrapportage 2004 - I 
Quarterly Report 2004-II  Kwartaalrapportage 2004 - II 
Quarterly Report 2004-III  Kwartaalrapportage 2004 - III 
Sector Annual Report 2004  Sectorrekening/Sectorrapportage 2004 
Sector Plan 2005  Sectorplan 2005 
Quarterly Report 2005-I  Kwartaalrapportage 2005 - I 
  
  
Operational documents Economic Policy 2004 en 2005 
English Dutch 
Sector Plan 2004  Sectorplan 2004 
Quarterly Report 2004-I  Kwartaalrapportage 2004 - I 
Quarterly Report 2004-II  Kwartaalrapportage 2004 - II 
Quarterly Report 2004-III  Kwartaalrapportage 2004 - III 
Sector Annual Report 2004  Sectorrekening/Sectorrapportage 2004 
Sector Plan 2005  Sectorplan 2005 
Quarterly Report 2005-I  Kwartaalrapportage 2005 - I 
  
 
Operational documents Spatial Planning 2004 en 2005 
English Dutch 
Sector Plan 2004  Sectorplan 2004 
Quarterly Report 2004-I  Kwartaalrapportage 2004 - I 
Quarterly Report 2004-II  Kwartaalrapportage 2004 - II 
Quarterly Report 2004-III  Kwartaalrapportage 2004 - III 
Sector Annual Report 2004  Sectorrekening/Sectorrapportage 2004 
Sector Plan 2005  Sectorplan 2005 
Quarterly Report 2005-I  Kwartaalrapportage 2005 - I 
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Appendix III  Interviewed persons 
concern:     function:  (Dutch) 
Mr. drs. C.H.J. Brugman     gemeentesecretaris   
Mr. drs. D. Tuijtjens     concerncontroller   
Mr. W. Koopmans      medewerker concernstaf   
 
Welfare Payment: 
Mr. T. van Mourik  wethouder cultuur, vastgoed, grondzaken, econo-
mische zaken, werkgelegenheid en sociale zaken
    
Ms. D. Bouma      directeur dienst Welzijn     
Mr. drs. H. Jansen      controller dienst Welzijn   
Mr. W. J.A. van Rijnsoever  sectormanager sociale zaken   
Ms. mr. drs. J.A. Probst    sectormanager werk en inkomen 
Mr. W. de Boer      teamleider sociale zaken, sociale recherche Fryslân 
 
Sewerage 
Mr. drs. W.R. Sluiter  wethouder van Volkshuisvesting, Stedelijke Ver-
nieuwing, Wijkcoördinatie, Grote Steden Beleid, 
Beheer Openbare Ruimte 
Mr. drs. ing. H. de Haas  directeur dienst Stadsontwikkeling 
Ms. M. Vogelezang  sectormanager Wijkzaken 
Mr. ing. W. Bosch  coördinator ondergrondse infrastructuur en water-
huishouding 
Mr. ing. J.C.C.M. Eijssen teamleider  Bedrijfsbureau 
 
Economical policies 
Mr. T. van Mourik  wethouder cultuur, vastgoed, grondzaken, econo-
mische zaken, werkgelegenheid en sociale zaken
  
Mr. drs. ing. H. de Haas  directeur dienst Stadsontwikkeling en -beheer 
Mr. J.W. Doetjes  sectormanager Grond, Economie, en Vastgoed 
Mr. mr. H. Besselse  hoofd Economische Zaken 
 
Spatial Planning 
Ms. M. Waanders  wethouder 
Mr. drs. ing. H. de Haas  directeur dienst Stadsontwikkeling 
Mr. ing. G. Hendriksma  teamleider Ruimtelijke Ordening 
Mr. L. Kappert  sectorhoofd Ruimtelijke Ontwikkeling en Inrichting 
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Appendix IV Organizational structure of Leeuwarden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council 
Board of Mayor and Alder-
men (executive board) 
CEO (civil) 
City development depart-
ment  
Welfare department  Service Department 
Management 
Fire Department 
Registry 
Control Staff  
Financial Services 
Communication 
Facilities and General Purchase
Historic Centre Leeuwarden 
Legal and Safety 
HRM 
Public Affairs 
Public Space management 
Building and Living 
Land, Economic Policy, and 
Real Estate 
Administration 
Management 
Youth and Education 
Social and Cultural develop-
ment  
Social Affairs 
Work and Income 
Assistance and Sports 
Environment 
Projects 
Spatial Planning and Devel-
opments   176 
Appendix V  Programs and products 
1C u l t u u r Welzijn 8 Publieke dienstverlening Algemene Zaken (AZ)
Kunst en Cultuur Persoonsinformatie
Gemeente archief Identificerende documenten
Cultuurhistorisch beheer
Kwaliteit gebouwede omgeving
Burgerlijke stand
2O n d e r w i j s Welzijn
Hoger onderwijs 9 Politiek bestuur Algemene Zaken
Basis- en voortgezet onderwijs Politiek bestuur
Leerlingenzorg Bestuursondersteuning directeur
Onderwijs-achterstandbestrijding Secretariaat raadsadviescommissies
Volwasseneducatie Kabinetszaken
Verkiezingen
3 Economie en Toerisme SOB Griffe
Economisch Beleid
Bedrijfslocaties 10 Veiligheid, openbare orde en handhaving AZ
Markten Integraal veiligheidsbeleid
Standplaatsen Brandweer
Vastgoedbeheer Rampenbestrijding
Grondzaken Handhaving openbare orde
Recratiegebieden Milieuvergunning
Recreatievaart Bouw- en woningtoezicht
Kermissen
Toerisme 11 Sport Welzijn
Sport en ontspanning
4 Zorg en Opvang Welzijn IJswegen
Sociale integratie achterstandsgroepen
Opvang en zorgverlening 12 Ruimtelijke ordening, wijken en dorpen SOB
Maatschappelijke acceptatie Ruimtelijke ordening
Bestuurlijke projecten (LSB) Bestuursadvisering (ROI)
Geometriebeheer
5 Werk en Inkomen Welzijn Benoeming openbare ruimte
Minimabeleid Wijkaanpak
Inkomensvoorziening Armoedebestrijding
Arbeidsmarkt en sociale (re)integratie 13 Milieu SOB
Inzameling afval
Riolering
Milieubeleid
6W o n e n SOB Begraafplaatsen
Woningmarktbeleid Lijkbezorging
Overige huisvesting Bedrijven
Beleid ISV Bodem en geluid
Volkshuisvestings-regelingen Milieucommunicatie
Stadsvernieuwingen Ongedierte bestrijding
Voorziening honden
7 Infrastructuur / Bereikbaarheid SOB Afvoer kadavers
Openbaar vervoer
Spoorlijnen 14 Woon- en leefomgeving SOB
Waterwerken Straatverlichting
Verhardingen Reiniging verhardingen
Kunstwerken Openbaar groen
Verkeersmaatregelen Zwervuil bestrijding
Verkeer en Vervoer Speelplaatsen
Parkeren Buitenreclame
15 Algemene dekkingsmiddelen
16 Onvoorzien
Voorwaarden arbeids/sociale participatie 
(kinderopvang)
Advisering derden anturalisatie, 
naamswijziging e.d.
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Appendix VI  Costs and income of programs 
 
  *€1000.000  budget budget
  Costs of Programs  2004 2005
001 Culture  10,232 10,157
002 Education  39,550 37,360
003  Economy and Tourism  22,573 31,048
004 Care  and  reception  26,444 25,252
005  Work and Income  105,937 100,886
006 Housing  30,190 28,827
007 Infrastructure    24,238 18,286
008 Public  Services  2,317 2,537
009 Council  6,267 6,665
010  Safety, public order  6,059 6,078
011 Sport  5,338 5,492
012  Spatial Planning  2,703 3,187
013  Environment  25,737 26,718
014  Living and environment  8,399 8,507
015  General financial means   25,824 31,565
016 Miscellaneous  0,412 0,308
 Total  342,220 342,873
 
  *€1000.000  budget budget
  Income of Programs  2004 2005
001 Culture  -0,524 -0,301
002 Education  -26,583 -23,357
003  Economy and Tourism  -20,829 -28,160
004 Care  and  reception  -11,752 -11,204
005  Work and Income  -86,706 -83,137
006 Housing  -28,228 -26,656
007 Infrastructure    -14,185 -8,097
008 Public  Services  -1,212 -1,278
009 Council  -0,540 -0,346
010  Safety, public order  -0,204 -0,169
011 Sport  -0,045 -0,023
012  Spatial Planning  -0,456 -0,484
013  Environment  -13,333 -15,651
014  Living and environment  -0,986 -0,987
015  General financial means   -136,635 -143,026
016 Miscellaneous 
 Total  -342,218 -342,876
 
(Source: Program Budget 2004, page 187, and Program Budget 2005, page 161) 
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Appendix VIII  Summary of Aspects 
  Welfare Payment Sewerage Economical  Policy Spatial  Planning 
Indication of a:      
- businesslike context  yes yes limited limited 
- political context  yes no no limited 
      
Specificity of objectives above  average high average below  average 
a.  integration of objec-
tives and performance 
measures 
a. objectives and performances 
are integrated 
a. objectives and performances 
are integrated  
a. objectives and perform-
ances are indirectly inte-
grated  
a. limited, partly for zone plan-
ning 
b. relevance  b. objectives and performances 
are relevant 
b. objectives and performances 
are relevant 
b. objectives and perform-
ances are relevant 
b. objectives are relevant 
c. clarity  c.  objectives are clear to some 
extent 
c.  objectives are clear   c.  objectives are clear but 
hardly operational 
c.  objectives are clear, but  
often formulated in general 
terms 
d. priority   
 
d. objectives are not prioritized  d. technical objectives are used 
for prioritizing projects 
d. objectives are not prioritized  d. objectives are not prioritized 
      
Multiplicity of objectives above  average low low below  average 
a. conflicting  pressures 
 
 
a. conflicting pressures exerted 
from central government, 
Council, and management  
a. no clear conflicting exerted 
pressures  
 
a. no clear conflicting exerted 
pressures 
a. conflicting pressures exerted 
from different  organisational 
sectors  
 
Tightness of budgetary 
control 
average below  average below  average below  average 
a.  intolerance for interim 
budget variations  
a. limited  a. limited,   a. limited financial,   a. limited  
b. detailed  budget-items 
follow-up  
b. average, mainly on non-
financial actual perform-
ances operational level 
b. limited details on organiza-
tional level, many details on 
operational level 
b. limited details on organiza-
tional level,  
b. limited details on organiza-
tional level, many details on 
operational level 
c.  intensity of budget-
related communication 
c.  average, high intensity on 
operational level, low on or-
ganisational level 
c. limited  c. limited    c. limited 
d.  emphasis on short-
term budget targets 
d.  average, mainly on financial 
budgets 
d. average, mainly on financial 
budgets 
d. limited  d. limited  
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Routineness of tasks high average low average 
analyzability and repetition    high    high routineness of tasks, 
but many unexpected cir-
cumstances during execu-
tion of tasks 
  many different tasks, no well 
known ways of doing things 
  many well defined tasks, but 
hard to plan in advance  
 
Roles/sub-roles 
 of BPM use 
all   operational planning and 
status reporting  
signaling and reporting the 
past 
all except learning and sig-
naling 
a1. operational  targets 
   (budgets) 
a1. clearly  present  a1. clearly  present  a1. limited    a1. present 
a2. monitoring  (operational 
reporting) 
a2. clearly  present  a2. present  a2. limited    a2. present 
a3.  variance analysis  a3.  mainly financial  a3.  every four years  a3.  mainly financial  a3.  mainly financial 
b.  to learn to change 
ways of doing 
b. clearly  present  b. limited  b. limited  performance-
related  
b. limited 
c. signaling 
 
c. clearly  present  c. limitedly  present  c. present  c. limited 
d. influencing  future 
budgets (budgeting) 
d. clearly  present  d. not  observed  d. limited  d. clearly  present 
e.  to report on past per-
formances (organiza-
tional reporting) 
e.  clearly present  e.  in general terms  e.  clearly present, mainly in 
general terms 
e.     clearly present 
        
Budget information  scope and quality above av-
erage 
scope and quality average  scope above average, quality 
average 
scope above average, quality 
average 
a. financial  and  non-
financial 
a. both  a. both  a. both  a. both 
b.  actual, budget, vari-
ance, en additional in-
formation 
b. emphasis on budget, actual 
and additional information 
b. emphasis on budget and 
actual information 
b. emphasis on budget and 
additional information 
b. emphasis on budget, actual, 
and additional information 
c.  quality of information  c. above average   c. average   c. average   c. average  
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